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This study challenges the dependency perspective claim 
that Spanish American countries developed agro/mineral export 
economies in the nineteenth century as a result of their 
integration into the capitalist international economy. It 
offers an alternative interpretation which argues that the 
process of State building and the response of the emergent 
Spanish American States to internal political class struggles 
were chiefly responsible for setting the direction of their 
economies as well as the degree and character of their inte­
gration into the international economy.
Rather than focusing on the effects of the international 
economy in. explaining the roots of dependency and underde­
velopment in Spanish America, this study examines the
historical development of inter and j.ntra class conflicts in 
the aftermath of the V?ars of Independence. Th.ese conflicts 
focwacd primarily on the role of the State in the political 
economies of the net countries because, the various dominant 
classes each relied upon disparate forms of production and 
surplus appropriation which sometimes required incomputable 
political requisites for their maintenance and reproduction.
The importance of the State as a major determinant in 
economic development is outlined in an examination of the 
colonial period while an analysis of Peruvian and Argentine 
development during the nineteenth century finds that the 
new State administrations in these countries were too weak 
to manage conflicts within the dominant classes until agro/ 
mineral export development provided them with the physical 
and institutional resources to do so. These States followed 
policies which encouraged the growth of agro/mineral export 
enterprises as a means of acquiring revenues to strengthen 
their bureaucratic apparatuses, create hegemonic ruling 
classes and eliminate or attenuate political conflicts be­
tween sectors of the dominant classes. The study concludes 
that while tha international economy made this solution to 
political conflict and State consolidation possible, the in­
ternal political and class forces at work were the determining 
elements of agro/mineral export development.
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PART I: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS: DEPENDENCYt
MODES OF PRODUCTION AND THE STATE
CHAPTER I
THE DEPENDENCY APPROACH AND SPANISH 
AMERICAN UNDERDEVELOPMENT
In the late 19th century, the nations of Spanish America 
emerged from a period of relative economic stagnation or de­
cline and almost constant civil war into a period of relative 
economic growth based on agro/mineral exports and relative 
political stability. Economically, this period was charac­
terized by the emergence of 'classical export economies' in 
which agro/mineral products were exchanged in international 
trade for manufactured goods, capital and infrastructure in­
vestment. Politically, this period was characterized by the 
emergence of the 'oligarchies', small groups of landowners, 
merchants, urban politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals 
who formed a solid basis for governing, whether in liberal 
democratic or authoritarian guise.
The confluence of these two developments have led recent 
interpretations of this period tc imply that (1) political 
stability in Spanish America in the late 19th century was a 
result of the prosperity created by agro/mineral expert
growth1? 12} since the industrial development of Britain {and 
to a lessor extent the U.S. and Germany} sparked the world 
market demand for Spanish American agro/mineral products, 
both the development of their export economies and their 
political stability can primarily be explained by external 
factors;2 and (3) since externally induced export growth in 
Spanish America led to underdevelopment, underdevelopment was 
caused by an international economic system controlled by 
Western Europe and the U.S.2
Such interpretations, in my estimation, are flawed be­
cause they ignore the role of class conflict and the state in 
the creation of the agro/mineral export economies and politi­
cal stability in Spanish America. This study will attempt to 
show, through an examination of these factors, that agro/ 
mineral export growth was directly linked to the search for 
political stability in 19th century Spanish American nations, 
and thus, that underdevelopment has its origins in factors in­
ternal to Spanish America.
Dependency Theory And 19th Century Spanish America
To ask the question of why the Spanish American nations 
became agro/mineral export economies in the late 19th century 
ie to ask the more important question of why they became 
underdeveloped. The term ’underdeveloped* is used here in a 
very specific se^se. It does not mean that thes* nations
2
loft undeveloped, obviously economic developments did occur 
throughout the 19th century (more land cultivated, people put 
to work, production extended, wealth created, etc.). Yet, 
with the close of the 19th century, Spanish America was well 
behind the Western European nations in economic development. 
This of. course could be explained by citing the head start 
Western Europe had over Spanish America but, what about the 
nations which exceeded Spanish American economic development 
without the benefit of a head start? The United States, for 
example, starting from a relatively similar position wound up 
by the end of the 19th century, on the road to advanced in- 
dustrial capitalism,^ while Japan, starting in the mid 19th 
century with a feudal system, was not very far behing.^
Obviously, development and underdevelopment are rela­
tive terms. Developed or underdeveloped (or for that matter 
undeveloped) in relation to what? West European, American 
and Japanese industrial capitalism are taken as the standard 
for development, not arbitrarily, but because they have pro­
duced great wealth and high standards of living. In effect, 
they not only provide subsistence but an enormous surplus 
that# however mal-distributed, provided their peoples with a 
relatively better life than non-industrial nations. Under­
development, on the other hand, is the lack of advanced in­
dustrial capitalism. Less wealth is created and thus, a
moire meager surplus available and a poorer life for the 
majority. At bottom then, while Western Europe, the U.S. 
and Japan were creating industrial capitalism (development) 
in the 19th century, the Spanish Americans wero creating 
non-industrial agro/mineral export economies (underdevelop­
ment) .
Of the various explanations for this development, the 
one that has received the most attention in recent years is 
'dependency theory’.® Although the creation of such neo- 
Marxists as Andre Gunder Frank7 and Fernando Henrique
QCardoso, dependency theory has been accepted by such non- 
Marxists a.3 Peter H. Fmith as an approach that has 
"...great potential as an explanatory tool..." which he 
hopes "...political history in the 1980's will pursue".9 
Dependency theory itself was conceived by its authors as a 
response, critique and alternative to the writings of such 
os Jacques Lambert, Gino Germini, Frank Jay Moreno and 
W.K. Rostow who argued that underdevelopment in Spanish 
America was the result of an 'original' undevelopment which 
could only be overcome through greater contact - trade and 
investment - with the more developed countries.^-0 These 
authors posited dual economies and societies in Spanish 
America wherein relatively developed modern capitalist 
sectors st-ood in opposition to undeveloped feudal or
4
'traditional* sectors. Development, they concluded would cone 
with the diffusion of modern economic, social and political 
values from the developed modern sector into the undeveloped 
sector. Close ties and economic, social and political inter­
course with the advanced industrial countries would facilitate 
this process in the same manner and to a greater degree.
Frank began his attack by rejecting these notions and 
arguing quite the opposite. What the 'dualist' theorists 
took to be the 'original' or 'traditional' characteristics 
of Spanish American economies and societies, he argued, were 
rather the results of economic contact between Spanish 
America and the advanced industrial nations. In effect, 
the same process which had developed the developed nations 
underdeveloped the nations of Spanish. America. In this 
formulation development and underdevelopment are opposite 
sides of the same coin of capitalist development.**
For Frank, Spanish America has been part of the world 
capitalist system since the 16th century and, its incorpora­
tion info that system has determined the structure of its 
economy, society and polity as much as it has determined 
those of the advanced industrial nations. This occurred 
Frank argues, by virtue of European capitalist expansion in 
the lGth century, spearheaded by Spanish capitalism, which 
subordinated the nuw Spanish American nations to the logic
5
of capitalist accumulation. By integrating Spanish America 
into the world capitalist system, Spanish America became 
'capitalist' itself, the defining characteristic of capi­
talism being production for the market. Through colonial 
domination, the Spanish American colonies were forced to 
become coinplementaries of the European economies, producing 
for the most part raw agricultural and mineral (gold and 
silver) products in exchange for manufactured goods from 
Spain, and later, with the industrial decline of Spain, 
England, France and the Netherlands through Spain. ^
Thus, according to Frank, the integration of Spanish 
America into the world capitalist system not only conditioned 
or affected its economic, social and political development, 
it determined itI The dynamic capitalist central or 'metro­
politan' nations, because their economies generated economic 
growth autonomously, determined their own economic, social 
and political direction. Spanish American nations, on the 
other hand, finding the impetus for their economic growth 
outside their borders, received an external determination of 
their economic, social and political structures. Thus- the 
rhythm of the international economy, directed by the needs 
of the advanced industrial nations, determined the stages of 
Spanish American underdevelopment. From the dependency 
perspective, therefore, Spanish American nations are
6
'dependent1 societies, the direction of their development
depending on the dynamic of change in the advanced capitalist
13nations. In Theoton5.o Dos Santos' words,
Dependence is a conditioning situation in which 
the economies of one group of countries are 
conditioned by the development and expansion of 
others. A relationship of interdependence 
between two or more economies or between such 
economies and the world trading system becomes 
a dependent relationship when some countries 
can expand through self impulsion while others, 
being in a dependent position, can only expand 
a3 a reflection of the dominent countries, which 
may have positive or negative effects on their 
immediate development.
If the result of dependency is the growth of agro/mineral
export economies which ultimately lead to poverty, economic
stagnation and social turmoil - the blame must be laid to
external domination by the world capitalist system.
There is of course some dispute within the dependency 
perspective as to the weight that should be ascribed to the 
international economy as opposed to internal factors such as 
class relations and politics in the creation of underdevelop­
ment. Frank's rather crude original formulation, which 
mechanistically attributed all change in the underdeveloped . 
nations to the changes in and demands of the 'metropolitan' 
nations4 has, to some degree, been softened by his later 
formulations. In these Frank gives some place to the struggle 
of classes within the underdeveloped countries but, then goes
7
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on to assert that these classes and the results of their 
struggles are, in the last instance, determined by their 
relationship with the metropolitan nations.^ It is diffi­
cult for dependency analysts to avoid this conclusion if the 
economy, society and polity of the dependent countries are 
structured by their relations with the international economy. 
Cardoso and Faletto, who amonyst the dependency writers give 
the most salience to the play of class forces in dependent 
countries, find themselves forced to the same conclusion as 
Frank. For Cardoso and Faletto, class relations within the 
Spanish American countries do determine the nature of the 
internal economy but only after they have received their 
determination from the international economy and, only within 
the context of dependent development. It is not, as with 
Frank, that local classes are puppets on the string of inter­
national capitalism and must dance to its tune, but rather 
that Spanish American integration into the international 
economy sets the limits within which local classes can act.
As Joseph Kahl says of their perspective,16
It tries to separate analytically the political 
from the economic forces, and suggests that 
although the maneuvering limits are set by the 
external world - by imperialism - the range of 
possible responses to a given situation 
depends upon internal political alliances and 
creativity,.. The key to an understanding of 
those realities is a focus on the internal 
response to external dependency.
8
While this is quite true once a country is in a situation of 
dependence, and follows closely the approach that will be 
untilized in this work, it does not explain why or how a 
country becomes dependent in the first place. Here, Cardoso 
and Faletto are one with Frank in arguing a variant of the
Leninist theory of imperialism in which Spanish American*
underdevelopment or dependency is a result of the expansion­
ist tendencies of capitalism (for Frank of course this 
expansionism began three centuries before Lenin's 'highest 
stage of capitalism).17 In this vein they argue that, 2.8
...the situation of underdevelopment is produced 
historically when the expansion of early commercial 
capitalism and later industrial capitalism ties the 
backward regions into the international market, and 
these regions become suppliers of essential raw 
materials for the advanced countries as well as 
purchasers of their industrial goods. Therefore, 
internal development in the countries of the 
periphery is shaped according to the needs of the 
metropolitan powers that dominate them.
However, in arguing that internal class relations and
political development have a 'relative autonomy' in their
response to situations of dependence, Cardoso and Faletto
do not abandon the Frankian linear determinism of the
international economy. Rather than this being expressed as
some kind of external force determining internal development,
for Cardoso and Faletto the external force of the international
economy expresses itself as an internal force. In their
words,19
The concept of dependence tries to give meaning 
to a series of events and situations that occur 
together, and to make empirical situations under­
standable in terms of the way internal and external 
structural components are linked. In this approach, 
the external is also expressed as a particular type 
of relationship between social groups and classes 
within the underdeveloped nations.
and,
Of course, imperialist penetration is a result of 
external forces (multinational enterprises, foreign 
technology, international finance systems, 
embassies, foreign states and armies, etc.). What 
we affirm simply means that the system of domination 
reappears as an 'internal* force, through the social 
practice of local groups and classes which try to 
enforce foreign interests, not precisely because 
they are foreign, but because they may coincide 
with values and interests that these groups pretend 
are their own. (my emphasis)
and, I might add, are structurally determined by external
link3.
The position of the dependency analysts' is undoubtedly 
correct in its description of the results of developing an 
exclusively agro/mineral export economy. Such economies are 
so sensitive to the vagaries of the international market that 
a drop in world prices for a particular commodity, a shift in 
demand to an alternative commodity or the substitute of a 
synthetic which could be manufactured in the developed econo­
mies themselves, can throw the whole economy of the agro/ 
mineral exporter into a tailspin. Conversely, a sudden and 
dramatic rise in demand for a particular commodity may produce
10
dramatic prosperity and growth masquerading as development.2- 
In either case as the dependency theorists argue, the economy 
of the agro/mineral exporters is determined by the demands 
and shifts in demand of the developed industrial nations.
Where dependency analysis fails though, is in explaining how 
this relationship of dependence is created in the first 
place. Obviously, for countries under the administration of 
a colonial power, this relationship may be created by force. 
But, what of those countries that are politically independent?
For the dependentistas, the 'effects' of the capitalist 
international economy system create dependent economies - 
particularly in independent countries. Thus, although Frank 
and Cardoso and Faletto do recognize the importance of the 
winning of political independence in the early 19th century 
in producing a potential break in dependency,22 they argue 
that a new period of dependence succeeded the old when inter­
national market forces weighted the internal balance of class 
forces in favor of those who would profit by the creation of 
agro/mineral export economies. ^  As Cardoso and Faletto 
explain, "The wars of independence had been waged to achieve 
a political order and a different "pact" with the new 
metropolis. The way in which the latter evolved economically 
would put its stamp on Latin America".24
The metaphysics of such an explanation are clearly
apparent* If the capitalist international economic system 
was responsible for the integration of Spanish American 
economies into that system as agro/mineral export economies 
then, why did it not integrate the United States, Germany, 
or even France, for example, in the same manner? If the 
answer cannot be found in trade or the international economy 
itself, wouldn't it more likely be found in the internal dif­
ferences of these countries upon which the international 
trade links had effects? This is impossible from the per­
spective of dependency analysts. For them, Spanish America, 
Western Europe, and the United States all had fundamentally 
the same type of economies - capitalist. Since all were 
capitalist, any explanation which is based on the basic 
internal differences between Spanish American economies, 
polities and societies and those of Western Europe and the 
United States, is absurd. In other words, 'capitalism* 
creates dynamic central economies in one part of the inter­
national economy and dependent underdevelopment in the 
other.
Conceiving of capitalism as a system which creates both 
development and underdevelopment eliminates capitalism as an 
explanation for either. Yet, isn't the question of develop­
ment in reality a question of the development of capitalism? 
The prodigious increase in material wealth and production in
12
the modern era is a result of the capitalist system of produc­
tion which requires continued progress and expansion for its 
very survival. The reproduction of the system as it isr is 
not enough, it must reproduce on an expanded level; more 
production, higher profit, greater efficiency, higher com- 
sumption, more technologically developed production 
tools, etc.25
The basic weakness of-the dependency approach is thus 
in arguing that the international trading system is capi­
talism. Capitalism, for them, is a market, a market in 
which trade is for profit and profit, that is capital, is 
acquired through trade.26 But is capitalism simply trade and 
can trade create development, much less underdevelopment?
The problem of the definition and origin of capitalism 
is not new. Marx pointedly criticized the classical 
economists for arguing for the primacy of market forces and 
relations in their definition of capitalism.27 in the 
1950's Paul Sweezy and Maurice Dobb debated ;just this issue 
on similar grounds. Sweezy argued that the expansion of trade 
in 16th century Western Europe gave capitalism there its 
impetus. Dobb, on the other hand, argued.that changes in the 
relations of production, that is, the change from feudal 
coercive labor systems to capitalist free wage labor, produced 
through class struggles, explains the origin and growth of
capitalism in Western Europe.28 Dobb here, X believe, more
closely follows Marx who, while taking note of the importance
of a rising world market for commodities in that era, defined
capitalism as a system of production. As Marx points out,2^
The first theoretical treatment of the modern mode 
of production - the mercantile system - proceeded 
necessarily from the superficial phenomena of 
the circulation process as individualised by the 
movements of merchant's capital, and therefore 
grasped only the appearance of matters. Partly 
because of the overwhelming influence which it 
exerted during the first revolutionising period 
of feudal production - the genesis of modern 
production. The real science of modern economy 
only begins when the theoretical analysis passes 
from the process of circulation to the process of 
production.
While it is true, as the dependency theorists point 
out, that capitalism has to do with producing for a market 
and making profit, concentrating on these factors leaves its 
material basis hidden. The relationship between wage labor 
and capital better defines capitalism because it is this re­
lationship that must be produced and reproduced for commodi­
ties and capitalist profit to be produced. A 'mode of 
production* therefore is not a system of trade, nor is it a 
market. It is a specific set of relations and forces of 
production, the former being the relation of the direct pro­
ducer or laborer to the means of production, or in other words 
property relations, end the latter being the means of produc­
tion themselves (end their level of organization and technical
1«
development).30 The uniqueness o£ the capitalist 'mode of 
production’ is in the tensions created within the system of 
production that produce the conditions for the production of 
greater and greater material wealth. Capitalist relations 
of production - wage labor and capital - compel capitalist 
units of production to constantly revolutionize the means of 
production and, under the threat of extinction, to accumulate 
or *die1.
In this view, perhaps the most important criticism of 
Frank's thesis comes from Ernesto Laclau. Laclau argued 
that Spanish America could not be defined as capitalist in 
the period under discussion. For Laclau, participation in 
international capitalist markets did not define Spanish 
America as 'capitalist*. That the products produced by 
slave, share-cropping, debt peonage or feudal labor were 
sold for a profit in a 'capitalist' world economy did not 
make these relations of production capitalist, as Frank 
asserted.32 They were, for Laclau, 'pre-capitalist' forms 
of relations of production which could hardly be expected 
to generate the dynamic possibilities of industrial capi­
talist production. The failure of Spanish America to 
develop was then a result cf the non-capitalist nature of 
its economies.Laclau*s criticism has been echoed by 
others. John Weeks has argued, "...that in many or even
15
roost cases where there is a net flow of surplus out of the 
backward countries into the advanced countries in commodity 
or money form ... this is a consequence of backwardness, not 
its cause."34 In other words, although Weeks acknowledges 
that the Spanish American countries have not done well in 
international exchanges, the reason is not that they have 
been exploited by the advanced countries or the fworld 
capitalist eccnomy1, but because of their backward relations 
of production. For Weeks, exploitation, that is, the 
extraction of surplus value, occurs in the process of 
production, not trade.**5
To argue this is not to dispute the dependency 
theorists* claim that an unequal economic relationship 
exists and has existed between the Spanish American econo­
mies and the advanced industrial economies, but to dispute 
its basis. Geoffrey Kay has convincingly shown that the 
nature of trade and investment in Spanish America, particu­
larly during the 19th century under the aegis of merchant's 
capital could not create capitalist relations of production. 
Kay, following Marx, 36 argues that trading or merchant's 
capital, though it has effects on pre-capitalist economies, 
does not transform their production relations. It may destroy 
certain branches of production, e.g. British destruction of 
Indian textiles through the dumping of cheap Briti£i textiles.
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or help conserve or expand others, e.g. European demand for
beef in the 19th century aiding in the extension of cattle
raising in Argentina and Uruguay, but it does not replace
them with capitalist relations of production. As Kay notes,37
...historically, merchant's capital has never been able 
to effect this transition to capitalism proper itself.
Its dependence on the non-capitalist class that is 
directly responsible for their merchant capitalists 
exploitation of labor leads it to support this class 
at the very moment it is undermining it. Its 
revolutionary edge is always blunted by this conserva­
tive bias. This is fully apparent in the effect it has 
on production ... merchant capital is trading capital 
and the surplus it seizes is used to expand trade not 
the forces of production.
Where merchants and merchant's capital hold sway, Marx
argues,^8
This system presents everywhere an obstacle to the 
real capitalist mode of production and goes under 
with its development, without revolutionising the 
mode of production, it only worsens the conditions 
of the direct producers, turns them into mere wage 
workers and proletarians under conditions worse than 
those under the immediate control of capital, and 
appropriates their surplus-labor on the basis of the 
old mode of production. (my emphasis)
and, if trade and money were all that were necessary,39
...ancient Rome, Byzantium etc. would have ended up 
their history with free labor and capital, or rather 
begun a new history. There, too, the dissolution of 
the old property relations was bound up with the 
development of monetary wealth - of trade etc. But 
instead of leading to industry, this dissolution led 
in fact to the supremacy of the countryside over the 
city.
As Colin Leys points out, dependency theory is flawed
17
by its genesis as a critique of western development theory.
In arguing the opposite of western development theory - that 
close contact with the developed nations did not create 
development but underdevelopment - the dependentistas accept 
the main explanatory variable of their opponents - interna­
tional trade.40 There is no doubt, of course, that inter­
national trade may have important effects on the internal 
economic development of a country. But, as we have seen, it 
cannot determine major changes e.g. a transition from pre­
capitalist relations of production to capitalist relations 
of production.4^ The question of underdevelopment in 
Spanish America then is a question of what forces, other than 
the external, were responsible for the perpetuation of non­
capitalist economic relations.
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American nations was their de-capitalization through depen­
dence. In other words, the surplus produced by Spanish America 
has been drained out of it and to the metropolitan countries 
and thus, there has been little capital available there for 
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here as it raises questions not considered relevant and because 
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though, that in Imperialism, Lenin abandoned Marx and Engels' 
position that capitalism was a progressive developmental 
force (Warren, 11-83). Although Lenin could write of the 
effects of Imperialism in the non-capitalist countries that, 
"The Export of capital greatly affects and accelerates the 
development of capitalism in those countries to which it is 
exported" (Lenin, 65), the overall effect was that, "Capi­
talism has grown into a world system of colonial oppression 
and of the financial strangulation of the overwhelming 
majority of the people of the world by a handful of 
'advanced' countries" (Lenin, 10). Lenin was, of course, 
less concerned with capitalism in the less developed coun­
tries than in the 'advanced* countries and believed that it 
had become 'decayed' and 'moribund' there precisely because 
it could exploit the less developed countries (Lenin, 99-108). 
This characterization of capitalist imperialism has been, in 
Warren's opinion, the foundation for all subsequent Marxist 
theories of 'underdevelopment' and 'dependency' (Warren, 
110-185), For Warren, neither Lenin's formulation concerning 
capitalism's decay in the advanced countries, nor the debili­
tating effects of imperialism on the less developed countries 
implied by his theory have been borne out (WTarren, 70-81 & 
187-255). Although the latter case may be debated, the 
former is indisputably correct:, capitalism in the advanced 
countries has hardly 'decayed* since Lenin's formulation.
This fact has necessitated a reformulation of Lenin's 
characterization of capitalism by both Frank and Cardoso.
For Franx, it necessitated postulating two capitalisms - a 
progressive one in the advanced countries and a regressive 
one in the underdeveloped countires. Cardoso, however, breaks 
with both Lenin and Frank here by arguing a progressive
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tries but, only after Lenin's Imperialist Stage. For Cardoso 
a new stage has arrived in which, "...dependency, monopoly 
capitalism and development are not contradictory terms: there 
occurs a kind of dependent capitalist development in sectors 
of the Third World integrated into the new forms of 
monopolistic expansion" (Cardoso, 11).
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Nothing is more common than the notion that history up till 
now has only been a question of taking. The barbarians take 
the Roman Empire, and this fact of taking is made to explain 
the transition from the old world to the feudal system. In 
this taking by the barbarians, however, the question is, 
whether the nation that is conquered has evolved industrial 
productive forces, as is the case with modern peoples or 
whether their productive forces are based for the most part 
merely on their association and on the community. Taking is 
further determined by the object taken. A banker's fortune 
consisting of paper, cannot be taken at all, without the 
taker's submitting to the conditions of production and inter­
course of the country taken. Similarly the total industrial 
capital of a modern industrial country. And finally.
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everywhere there is very soon an end to taking, and when there 
is nothing more to take, you have to set about producing.
From this necessity of producing, which very soon asserts 
itself, it follows that the form of community adopted by the 
settling conquerors must correspond to the stage of de­
velopment of the productive forces they find in existence; 
or, if this is not the case from the start, it must change 
according to the productive forces. Karl Marx, "The German 
Ideology" Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works 
3 Vols. (Moscow: Progress Pub., 1969), 1:72.
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CHAPTER II
THE STATE, CLASS CONFLICT 
AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT
In developing an alternative approach to the 'develop­
ment of underdevelopment' in X9th century Spanish America I 
will examine four factors; (1) Economic class conflict;
(2) Political conflict and the State; (3) The State and 
economic development; and (4) The world economy and economic 
development.
Economic Class Conflict 
The Marxist theory of class conflict offers an ex­
planation of major historical change based upon the antago­
nisms between and within classes within a socio-economic 
formation, that is, an explanation internal to the society. 
For Marx, classes are principally derived from the position 
of individuals in the process of production. In other words, 
"The economic place of the social agents has a principle role 
in detex*rr,3‘ning social classes".1 Relations between classes 
are inherently ccnflictual because of their exploitative
25
character as the class of owners of the means of production 
extract, in various ways (economic, political, etc., according 
to the particular mode of production), the economic surplus 
produced by the direct producers. Relations within classes 
may also be conflictual as, for example, capitalists compete 
with one another for markets, labor and financial resources,2 
or feudal Lords compete with one another for land and serfs,3 
or proletarians compete with one another in the labor market.^ 
For Marx, these structural antagonisms, internal to any 
society divided by classes, create the tensions in the 
economic, and ultimately political level of society that 
create change or stability.
To understand either change or stability of a given mode
of production, one must analyze these conflicts in their
historical setting. Robert Brenner, for example, follows
Marx in explaining the decline of feudalism and the rise of
capitalism in Western Europe by focusing on the changes in
the relations of production as a result of class conflict
between lord and serf. For Brenner,5
.., the origins of capitalist economic development as 
it first occurred in England, are to be found in the 
specific historical process by which, on the one hand, 
serfdom was dissolved (thus precluding forceful 
squeezing as the normal form of surplus extraction) 
and, on the other hand, peasant property was short 
circuited or undermined (thus opening the way for 
the accumulation of land, labor and means of pro­
duction.
These two conditions were met, on the one hand, by peasant 
resistance to increased surplus extraction by the lord based 
on the direct appropriation of the peasants surplus, and on 
the other hand, the success of the lords and/or rising 
capitalist farmers in defeating the peasant's attempt to 
appropriate the means of production (land) for themselves.
The result was, on the one side, the free laborer, and on 
the other, the capitalist farmer who, by innovation in pro­
duction could dramatically increase his surplus through the 
use of free wage labor.^ Elsewhere, the results of similar 
class conflicts may be different. In France, for example, 
the peasantry won control of the land, impeding the develop­
ment of a developed capitalist agriculture as in England.^
Economic class conflicts in 19th century Spanish 
America have largely been ignored by observers of that period 
because they rarely broke out into open, and thus observable, 
violence. These conflicts though, can be inferred from the 
structural position of individuals in the production
oprocess.
The overall structure of early 19th century Spanish 
American economies was largely pre-given by the needs of the 
Imperial Spanish State. In the antecedent colonial period, 
the economy was geared to provide the Spanish State with 
revenue from the silver mines (the royal fifth) to enable it
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to continue its territorial wars in Europe. Economic 
activities other than mining were largely ancillaries to the 
mines - trading, agriculture, stock raising, artisanal 
crafts - or, necessary for the support of outlying defense 
posts, as in the River Plate area. The distribution of land, 
labor and trading rights was firmly set in the hands of the 
imperial colonial bureaucracy which tended to regulate these 
in the interest of the crown.® Although in competition for 
these resources Creoles were potentially in conflict with 
one another, their efforts were directed more towards the 
Spanish colonial bureaucracy which could affect a change in 
their distribution. Given that these economic distributions 
were made by the political authorities, Creoles, Spaniards 
and Indians were more than willing to bribe, patronize, or 
in any other way influence bureaucratic officials to make 
distributions in their favor. Corruption thus became 
institutionalized within colonial society, from the local 
corregidor to the viceroy, both as a means of affecting the 
distribution of scarce economic factors and as a way for local 
crown representatives to augment their meager remuneration.
Relations between Creoles and their laborers (Indians, 
mestizos and slaves) were generally exploitative but also 
severely circumscribed by the policies of the Crown. Royal 
bureaucrats regulated the supply and the uses of much of the
available labor. Spanish State policy restricting the uses 
and the supply of labor to the Creoles was directly related 
to the Crown's interest in conserving labor for and directing 
labor to the mines and needed support activities. Creoles 
were further restricted in merchant activities by State 
policies. The lucrative trade between the colonies and 
Spain was made the official preserve of Peninsular Spaniards, 
leaving Creoles only the intra-colonial and contraband 
trades, both largely illegal,
A change in dynasty, from Hapsburg to Bourbon in 1700, 
brought gradual change in Spanish State policy towards the 
colonies in the latter half of the 18th century. The new 
policies, while promoting a more general economic growth 
throughout the colonies, increased tensions and conflict 
between Creoles and the bureaucracy, Creoles and Creoles, 
and Creoles and their laborers. The Bourbons, attempting 
to re-invigorate the depressed Spanish economy along the 
lines of France, sought to re-integrate the Spanish American 
colonies into Spain's economy as mercantilist colonies.
The policy of 'freer1 trade attempted to produce a colonial 
trade advantageous to the development of industry in Spain. 
Rather than remaining content to receive declining revenues 
from the depleted silver mines, the Bourbon administration 
sought to increase crown revenues by taxing agricultural
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production and trade for export.3-2 Some hard pressed Creoles 
increased their exactions from their laborers, legally or 
illegally3-2 contributing fuel to rural and urban revolts 
from below, the two most celebrated being the rural revolt 
in Peru under Tupac Amaru II in lVSO3-̂ , and the urban revolt 
of the Communeros in Colombia in 1781.25 Others, particu­
larly those involved in trade, profited through the reduction 
of impediments to their participation in trade with Spain 
while Spanish merchants and bureaucrats suffered the loss of 
their monopoly.^
The Wars of Independence removed the mediation of the 
Spanish State in the conflicts between Creoles and 
Peninsulares, Creoles and Creoles, and Creoles and their 
laborers. These groups now stood in direct confrontation 
to each other as each sought its own advantage. Many 
Peninsular Spaniards gathered up what wealth they could and 
left for Spain creating a severe capital shortage and disor­
ganization of credit in the new nations. Creoles, standing 
now in direct competition with one another over the distribu­
tion of land, labor and trade began creating petty alliances, 
generally based on kin relations, which later formed the basis 
for caudillism.17 Conflicts arose over the control of avail­
able labor as the methods of control and renumeration 
(relations of production) differed amongst agricultural
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landowners, stock raising landowners, miners and urban 
e m p l o y e r s . 18 where those who relied on coercive methods of 
labor recruitment prevailed, those who depended on the sale 
of labor power in a free market suffered*
The Wars of Independence severely damaged the caste 
system which prevented the social rise of the mestizos during 
the colonial era. The wars had armed the mestizos and 
released them from their base subservience to the creoles.
They entered the scramble for control over land and labor 
either under their military mestizo leader or in the retinue 
of competing creole landowners. Though the mestizos pro­
vided the manpower for intra-Creole warfare, they also 
represented a potential threat from below. Thus, creole 
landowners sometimes allied with and sometimes opposed this 
force.
The Wars of Independence seriously disrupted landowner 
control over the Indian masses who constituted the main 
laboring force in Spanish America. Much of the administration 
and distribution of labor had been performed by the Spanish 
colonial bureaucracy which had now either disappeared or was 
in disarray. The wars and the breakdown of the labor control 
administration dispersed much of the labor force from the 
mining and agricultural regions. The disruption of trade 
and transport, and the difficulty of acquiring funds and
tools led many agricultural regions to fall back into sub­
sistence production which tended to the advantage of the 
Indian laborers.2® During the colonial era, the Spanish 
colonial administration protected creole landowners from the 
rise of a competing Indian landowning elite by redistributing 
Indian lands amongst displaced Indians. This policy also 
assisted the crown in that the creation of new Indian villages 
increased the tribute rolls and thus, crown revenue. With the 
abandonment of this policy by liberal governments in the 19th 
century, hacendados tried to grab as much land as they could 
to prevent the rise of such an Indian elite that might.com­
pete with them.21 it is also in this period that the local 
Indian elite, the caciques, who recruited Indian labor for 
the haciendas disappeared. The encroachment of Indian sub­
sistence agriculture on hacienda lands put the Indians in 
possession of much of the land and, the history of the 
hacienda, from this period until the early 20th century, is 
a history of the hacendado's struggle to reappropriate this 
land and the Indian's resistance.22 The intense competition 
between landlords for this labor and the availability of 
alternative labor systems for the laborers (wage labor, 
sharecropping, urban employment) put the landlords in a 
precarious position.
Thus, in the aftermath of the Wars of Independence,
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serious economic conflicts existed between sectors of the 
dominant owning classes and between the dominant owning 
classes and their subordinate laboring classes. Though 
these conflicts formed the material basis for Spanish 
America's turn towards agro/mineral export economic growth, 
and will be analyzed in their national settings later in 
this study, they themselves do not explain that development.
Political Conflict And The State
Focusing on economic class conflict as an explanation 
for the 'development of underdevelopment' is clearly inade­
quate in itself. To attempt to explain so complex a 
phenomenon in this way would simply substitute one form of 
economic determinism - that of the social relations of 
production, for the economic determinism of the dependency 
model - the capitalist world market. Economic conflicts 
between and within classes are but one factor, albeit an 
important one, in analyzing the development of any society. 
They are not immediately translated in their economic form 
to other important arenas of conflict and struggle.
In most cases, although classes may be defined at the 
economic level - social relations of production - the main 
arena of inter- and intra-class conflict will be the State. 
Political conflicts in general arc directed at the State
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Political conflicts in general are directed at the State 
because of the central position of the political system not 
only in legitimating, but in maintaining or transforming 
social, economic and political relationships between classes, 
regions and cultures within a nation.23 Through law and 
coercion, the political system performs a 'regulatory1 role 
which can either preserve economic, social and political 
relations as they are or substantially transform them.24 For 
Marx, this is why State power is the object of all revolu­
tions .
The most common error in attempting to relate politi­
cal conflicts to economic class conflicts is the dissolving 
of the former into the lattei*. Marxist studies have 
notoriously reduced the State and politics to mere 
epiphenomena of the economy. For some Marxists, the state 
and political conflicts are simply a reflection of the 
economy. Thus, in explaining a political conflict or issue, 
one is required to always refer directly back to the economic 
conflict or issue 'behind it.'25 Structuralist political 
scientists tend to dissolve the State and politics in a 
similar manner, though in their case, into the whole of 
society's conflicts. As Roy Macridis and Bernard Brown 
critically observe,2^
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... the government is at best a filter mechanism 
through which interests themselves and at its 
worst a simple transmission mechanism. The role 
of the State is reduced to the narrow confines of 
an organization that channels, reflects and ex­
presses commands and instructions that come from 
'elsewhere'.
Both therefore reject the specificity of the State and 
politics. The State and politics remain superfluous to what 
are essentially economic or societal conflicts.
To reduce the State and politics to economics or 
sociology is to entirely miss the point that, while social 
and technical economic relations condition and set limits to 
political conflicts, the one does not exactly correspond to 
the other. This is because the role of the State in repro­
ducing or transforming economic and social relations is 
specifically political.27 Once economic antagonisms, both 
between and within classes, are translated into the political 
level of the State they become 'political' issues and are 
expressed and defined by the individuals involved as politi­
cal issues. Although the basis for these issues, and the 
parameters within which they will be fought out, are ulti­
mately set by the economic level - social relations of 
production - they in themselves have a 'relative autonomy' 
and may develop on an other than economic basis. As Stuart 
Hall suggests,2®
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The level of the political class struggle, then, has 
its own efficacy, its own forms, its specific condi­
tions of existence, its own momentum, tempo and 
direction, its own contradictions internal to it, its 
'peculiar' outcomes and results.
To a greater or lesser extent, the State provides the 
political requisites or preconditions for the reproduction 
or transformation of economic relations. For example, under 
feudalism the political Estates system provided the basis 
for the reproduction of the lord-serf relationship, aud 
under capitalism, the legal-political definition, and the 
State's protection of private property rights and the wage 
labor contract, provide the requisites for the capital-wage 
labor relationship. Thus, the struggle against feudalism 
and capitalism are always essentially political struggles, 
the one against the Estates system, the other against abso­
lute private property rights. It is not difficult to see 
then, how John Locke could have seen absolute private 
property rights, the basis of bourgeois economic power, as 
the basis of liberty, that is, freedom from the domination 
of the nobility whose basis of economic power was the Estates 
system.
Political struggles then seek to affect the State's 
role in reproducing or transforming social, economic and 
political relations. They seek to affect the very organiza­
tion of the State, its constitution, and the balance of
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forces which form its supports. They seek to affect the very 
relationship of the State to society in general in contending 
over the very definition of the public and private spheres. 
How these are defined, as a result of political conflict, 
will determine whether the State reproduces or transforms 
the economic and social relations that are presupposed by 
politico-legal relations.
Although the dependentistas may view the history of 
19th century Spanish America as its integration into the 
international economy, for the Spanish Americans it was the 
intense political conflict of that century. In Spanish 
America during the colonial era economic and political power 
were fused, not in a decentralized nobility as with feudalism, 
but in the royal bureaucratic apparatus. Royal officials 
controlled the distribution of land and labor, while legal 
corporate entities controlled trade. The Bourbon reforms 
of the late 18th century were, in large parr, an attempt to 
change this system, disassociating direct political control 
from the economic sphere.29 The political conflicts within 
the new Spanish American nations in the 19th century were, 
to a great degree, over the continuation of this movement. 
Whether one's position in society was to be defined politi­
cally, as in a caste or Estates system, or economically, as 
in a class system, was a major facet of these conflicts.
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There were miners, merchants, landowners, bureaucrats 
(particularly lawyers), artisans, and clerics whose position 
in society required a political definition of their place. 
Other merchants, miners, landowners, bureaucrats, artisans 
and clerics, those whose political status prevented them 
from rising in the social structure, found that a change to 
a class definition could greatly improve their position.^® 
This change had economic effects but, was, in the 
last instance, the result of political change and was fought 
out primarily in a political context. The object of the 
conflict was the State and its role. I will here briefly 
outline the four major political conflicts in 19th century 
Spanish America that will be examined later in their national 
context; (A) the conflict between liberals and conserva­
tives; (B) the conflict between Church and State; (C) the 
conflict of regionalism (or federalism vs. centralism); 
and (D) the issue of caudillismo.
(A) Liberals vs. Conservatives: The major conflict in 19th
century Spanish America is generally regarded as the struggle 
between liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s . 33- This conflict is seen 
as either the result of the clash between the ideas of the 
Enlightenment and Spanish Scholasticism3? or, as in most re­
cent accounts, over strictly economic issues. In the latter 
view, conservatives represented the old colonial landowners
3 8
who struggled against the commercialization and open politics 
of liberal merchants, intellectuals and bureaucrats.33 This 
view has rightly been challenged, as no clear polarization 
of political forces based on occupation can be established.3* 
Conservatives included within their ranks not only landowners 
but merchants, intellectuals and bureaucrats. Liberal ranks 
similarly included individuals representing all groups. As 
Frank Safford states, "Their differences [the conservatives] 
with liberals tended to be not over the desirability of capi­
talism but over the role that the State and Church might 
play... "35
It would, perhaps, be better to approach the conflicts 
between liberals and conservatives from their respective 
positions on the role of the State in regulating class con­
flict and the maintenance of the position of the elite 
vis-3k-vis the lower classes and thus, as a continuation of the 
conflicts over the Bourbon reforms.36 From this view, con­
servatives generally favored the direct intervention of the 
State in inter-class relations. They preferred State regu­
lation of the relations between classes through the legal 
and police systems. Liberals, on theother hand, generally 
favored the indirect intervention of the State, preferring 
to have the State legalize their own regulation.of the rela­
tions between themselves and their working classes, with the
37State acting in a 'nightwatchman' capacity.
Though these positions were generally held, their
complexity in actual political practice cannot be minimized.
In Colombia, for example, artisans, organized in closed
corporate guilds, were courted by, and provided a good deal
of support for, the liberals between 1851 and 1854. The
liberal strategy in courting a 'feudal caste* was actually
not in contradiction to its opposition to a monopolistic-
corporatist society, but rather an attempt to countervail the
strength of rural conservatives who could muster a superior
numerical force in their dependent peasants. Thus, as
Urrutia argues,38
In theory, the Liberals were being inconsistent when 
they defended the colonial form of economic organi­
zation in Cauca, but in practice they were consistent 
since they only wanted to destroy the colonial 
institutions that created a barrier to bourgeois 
accumulation of wealth.
But, when the democratization fostered by the liberal regime 
became obviously threatening to all the owning classes, a 
large faction of the Liberals split from the Liberal govern­
ment and crossed over to the Conservatives. This alliance 
of a fraction of the Liberals, known as golgotas, and Con­
servatives made use of the Liberal enacted universal suffrage 
to mobilize the peasantry in a conservative reaction. This 
alliance gained State power and crushed the democratic
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artisan movement and its Liberal supporters.39
(B) Church vs. state: The issue of secularization formed a 
three way political conflict. The Church itself had acted as 
a political arm of the absolutist monarch in the colonial 
era. Creoles were kept in line by the Church administered 
Inquisition^0 and the Church's restrictions on their use of 
servile labor. With the coming of Independence, the Church 
was freed from the patronato of the Spanish crown (the Pope 
had ceded control over the Spanish colonial Church in the 
16th century) and became the object of intense political 
struggle. In the main, the struggle revolved around whether 
or not the Church would function in its traditional political 
role.
Conservatives generally favored the re-integration of 
the Church into the State apparatus as a social control 
mechanism and ideological prop, thus they favored retention 
of Church control over education and the exclusivity of the 
Roman Catholic Church in the nation. Liberals generally 
called for the reduction of the Church to political impo­
tence, favoring secular mechanisms of social control and 
ideology which they could control directly or through the 
State. These positions were not, of course, hard and fast, 
many times conservatives would favor an independent Church 
to protect it from the liberals when they were in power.
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Within the Church itself, there were those who wished to 
continue the colonial Church-State relationship, albeit 
with the Church having greater control over its own internal 
organization, and those who felt that internal autonomy 
could only be achieved through some kind of Church-State 
separation.4^
The attacks against the Church usually took the form of 
the appropriation of Church lands, the abolition of its cor­
porate privileges and role in the control over and protection 
of the Indian. Although these attacks have been interpreted 
as having been motivated by economic gain4 ,̂ their essential 
aim was political. As J. Lloyd Mecham argues,'*3
The basis of this early opposition to the Roman Catholic 
organization - not the Roman Catholic religion - was 
largely political. The abolition of tithes, suppres­
sion of religious orders, confiscation of ecclesiastical 
property, and like measures, were as a rule, acts of 
vengence wreaked upon the clergy their political 
opponents
and, "... if they regarded clerical wealth as an evil, it 
was because this wealth made the Church powerful 
politically".44 The weakening of the Church's political 
power, thus, had the aim of weakening a major prop of the 
conservative vision of society.45
(C) Centralism vs. Federalism; The conflict between cen­
tralists and federalists causes great consternation for those 
who opt for an economic or ideological analysis. Though
42
liberals generally favored political de-centralization and 
conservatives favored political centralization, these were 
political rather than economic or ideological positions.
The shift of some liberals to centralism and some conserva­
tives to federalism (most notably in Argentina and Colombia) ̂ 6 
should be related to their political aims rather than their 
economic opportunism or ideological confusion.
The initial attack of. the liberals against centralism 
derived from their desire to reduce the reach of the State 
in terms of its regulation of social and economic life*
Their triumph, usually short lived, created the basis for 
conservative resistence in the form of semi-sovereign 
regional or department governments which, with conservatives 
in control of many of them, acted as centralized states 
within their own borders* Liberals switched over to cen­
tralism in order to reverse this trend. The reduction of 
direct State intervention through the setting up of Federal 
type administrations did not, therefore, guarantee that the 
role of the centralized State would not reappear in regional 
governments.4 7
(D) The Rise of the Caudil.lo; The emergence of the caudillo, 
a local political boss at the head of an armed retinue of men, 
in 19th century Spanish America was the result of three sepa­
rate but related political problems. 1) The arming of
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mestizos during the Wars for Independence created a general 
breakdown of the caste system which had been slowly dying out 
in the crisis ridden late colonial era.^® A few mestizos 
actually rose to great social and political heights as a re­
sult of their participation in the armies of independence.
The problem of de-mobilizing this mass of armed and war ex­
perienced men in an era of contracting economic resources (a 
difficulty in paying for war service and re-integrating them 
into the productive system) plagued those areas which had 
provided the bulk of armed forces for the wars (Argentina, 
Gran Colombia, and later Peru)
2) Local conflicts between landowners, merchants and mine 
owners gave the caudillo led bands of armed men lucrative 
employment and a means of rising in the social system 
through the confiscation of opposition held lands.50
3) The lack of owning class political hegemony allowed the 
caudillo to use his control over the masses as a fulcrum in 
inserting himself into elite conflicts. Caudillos served 
in the employ of liberals and conservatives, frequently 
gaining control over the State apparatus, plundering the 
treasuries, confiscating the property of some rich creoles, 
but rarely solving the political crisis. Caudillism of this 
type receded and became the subject of derision once owning 
clasn hegemony was created in the. late 19th century.
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The State and Economic Development
It is clear from the preceeding discussion that the 
major conflicts in Spanish America in the 19th century were 
essentially political and focused on the problem of State 
building. Yet, even though political conflicts are directed 
at the State, the State is rarely the tool of any class or 
class fraction. The State has a 'relative autonomy' from 
warring classes and derives from this fact an independent 
economic role and economic effect.51
As Marx and Engels recognized, the State arises with 
the development of class society.51 The irreconcilable 
conflict between producer and non-producer requires an agency 
which is above the struggle and can manage it in the interest 
of the ruling sector of that society. The State, thus, is 
always a class State which, while tending to the interest of 
the dominant class, is not always slavish in its service.53 
The State receives its role from its structural position in 
society rather than from the social class position of those 
who occupy its institutions.54 Though a pre-given set of 
conflictual relationships must be managed, and civil order 
or peace maintained,55 how those who occupy the institutions 
of the State will achieve this depends on the given histori­
cal setting.56
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In assuming the role of wielding public power in a
class divided society, the State normally achieves a
'relative autonomy* not only from the dominated classes but
from the dominant classes as well.57 This autonomy may
approach absolute autonomy as with the Absolutist State in
Western Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries, the State
under the two Bonapartes in France and the Bismarkian State 
58in Germany. Relative state autonomy occurs in both normal 
and exceptional or crisis periods. For Marx, greater state 
autonomy occurred when the formation of a dominant ruling 
class was impossible or impeded by the disunity and conflict 
within the dominant class. Concretely, this occurred when, 
(1) classes representing more than one mode of production5® 
created a rough oppositional balance in a society. The 
failure of any class to impose its vision of society on the 
State leads to the greater independence of the State 
vis-li-vis these classes. Thus, both Marx and Engels 
described Absolutism in the West as the result of a balance 
between the feudal Aristocracy and the rising bourgeoisie.5® 
Though the Absolutist State was the class State of the 
Aristocracy, it could not and did not base its power on the 
Aristocracy.5  ̂ And (2) a situation where a heterogeneous 
ruling class cannot raise itself to the level of hegemonic 
political power. Here the hegemonic crisis results from
the structurally determined conflicts between members of the 
same class. For example, Marx believed that the bourgeoisie 
was itself so rift by internal conflicts (this because of the 
greater economic differentiation produced by capitalism - 
mercantile capital, manufacturing capital, finance capital, 
etc.) that it was impossible for it to rule without the State 
organizing its hegemony.®^ Thus, he could explain the State 
of Louis Bonaparte as the result of the inability of any 
sector of the French bourgeoisie to provide hegemonic leader­
ship for their class rule. Louis Bonaparte could step in as 
the representative of the peasantry, which was not a party 
to the conflict, circumvent the conflict ridden bourgeoisie, 
and impose political stability which was ultimately in the 
interest of the b o u r g e o i s i e . Thus, while the State may be 
'for' the ruling clas3, it may not be 'of' the ruling class.
Thus, in performing its major tasks - creating inter­
nal order and competing with other States internationally, 
the State maintains a 'relative autonomy1 from dominated 
and dominant classes. As Theda Skocpol argues, "Indeed, 
attempts of State rulers merely to perform the state's 'own* 
functions may create conflicts of interest with the dominant 
class".64 Further, it is in performing these State functions 
which, while they are not directly economic, that the basis 
for the State's crucial economic role is laid.
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The State’s economic role i3 an effect of, and secon­
dary to, its purely political role. This can best be illus­
trated by the role of the Absolutist State in the development 
of capitalism in Western Europe. While in some cases its 
policies stimulated trade, manufacturing and the acquisition 
of colonies, its objective was primarily the enhancement of 
State power vis-a-vis the internal classes and other, com­
peting States.65 In the era of the rise of the Absolutist 
States, the conflicts at the dynastic level were, for the 
most part, still feudal, given the level of the development 
of economic technology and organization. In effect, the 
conflicts were territorial, attempts to increase the amount 
of land and the number of people under one's jurisdiction in 
a world where these resources were seen as finite. Intra­
class conflicts over the control of land and people within 
the aristocracy in many cases led to inter-class warfare 
between the aristocracy and the peasantry who rose in re­
bellion against the rising exactions of the nobility caused 
by the increasing costs of war.**6 This general turmoil had 
the effect of freeing the monarchies from their subser­
vience to the nobility. The monarchies used this 'relative 
autonomy* to build strong Absolutist States which managed 
these conflicts in the interest of the nobility, raising them 
(the intra-claas conflicts) from regional to international
conflicts, and clamping down hard on the peasantry. While 
the State was managed in the interest of the nobility, its 
policies in doing so were often a boon to the class of town 
burghers.
Where territorial conquest failed as a policy for
increasing toe internal and external power of the Absolutist
State, Absolutist monarchies attempted to appropriate the
•finite* resources of their enemies through trade and
manufacture.6  ̂ Thus, though the aim of the Absolutist
monarchies was political - to reduce intra- and inter-class
conflict under the aegis of a strong central State - the
effects of this policy, in some cases, was to move their
6 8economies along the road to capitalist development. That 
the same political goal could have just the opposite eco­
nomic effect is apparent in the case of Spain. Successful 
in its territorial conquests which were fueled by the great 
3pecie wealth of its American colonies, the Absolutist State 
there had no need to stimulate home production and trade. 
Spain's bourgeoisie and economy withered away under the 
Hapsburgs while the class position of the. aristocracy remained 
secure.69
State policies encouraging trade and, more importantly, 
manufacturing in the interest of State power, some analysts 
argue, has not been atypical in the development of capitalism
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worldwide. The bourgeoisie itself, it seems, has not created 
capitalist economies without State aid or interest. John 
Merrington for example notes the reluctance of the commercial 
bourgeoisie in 17th century Europe to invest in industry, 
opting rather for 'usurious forms of rent and tax farming* 
which simply reinforced feudal forms of production, albeit 
on a commercial basis.70 Frances Moulder agrees and adds 
that,71
... the commercial bourgeoisie has repeatedly shown 
itself reluctant to invest in modern industry without 
government prodding and encouragment. In Japan after* 
the Restoration, there was little interest by 
bourgeois investors in investing in large scale 
modern industry. Industrial investment was forthcoming 
only after vigorous state effort to prove its potential 
profitability and to eliminate risk, it appears that 
Japan's bourgeoisie would have remained commercially 
oriented in the absence of government interest and 
would have doomed the nation to industrial backwardness.
while Stuart Bruchey claims that in the case of the United
States,^2
... if growth depended on industrialization, the latter 
depended on the national market, and a national market 
upon large capital sums for improved transportation.
If these are valid assessments, I cannot see how a 
place of central importance in American economic growth 
can be denied the role of government, because of its 
contribution to the formation of a national market ... 
This is one reason I have emphasized the 'American 
Revolution* which permitted the development of an 
independent state that could further national capi­
talist development.
A similar dynamic of class conflict and 'relative State 
autonomy1,1 will argue, created the export economies of late
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19th century Spanish America. How this occurred in specific 
Spanish American countries will be the subject of a later 
section, but the general outlines of the analysis can be 
pointed out here.
The failure to resolve the basic political disputes, 
mentioned earlier, in Spanish America in the aftermath of 
the wars of independence, was the failure of the political 
process and the State to fashion out of the various political 
positions held by sectors of the owning classes, a common 
principle on which the State could be based. The initial 
base of most of the new Spanish American States was external, 
as recognition of the State by other States in the inter­
national community generally "preceded the institutionaliza­
tion of a State power acknowledged within the national 
territory itself".73 Two notable exceptions, of course, were 
Chile and Paraguay. In Chile, Portales created a unity in 
the owning classes in the late 1820's that was to provide 
Chile with early political and social stability.74 While in 
Paraguay, the absence of a strong landowning and/or merchant 
class gave Dr. Francia free reign to create a stable, though 
isolated, autarkic r e g i m e . B o t h  though, rejoined the 
general flow of Spanish American history by polar opposite 
paths, Chile through victory in war, Paraguay through defeat.
Elsewhere throughout Spanish America a succession of
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liberal, conservative and caudillo regimes failed to create 
civil order amongst the owning classes. Shortly after each 
faction had captured power, difficulties appeared as its 
vision of social organization, its social and economic 
policies, its position on the role of the State was found by 
the opposition to be untenable. The problem for each faction 
that took power was how to reconcile the interests for whom 
they had taken power with the structural position of the 
State. Effective functioning of the State called for unity 
amongst the various fractions of the dominant class. Yet 
with each fraction considering its differences with the others 
irreconcilable, the State became the focus of disunity, not 
class unity and rule. If the State was to guarantee the 
interest of any fraction of the owning class, it had to be 
considered legitimate by all, or a large balance, of those 
fractions. Armed force was rarely a safe alternative to 
agreement. Assurance had to be made to the opposition that 
it would not be eradicated, that the State would guarantee 
its social and economic position too.
The early Independence governments found agreement 
among the owning classes only at the most general level.
Each fraction sought the protection, if not the enhancement, 
of its position. Those, who like miners and plantation 
owners, relied on coerced or slave labor sought a strong.
highly centralized State. Those who relied on less trouble­
some methods of labor control and recruitment, favored a less 
powerful, less expensive, less centralized S t a t e . S i n c e  
control over taxable wealth and people (Indian tribute was 
collected by the landowner) was the club with which some 
owning classes attempted to bludgeon their governments, many 
governments tried to free themselves of this influence by 
borrowing abroad.^ Thus, in the period immediately after 
the wars of independence, many Spanish American governments 
became deeply indebted to foreign (mainly English) creditors, 
adding international pressures to their already considerable 
internal pressures.?8 In Peru, the State's control of the 
guano mines substantially freed it from landowner pressure 
and allowed it to build up an independent (though contentious) 
political support among merchants involved in that trade. 
Revenues from guano even allowed the State to declare an end
to Indian tribute, substantially weakening the national
7 9political power of the recalcitrant Sierra landowners. 9
Borrowing abroad and government production monopolies 
were, in the long run, relatively poor solutions. Borrowing 
brought only debt which led back to the problem of internal 
taxation, while a government production monopoly, as in Peru, 
created its own tensions.®8 Thus, throughout most of Spanish 
America between 1C25 and 1890, civil war, authoritarian
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Ct-dillo government, regional secession and political insta­
bility were the rule rather than the exception. General 
anarchy and instability prevailed until a solution could be 
found to intra-class conflict within the owning classes.
Such a solution was found ('found1 not in the sense 
that there was any conscious 'looking for it* but in the 
sense that it presented itself as the path of least resis­
tance) in the active encouragement of export production by 
Spanish American States. Rather than continuing to attempt 
to create a unity based upon the economic integration of the 
owning classes which would exacerbate an already violent con­
frontation, the policy of export expansion tended to insure 
their social and economic isolation at the level of produc­
tion. Linking each sector (growth sector) of the economy 
to an external market, reduced tensions between owning 
classes and created a basis for their unity and political 
hegemony. Even a few industrialists could be integrated 
into the new order if, as in Argentina, their markets were 
protected by the relatively high transport cost for heavy 
imported lower class consumption goods and, their import of 
manufacturing machinery was assisted by low import tariffs.®"*' 
The State itself did not have to upset owning class relations 
over the issue of internal taxation as it derived most of its 
revenues from its control over the customs house.82
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Thus, the export expansion of late 19th century Spanish 
American nations emerged as a political solution to owning 
class cohesion, its effect - creating what later have been 
characterized as underdeveloped or dependent economies, 
though recognized by some in Spanish America in the period 
1880-1930, was generally ignored until the collapse of 
foreign markets in the 1930's also brought about the collapse 
of oligarchic unity.
Spanish America And The World Economy 
In rejecting dependency theory's focus on a single 
explanatory variable - the international capitalist economy - 
I am not, however, discounting its effects on Spanish 
American development in the 19th century. There is broad 
agreement in the literature on Spanish American development 
that the export economies would not have emerged without the 
creation of world market demand for their agro/mineral 
products.83 Some writers even go as far as explaining the 
movement for Independence as having been chiefly motivated 
by the desire to form export links with the dynamic center 
of v/orld trade in that period, England.84 While I agree that 
it is indisputable that by the end of the 19th century the 
Spanish American economies were firmly integrated into the 
world economy as raw agro/mineral product suppliers and 
manufactured goods consumers, I question whether the v/orld
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economy is the main explanatory variable.
That the Spanish American nations would orient their 
economies toward agro/mineral export growth exclusively was 
not a forgone conclusion in the immediate aftermath of the 
independence struggles. Upon independence, most Spanish 
American governments attempted to follow a path of balanced 
economic development. Although it was accepted that agri­
culture and mining were the most important activities in the 
nations (as they were in most of the world in the early 19th 
century - the industrializing European nations was well), 
and, an export trade was desireable, the establishment of 
modern industry was seen as an important, if not crucial 
goal. The view of Manuel Camilo Vial, Minister of Finance 
in the Bulnes administration in Chile (1841-1851), expresses 
what many in Spanish American governments believed,®'*
1 am far from believing...that in order to be rich 
a people must produce everything; but I am persuaded 
that to be prosperous, free and civilized, it has to 
possess an extensive industry and, if possible a 
varied one. What have been the purely agricultural 
peoples, and in the present time, what are they? There 
is no nation in which agriculture dominates everything, 
and in which slavery or feudalism shows its odious 
face, which does not follow the march of humanity among 
the stragglers. In Europe, for example, what figure
does Poland or Ireland cut? That future threatens
us also, if we do not promote industry with a firm 
hand and constant will.
Thus, in this period, many Spanish American States 
actively aided the establisliment of manufacturing. In
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Colombia, tariff protection of artisan production, loans to 
manufacturing enterprises and limited industrial monopolies 
only ended in the 1850*5.86 in Mexico, a national credit 
and loan bank was established in 1830 which financed the 
development of a modern textile industry whose production 
soon outdistanced internal demand. The development bank 
soon began financing woolen mills, carpet factories and iron 
and paper manufacture.
By 1860, most Spanish American States had abandoned, or 
were quickly abandoning the goal of industrial development. 
Rather than attempting to foster the growth of agro/mineral 
export development and industrialization, the States snifted 
to the encouragement of agro/mineral export production exclu­
sively. Protective tariffs were, for the most part, dis­
mantled, colonization schemes aimed at creating a sector of 
small capitalist farmers/consumers were abandoned, capital 
.available from State revenues or foreign borrowings were made 
available only to activities which expanded export production, 
and labor supplies were directed by the State to the export 
sectors.88 The attempt to create an integrated, balanced 
economic development was, thus, abandoned.
This shift in State policy could not have occurred with­
out the expansion of world economy demand for agro/mineral 
products or the means to transport them yet, it equally could
not have occurred without the active encouragement of export 
production through trade liberalization, monetary policies,
*
infrastructure investment and land and labor policies of the 
Spanish American States. These policies can only be explained 
through an examination of the Spanish American political 
scene.
Thesis Restated 
State Adminstrations in the latter half of the 19th 
century in Spanish America encouraged the growth of agro/ 
mineral export economies in order to solve two political 
problems. First, political conflicts between sectors of 
the dominant class had created a condition of intermittent 
civil war which heightened the threat of challenges from 
the subordinate lower classes and social revolutions.
Second, the dependence of the State administrations on the 
warring dominant classes for revenue, and local mestizo and 
caudillo-led armies for a military force, made the State a 
prize of the political battles. In such a dependent 
position, the States could not perform a role in mediating 
the disputes within the dominant classes and thus secure 
political and social peace.
State policies encouraging agro/mineral export develop­
ment solved both of these problems to a great extent. On the
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one hand, it minimized the conflicts within the dominant 
classes by externalizing their economic interests, and on the 
other, it freed the State administrations from fiscal and 
military dependence on the warring classes and factions, 
enabling them to organize dominant class unity from a 
'relatively autonomous' position vis-^-vis those classes.
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PART H i  COLONIALISM, CAPITALISM AND THE STATEi SPANISH 
AMERICA IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD
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CHAPTER III
STATE AND ECONOMY IN COLONIAL SPANISH AMERICA
If the heritage of Spanish colonialism weighed heavy on 
the emerging republics of 19th century Spanish America, capi­
talism was not one of its legacies. A chief error of the 
dependency theorists has been their assertion that Spanish 
America has been 'capitalist* since the 16th century.-* To 
argue thus, is to discount the true imprint of the Spanish 
colonial enterprise which, as I will show presently, had 
little to do with the instituting of capitalism in the 
Americas. Rather, the colonial period laid the foundation for 
Spanish American underdevelopment by instituting and main­
taining distinctly non-capitalist forms of production.
Further, these non-capitalist forms of production, 
largely maintained and reproduced by the policies and repre­
sentatives of the Spanish State for the benefit of that State, 
created the basis for major constitutional crises throughout 
Spanish America in the independence period. The struggles 
thau ensued over the role of the State in the societies,
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economies, and polities of the new Spanish American countries, 
not the effects of the international economy as the dependen- 
tistas claim, were chiefly responsible for the creation of 
the export economies in the late 19th century.
Although it is not within the scope of this study to 
present a comprehensive review of the colonial era, this very 
brief review is offered with the aim of highlighting two im­
portant aspects of colonial society; Cl) its non-capitalist 
origin and nature, and (2) the important role of the State in 
the regulation and maintenance of these non-capitalist forms 
of production.
The Colonial Enterprise; Capitalist 
Or Non-Capitalist?
If the British Empire can be said to have arisen in a 
fit of absentmindedness, as much can be said of Spanish 
colonial expansion in the 15th and 16th centuries. Spain, 
emerging from a seven centuries long reconguest of the 
Iberian Peninsula, and consolidating the first Absolutist 
State in Europe, was an expansionist power in the tradition 
of the late middle ages.^ Neither Spain itself, nor the 
society it ruled over in America were ever capitalist. No 
doubt, in the case of both some capitalist elements were 
present, yet they were hardly dominant and, in the case of 
Spain in the 16tb century, were under severe attack.
VO
Capitalism, as discussed earlier, is a system of produc­
tion in which the free laborer has access to the means of pro- 
duction only through capital. The means of appropriating the 
surplus of the laborer is purely economic as the laborer is 
forced to work for the capitalist because he has no other means 
of providing for his subsistence. The lack of a formally 
* feudal1 system in either 16th century Spain or colonial 
America should not immediately define them as capitalist. 
Non-capitalist systems do not all conform to the characteris­
tics of European feudalism, although they are certainly closer 
to that form than the capitalist. Manfred Kossok, for example, 
claims that Spain and colonial America were of a feudal 
'type1.̂  The existence of commercialization and the absence of 
formal serfdom, for him, does not indicate a transition to 
capitalist forms of production. Commercialization is rather 
an indication of the rise of merchant capitalism which, as we 
have seen, rarely affects the form of production. Similarly, 
Witold Kula, in his study of Polish feudalism, found that the 
commercialization of a large part of production in no way 
destroyed feudalism and, in Eastern Europe, became an integral 
part of it.” For Kossok, even che abolition of serfdom only 
indicates, ".. ,nov. the elimination of feudalism as a system, 
but only of certain forms of feudal domination."® The insti­
tution of equally, if different, extra-economic means of labor.
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exploitation such as arose in colonial Spanish America# for 
him# indicate the absence of capitalist relations of produc­
tion.7 Jaime Vicens Vives in his major study of Spanish 
economic development# concludes similarly that Spain was not 
’capitalist' but also argues that it was not formally feudal.8 
The many trappings of Western European feudalism that abounded 
in Spain during the medieval period were in all likelihood 
borrowed from the French who# at various points, assisted the 
Spanish militarily during the reconquest.8 Rather than feuda­
lism or capitalism# the combination of social and historical 
elements of Spain's unique medieval history created (except 
in Catalonia which may be characterised as 'feudal') what 
Vicens Vives calls a 'seigniorial' society.*8
The uniqueness of Spanish Seigniorialism derives from 
the Christian Spaniards' long struggle to re-conquer the 
Iberian peninsula from the Moors. Political power became, 
from the first# more centralized in the monarchy (although 
there were several) than under feudalism proper, as greater 
coordination was needed under a constant war footing for the 
national/religious enterprise.1* This centralism must however 
be seen as only a 'relative' centralism in that the realms of 
Spain were not unified until the reign of Isabel and 
Ferdinand.I2 More importantly, this centralism was also con­
ditioned and limited by the decentralized nature of the actual
12
re-conquest. Individual knights, groups of knights, untitled 
persons, religious orders, town militias and foreign adventu­
rers, receiving authorization from the monarchs, had a great 
part in re-conquering the peninsula in exchange for certain 
rights, privileges, grants of land and most importantly 
booty.13 The monarchs received ultimate sovereignty and owner­
ship of the conquered lands but granted all that had been con­
quered, less, most times, a 'guinto* or royal fifth of the 
booty captured.14 a s Mario Gongora notes, "The Reconquest led 
to the formulation of a system of political justice which 
placed great emphasis on the concepts derived from the royal 
duty of rewarding and granting favors to men who had dis­
tinguished themselves in war".!^ Though these, especially in 
Castile, became 'lords of the land* their jurisdiction over 
the land and its people was 'a jurisdiction limited by the 
power of the monarchy".16
At the same time, although the conditions of labor 
during the re-conquest were fluid in that Castile was under­
populated and the need to re-populate newly captured lands 
gave the ordinary peasant the opportunity to escape the most 
onerous servile conditions of labor, by the period of the 
Spanish conquest of America Spain was still a predominantly 
agrarian nation with more than 80% of the population peasants 
working under servile conditions of labor on land owned
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17largely by the aristocracy and Church. Thus, the hallmark of
this 'seigniorial system' was the non-alienation of ultimate
political sovereignty by the monarchs, while the social con-
18ditions of labor remained predominantly non-capitalist.
The town middle classes or bourgeoisie were always rela­
tively weak owing to their small numbers (not more than 3-5% 
of the population) and to the fact that many were Jews or 
conversos (Jews or their forbears who had 'converted' to 
Christianity) who were either persecuted or emigrated during 
this period.^ Their traditional historical role as an ally 
of the monarch against the aristocracy in the consolidation of
p  Athe Absolutist State led, in the Spanish version of that 
alliance, to the destruction of the autonomy of the cities and 
towns and led to the predominance of the aristocracy under the 
auspices of the Absolutist S t a t e . W i t h  the growing pre­
dominance of the aristocracy economically and socially, the 
remains of the bourgeoisie in the 16th century took on aristo­
cratic values and ceased to be an enterprising, ascending 
bourgeoisie.22 Industry, which had made some gains in the 
early 16th century with the advent of the American trade, fell 
back into ruin under the weight of a seigniorial economic 
structure.22 The discovery of the great riches in America 
gave the final blow to the Spanish bourgeoisie, as 
Ronald Glassman relates,24
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...at precisely the point when other European kings 
fell back upon the merchant classes in their need for 
monetary wealth for internal and external expansion, 
the Spanish kingship got a miracle, the delivery of 
unbelievably enormous and endless sources of wealth, 
with no strings attached.
Therefore, the Spanish kings did not have to en­
courage the development of the internal economy, 
for they had been blessed with an external source 
of wealth. Not only did they not have to develop 
and encourage internal economic development, but 
they preferred not to develop it (as all other 
European kings would have preferred not to), for ... 
this meant that the only remaining class of po­
tential political foes to the kingship could be 
reduced or ignored...
Thus the Spanish internal economy was allowed 
to disintegrate, and the Spanish commercial classes 
slowly and imperceptibly began to disappear as a 
force in the realm.
It is within the context of this type of political, 
economic and social structure that the Spanish conquest of 
America must be understood. The original aim of the monarchy 
in this age of conquest was not colonization (Spain was still 
relatively underpopulated) but conquest and trade - the crown 
would share with the individual conqueror the booty or trade 
secured, upon the discovery of the Indies, the objective of 
the State, according to Gongora was, "...to establish in the 
Indies entrepots for the trade of gold, on the Portuguese model 
and as a crown monopoly, keeping overseas only a small garrison 
of soldiers and the indispensible minimum of settlers...
If the intent of the crown was fairly traditional, so 
too were the intentions and organization of the 1conyuista-
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dores'. These conquistadores came to the New World with rela­
tively the same social and political organization under which 
they had fought the re-conquest in Spain - " a nucleus of 
conqueror - the caudillo or military leader, and his compania, 
or followers”.26 The conquistador, holding in his hand a 
capitulacfon, or grant from the monarch stipulating his rights 
and rewards for the conquest, rewarded his followers and paid 
due homage to the monarch by giving each their rightful share 
of the booty.2? The conquests of America were not *private' 
enterprises, although they may have been financed as such.
They required the permission of the crown and were required 
to conform to the goals of the State.2®
The conquistador was under no illusion that he was there 
to create a 'new* society. Most were members of the lower 
aristocracy who claimed the social prestige of their class but 
lacked the economic means to enjoy it because of the system of 
primogeniture.^ These relatively impoverished knights sought 
a way back into the upper reaches of CastiIlian society 
through success in plunder. As James Lang argues,
This was not a movement of a counter culture.
Cortes and Pizarro came to the New World to 
acquire the resources to re-enter the old one 
with enhanced status and prestige.
and,
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These men are not institutional entrepreneurs 
or the harbingers of social change. They are 
attuned to the aristocratic, seigrieurial ideal.
In fact, the conquest of America can be seen as a rebirth of
the reconquest of Spain itself in that it revived conquest as
the principal means of upward social mobility. As Glassman
relates,32
In Spanish America, as in the reconquest of Spain, the 
possibility of (1) heroism in battle (2) conquest of 
Indian controlled lands and treasures (Moslem land and 
treasure in Spain), and piratical and bandit acquisition 
of wealth reproduced a situation in which everyman could 
become enobled, and where enormous numbers of men did 
received titles or the power that comes from territorial 
control. The spirit of 'hidalgo', and the would be 
'hidalgo' re-emerged from the corpses of the Indian 
aristocracy, as it once had emerged from those of the 
Moslems. Land, slaves and titles were available once 
again. The New World had opened the door to the Old.
Given these roots, it is not surprising that neither 
the crown nor the conquistadores instituted a capitalist 
regime in America. While a classically 'feudal' system was 
not instituted, neither did they create small farmer settler 
colonies. What emerged as the pattern of social, economic 
and political development unsurprisingly mirrored the 
seigniorial system extant in Spain.
Spanish American society and economy was dominated, 
throughout the colonial era, by the State. Mercantilism, as 
Magali Sarfatti notes, tended towards two varieties, one, a 
"...monopolistic mercantilism, where the purely fiscal orien­
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tation prevails and where new industries, based on the conces­
sion of a monopoly by the State, are submitted to strict State 
control" and the other a "...national mercantilism, which 
builds up a protectionist syste.m for the national industries 
that already exist."33 Spanish mercantilism tended towards 
the first form, the most unlikely to produce industrial capi­
talism. 34 Thus, while economic exploitation was entrusted to 
private individuals, the remarkable achievement of the Spanish 
crown in the opinion of Sarfatti "...was to superimpose 
regulations on the system of production to control access to 
the means of production and place a toll on the results".33
Yet, although unprogressive in this sense, the State's
control over the society and economy of Spanish America did
secure the crown's goal of directing a large part of the
enormous bullion wealth of the colonies into its coffers.
Direct bureaucratic intervention into the society and economy
also had the benefit of reducing tension between competitors
for the resources available - land, labor and trade. Ther *
bureaucracy itself became the focus of that competition. While 
corruption and poor administration were the result of such a 
policy, the benefits were many in terms of creole attachment 
to the Imperial system and the providing of the social control 
mechanisms necessary for the exploitation of servile labor.
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Encomienda And Its Antecedents 
Immediately upon their arrival in the Indies, the con­
quistadores set to imposing servile labor conditions upon the 
native inhabitants. From this it is immediately apparent that 
the men who came to America had no intention of working the 
land themselves. The Spaniards, after surviving for a while 
on the hospitality of the natives of Hispanola, enslaved them 
after the natives revolted against the increasing demands of 
their 'guests'. Columbus imposed a tribute tax upon the whole 
native population over the age of fourteen, and those unable 
to pay (of which there was a large majority) were forced to 
provide labor service free.^6 By 1499, the 'choice' of tribute 
tax or labor service had effectively been suppressed in favor 
of labor service, parcelled out to individual Spaniards as this 
batter assured them control over the fruits of native labor.37 
Although the crown did initially halt the practice of 
private compulsory labor due3 (compulsory labor in crown mines 
was never questioned), this would have left the Spaniards to 
fend for themselves, a position which, given the aristocratic 
values they had left Spain with and to which status they as­
pired, they violently protested. Thus, the crown's re-evalua­
tion of its policies towards the conquistadores led to the 
formal legalization of compulsory forced labor in 1503.38 
Under Governor Ovando, this began to take the form of
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Under Governor Ov&ndo, this began to take the form of 
encomienda, that is a conditional grant of native forced labor 
to particularly meritorious conquistadores. The encomendero 
was obliged to 'take care' of his native charges, instructing
them in Christianity and civilization, and protecting their
39persons and properties.
The grossly increasing exploitation of the native 
population of Hispanola quickly led to depopulation and a 
cry by the Spaniards for new sources of labor. Estimates of 
native population decline on the island of Hispanola cite a 
drop from a high of one million when the Spanish arrived to 
scarcely five hundred by 1570.40 Expeditions to neighboring 
islands were sent out in order to secure the needed labor 
leading to the rapid depopulation of many of the Caribbean 
Islands.^ The continuing decline of available forced labor 
then led to expeditions to the mainland in search of both 
labor and riches as new 'conquistadores* arrived from the 
peninsula regularly only to find colonial society now closed. 
These new 'conquistadores', seeking lucrative positions, 
clamored for new conquests.^
This medieval Spanish form of conquest and colonization 
did not radically alter with the conquest of the mainland. 
There, in the Andes and the Valley of Mexico, the Spaniards 
found relatively developed native empires lording over fairly
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complex systems of production. In Peru, the Inca Empire ruled 
over an estimated sixteen million people stretching from 
southern Colombia to northern Chile along the Andean 
cordillera.43 ^he Incan social, economic and political system 
was characterized by groups of independent village communities 
or ayllus, organized by lineage, and linked to the central 
Incan authority through a complex bureaucracy subordinate to 
that, and only that authority. The independent villages pro­
duced communally on lands designated for the village, the sun 
god and local gods. Indian villages also owed the State a 
certain amount of labor service, predominantly for public 
works, e.g. roads, temple building and irrigation projects. 
Much of the surplus collected by the central authorities (that 
not used for the support of the royal family, the bureaucracy, 
the priests or to feed, house and clothe laborers doing public 
service) was re-distributed to the villages in the form of 
largesse from the Inca.44
The Aztecs of Mexico were, at the village level, simi­
larly organized. Differences though existed in their politi­
cal, social and economic system. Central administration was 
fairly lax as compared to the Incas. Local authorities 
(chiefs, village headman etc.) held power in the absence of an 
Imperial bureaucracy. All that was required of the local 
authorities was that they deliver their share of the tribute
demanded by the Aztec aristocracy. Economically the system 
was not redistributive, at least not at the Imperial level 
as with the Incas and trade and economic differentiation had 
begun to appear before the arrival of the Spanish conquista­
dores. 4 5
Two factors greatly facilitated the relatively easy 
conquest of these two advanced Indian Empires. First, in 
both empires, internal dissension greatly assisted the 
Spaniards. The Aztecs had only recently militarily con­
quered many tribes on their periphery and, groaning under 
the heavy tribute exactions of the Aztecs these tribes 
gladly assisted Cort/s' attack of the Aztec eapitol. In 
Peru, a dynastic struggle within the Inca royal family per­
mitted a small band of Spaniards under Pizarro's leadership 
to play both sides against each.other, allowing them to 
defeat both.46 Second, the apparent absence of popular up­
risings (except in the very centers of both Empires - Cuzco 
and Tenochitlan) which was a result of the sedentary nature 
of both populations and the insularity of the villages 
vis-a-vis the Empires themselves. These independent villages 
had been the object of conquerors before the Incas and Aztec3 
and regarded the Spaniards at first as deliverers and later, 
simply new overlords to bear.
Marx's assertion that the conqueror must conform to the
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forms of production and exchange of the conquered was never 
so borne out than in the Spanish conquest of the Inca and 
Aztec E m p i r e s . 47 After the Spaniards had stripped the 
American Indian Empires of all the precious metals they had 
lying around, they had to confront their own survival in their 
new land. Rather than changing the modes of surplus extrac­
tion extant, the Spaniards inserted themselves at the pinnacle 
of the hierachic structure of tribute distribution through the 
use of e n c o m i e n d a , 48 The encomienda^ was, in the early 
stages of Spanish colonialism, the primary method of ex­
tracting the surplus wealth and labor of the native popula­
tion. It was a conditional grant of Indian communities to a 
particularly meritorious Spaniard who received the tribute 
(inkind and later cash) that the Indians were required to 
pay the Spanish King (before him the Inca or Aztec King) as 
their overlord.^0 Certain kinds of direct labor services 
were also extracted by the encomendero although such practices 
were not condoned by the crown and were ultimately outlawed.
In some areas, particularly Chile, which suffered from extreme 
labor shortage, encomienda was extremely harsh in that tribute 
was extracted mainly through labor services. Arnold Bauer 
relates how Haurpe Indians from Cuyo "...were brought in chains 
through Andean passes and assigned to various agricultural 
tasks around Santiago. Often the indios huarpes were rented
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by their encomenderos to other Spaniards.,."51
The encomienda was not a grant of land nor did it form 
the legal basis for the large landed estates or haciendas 
that were to arise in the 17th century.52 Grants of land 
(merced) were made by the Spanish towns upon their founding 
according to the status of the individual settler. Land was 
also granted and sold by the crown in the 16th and 17th cen­
turies. 53 Encomenderos were forbidden to own land or to live 
within the confines of their encomienda. Encomiendas could 
include Indians who lived on their own community lands, crown 
lands, or lands owned by other Spaniards.54 Although 
usurptions of Indian lands by encomenderos and others 
occurred throughout the colonial period, control of land, 
except that in the immediate vicinity of Spanish towns (for 
the provisioning of those towns) was less important than the 
control of labor in the first century and a half of coloniza­
tion.55
The encomenderos* aim was not to institute a new system 
of production but to live well off of the old Indian system.55 
The encomendero was still, in a sense, a military leader who 
provided for his retinue of soldiers through the tribute he 
received from his encomienda Indians.57 His responsibilities 
to the crown were military, social and economic - further 
conquest, the Catholization of his Indian charges and the
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provisioning of the crown with as much gold and silver wealth 
as he could find.5® He. was not an independent ’lord1, as 
Claudio Veliz notes, although the Indians were commended to 
the Spaniard he did not therefore receive jurisdictional 
authority over them as a feudal overlord. The encomenderos 
were "...informal civil servants representing the monarch, 
acting on behalf of the central government with limited tenure, 
and liable to have their duties terminated at the royal 
will".59
The encomienda form was geared to the survival of the 
indigenous non-capitalist mode of production and social and 
political organization (relations within the village and 
between the village and the Spaniards was mediated through 
the village headman or curaca). First, the crown did not want 
the American conquerors to become an hereditary aristocracy 
(the one it had to contend with in Spain was already one too 
many) and thus restricted the encomendero in his tenure and 
use of Indian labor.5® Second, the crown had an interest in 
the survival of the indigenous system which produced the labor 
for the silver mines and tribute for the State and church.6”*- 
But, the encomienda system, this hybrid public/private system 
of surplus extraction, did not survive past the early 1700’s 
(for various reasons it lasted well into the 18th century in 
Chile and Paraguay) and divided into the 'private1 hacienda
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and 1 public1 corregimiento.62
By the end of the 16th century and throughout the 17th
century the encomienda form of surplus extraction began to
change radically until it was finally abolished in 1718.
This change did not include a transformation to capitalist
forms of surplus extraction but rather was a reorganization
of non-capitalist forms. Several developments led to this
unplanned reorganization# (1) the dramatic decrease in the
Indian population throughout the 16th century, (2) the
development of a large market for agricultural produce with
the development of silver mining on a grand scale, and
(3) the crown's policy of decreasing both the power and
profitability of encomienda.
Perhaps of all of these, the dramatic decline of the
Indian population was most important. A number of factors
have been cited as the cause for this demographic disaster
but it is generally agreed that the introduction of European
diseases, particularly small pox, typhus, malaria and yellow
fever, to which the Indians had little immunity was the chief 
6 3cause. Compounding the decline by disease was the intensi­
fied labor requirements in the silver and mercury mines and 
in producing agricultural products for Spanish consumption 
which took time away from their own subsistence production. 
According to Rolando Mellafe, it seems th2t Indian labor
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drafts for the building of new Spanish towns and the usurption 
of some of the best Indian agricultural lands for the building 
sites of these towns also greatly contributed to the demogra­
phic decline.64 Although there is some dispute as to the 
loss in actual numbers, recent research has put the decline 
in Mexico from a high of 25-30 million at the time of the 
conquest to about lJs million by the middle of the 17th cen­
tury. The decline in Peru appears to have been somewhat 
less dramatic as the population of the isolated altiplano 
communities of Upper Peru seem to have fared much better.6  ̂
Thus, with such a great decline of population and thus pro­
duction, encomenderos were finding it more and more difficult 
to support themselves and their numerous dependents solely 
on the basis of Indian tribute.
The dramatic increase of mining activity in both 
Mexico and Peru had a twofold effect in hastening the decline 
of encomienda. First the mines not only caused a decline of 
encomienda Indians available to encomenderos because of the 
deaths within the mines, but also because Indians subject to 
mining drafts fled their communities to reside on the proper­
ties of Spaniards (and the church) who, in return for their 
labor, would shield them from such labor drafts.66 Second, 
as the mines created greater demand for foodstuffs, transport 
and mining r.ools, private farms or haciendas arose to which
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encomienda Indians, subject to mine labor, could escape and 
find security.67
Nevertheless, royal policy was a most important factor 
in the demise of the encomienda system. The crown very early 
sought to control the aristocratic pretensions of encomenderos 
by first restricting their use of encomienda Indians and 
second, restricting their tenure as encomenderos and their 
ownership of land. The encomendero was further restricted 
in not being allowed to administer justice to his Indians, a 
function which the crown delegated to local corregidores or 
alcaldes mayores who were not allowed to be encomenderos.
More effective than any of these was the crown imposed de­
cline in encomendero tribute income. In 1568, the crown ruled 
that large encomiendas were to be limited to an income of 
2,000 pesos per year, the remainder going to the crown.6** By 
constantly increasing the State's share of the tribute 
collected by the encomendero, the crown made the holding of 
an encomienda in the highly populated regions extremely 
unattractive. In Peru, encomienda was abolished - "all 
encomiendas began to revert to the crown upon the death of 
the owner" - in 1718.6  ̂ The best an encomendero could hope 
for now was a pension from the crown.
Corregimiento, Hacienda, Repartimiento Or Mita
Actually, encomienda type surplus extraction did not
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disappear with the end of encomienda. The crown's purpose
was not to destroy the system, but to preserve it by gaining
greater control over it as it was the basis of the bulk of
revenue the crown extracted from the colonies. As Robert
Keith has noted, the system of corregimiento was simply
encomienda by another name - with one important difference.
Rather than a private Spaniard holding it, the corregimiento
was an encomienda held by the crown and administered by its
representative.^ Corregidores de indios (or alcaldes
mayores in Mexico), appointed for a relatively short term of
office, it was felt by the crown, would ensure the survival
of the indigenous population and the social and economic
organization v/hich preserved it. This however was not ob-
71tainod in the long run. The office of corregidor, as most 
offices during the latter Hapsburg period, was sold by the 
crown in an effort to fill a treasury impoverished by war. 
Those who bought the offices were usually poorer Spaniards 
or creoles who borrowed heavily from local merchants in order 
to pay the fee. To recoup this debt and make their sinecure 
pay, corregidores initiated the repartimiento de mercancias, 
or forced distribution of goods, whereby Indians were forced 
to purchase a certain amount of goods (useful or useless) 
from the corregidor.^ In order to pay for these goods the 
Indians were forced to produce goods that they could sell in
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Spanish markets or to the corregidor. A good deal of the 
commodities circulating in Spanish markets were thus produced 
in this manner.73
Corregidores, while serving as a conduit for both mer­
chants in the sale and collection of goods, and the State in 
the collection of tribute, were the chief distributors of 
justice and administration to the Indians and acted as labor 
recruiters for local haciendas (although this practice was 
illegal). As the King's administrative and judicial repre­
sentative, the corregidor dispensed justice to the Indians in 
his district and was responsible for maintaining the separa­
tion of the Indians from Spaniards and mestizos who, the 
crown felt, would (and did) abuse the Indians.^ But, while 
charged with protecting their Indians from Spaniard and 
mestizo freebooters, corregidores were not averse to handing 
over any number of their charges to local hacendados who re­
quired additional labor on their lands - for a price.^
The hacienda, a large private estate-farm, received 
its impetus with the decline of encomienda. As the Indian 
population declined, and opportunities for gain in the pro­
visioning of the mines which were often, like Potosi in Upper 
Peru, in areas where agriculture could not flourish, land 
ownership became important.
Land itself uas a concession given away or sold by the
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the political authorities. From the first, grants of land
were made by the founder of a Spanish town and later, the town
council or cabildo.76 All ultimate ownership of land in
America was held to belong to the crown. At various periods,
viceroys, governors and audencias were authorized to either
grant or sell land for the benefit of the crown. Ownership
of land gave rise to all sorts of disputes as gaining clear
title, given the counter claims of Indians whose lands were
usually being usurped and competing hacendados (or the
church), complicated matters. Thus, the colonial courts,
officials and lawyers (letrados) were enormously important
to any landlord (or aspiring landJord).77 Obviously, having
connections to or the ability to bribe royal officials was
extremely important. Further, the instituting by the State
of entail and primogeniture ensured the reproduction of the
78system of large landholding.
Although now more 'free* in relation to encomienda 
Indians, hacienda Indians produced for the hacendado in much 
the same way they had produced for the encomendero. Although 
the hacienda was more market oriented, particularly those that 
provisioned large urban areas or mining centers, they were 
nevertheless in no way harbingers of an emerging capitalist 
economy. Each hacienda, regardless of its connection to the 
market, strove for the ideal of self sufficiency.
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Diversification was striven for in order to take advantage of
many small markets which they sought to monopolize and thereby
control supply and price. Even the most highly commercialized
sugar plantations grew their own food - maize, vegetables,
wheat and cattle - with an eye towards monopolizing the
7 9entire production process.
The hacendados attracted labor to the hacienda by 
offering the Indians a better situation than they could ob­
tain either as encomienda or/and community Indians. In 
Peru especially, with the dramatic rise in cost of tribute 
(in Peru tribute was assessed to villages and thus, the de­
crease of the Indian population only increased the per capita 
tribute the remaining Indians had to pay; in Mexico, tribute 
was an individual responsibility) many sought succor on 
haciendas. The hacendado offered the Indian a small plot of 
land to work in exchange for his labor. Even later, when the 
crown required the hacendados to pay their Indians a 'wage' 
in addition to a plot of land, wages were paid (if they were 
paid at all) in kind.80
Labor relations on haciendas were varied. For the most 
part, the hacendado required a small permanent work force 
which, at harvest times, could be expanded fairly easily.
The permanent work force, those attracted to year round 
residence on the hacienda, were either serf-like yancononas
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as in southern Peru, sharecroppers who owed the hacienda cer­
tain portion of their harvest, or wage laborers (though very 
few permanent workers) who were paid a wage well below sub­
sistence and therefore had to depend on support outside the 
hacienda. Much of the seasonal labor the hacienda required 
was provided through the 'mita' or 'repartimiento1 - forced 
labor (though 'paid') directed to the haciendas by repre­
sentatives of the crown.81 Even in the later colonial period, 
according to James Lockhart, resident and non-resident labor 
was provided through the pre-colombian system of periodic 
obligatory work, Hacendados continued to enjoy the free 
personal services of Indians in having their produce de­
livered to market and in the provision of house servants.®2 
The hacienda, for the most part, was able to attract 
labor, particularly additional seasonal labor, in two ways. 
One, which seems to have been more predominant in Mexico, 
was to put pressure on Indian villages in their vicinity 
by usurping their lands and thus forcing the Indians to send 
labor to the hacienda to supplement the decreased community 
resources. The other, was by the State putting pressure on 
Indian villages through tribute, payment required by the 
church, labor drafts for the mines and forced sale of goods 
by corregidores. All of these exactions forced Indians to 
seek added income in seasonal labor on haciendas. In fact
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Karen Spalding claims that it was the State which "... forced 
the Indians to sell their labor to the Spaniards", though 
only cheap below-subsistence labor for, it was not in the 
interest of the hacendados, who could not fully support such 
a large labor force, or the State, which needed the Indians' 
labor and tribute, to fully destroy indigenous systems of
social reproduction.8^
Mita And Repartimiento 
Obviously, forms of enforced labor did not end with 
encomienda. In both major areas of Indian population, 
systems of forced labor recruitment lasted will into the 
18th century. Forced labor, generally called mita in Peru 
and repartimiento in Mexico, was distributed by royal 
officials, corregidores or jeuces repartidoes, to mines, 
haciendas, textile 'factories', churches and church lands, 
and towns.84 Thus, some degree of influence with the politi­
cal authorities was necessary to acquire this form of labor. 
Though nominally 'wage labor', the need to make such employ­
ment obligatory indicates that proletarianization, that is, 
the inability of the worker to survive without selling his 
labor, had not really gone very far.
In Peru especially, the mita was a labor draft in which 
certain Indian villages were required to send a given number
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mitayos to the mines, haciendas or public works - such as 
roads, irrigation, town building, etc.8® Until 1609, mitayos 
were unpaid, but thereafter they received a small daily pay­
ment for their forced labor.8® Forced labor in the silver 
mines of Pot-osi* and the mercury mine at Huancalevica was 
especially onerous as thousands died from work in these 
mines.8  ̂ Given unrelaxed mita conscription in the same 
geographic area, it has been estimated that the mita produced 
11,199 laborers in 1573 but only 1,674 one hundred years 
later.88 Of course this decimation was not entirely the 
fault of work in the mines but it nevertheless was the reason 
so many Indians also fled these particular areas to seek 
shelter on Spanish haciendas.
In Mexico, such forced labor was milder, as a reparti­
miento for the mines was not the fashion. Yet, Indians, 
Negroes, vagabonds and all people of color were required to 
make themselves available daily for labor drafts. The laborer 
could in theory 'choose1 his employer but he nevertheless had 
to work.88 Debt peonage also seems to have appeared earlier 
and been more widespread in Mexico, as hacendados sought to 
acquire a fixed labor force by making the Indians legally 
bound to theni through debt. As the Indians attempted to pay 
off their debts, the small below subsistence 'wage' they re­
ceived only sent them deeper in debt.80 However, as recent
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research into this aspect of colonial (and 19th century) social
relations indicates, to the Indians, their debt slavery was
relatively unimportant in that being a permanent tenant on a
hacienda may have been the best possible existence for an 
91Indian.'
Mines, Obrajes And Guilds 
The silver mines of Peru and Mexico were of chief 
importance to the Spanish crown and therefore received 
careful attention by the colonial bureaucracy. Although 
bullion remittances to the crown never exceeded the revenue 
raised through taxation in Castile, it was of great value 
because of its liquidity and therefore useful in the crown's 
international adventurism.92 The crown sought, therefore, 
not only to increase its production but also to assure 
that the resources necessary for the exploitation of the 
mines were available.
The mines, though worked by private individuals were 
rarely sold outright to these entrepreneurs. Usually, they 
were granted as concessions to Spaniards and creoles, the 
crown retaining ultimate ownership.Concessions were of 
relatively short duration and thus the exploitation of the 
mines, particularly in the early flush days, was rapacious 
while investment was minimal. The crown held ultimate con-
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trol over mining not through ownership of the mines but by 
monopolizing the production and distribution of one essential 
input - mercury. Mercury, needed in the amalgamation process 
which reduced silver bearing ores to relatively pure silver 
(thus its appellation 'quicksilver') was produced and distri­
buted as a crown monopoly.9  ̂ In addition, all bullion had to 
be delivered to government smelters to be assayed, cast into 
bars, stamped and taxed, A small tax of 1-1%% was assessed 
for the costs of this service while 1/5 or the quinto v/as 
assessed and collected for the crown.9  ̂ Although much of 
the silver produced in America never reached government 
offices to be taxed, being hidden or leaving as contraband, 
much that did reverted to the crown during its periodic 
financial crises when it simply confiscated all private 
bullion coming from America.96
Mining itself was a precarious industry. A concession­
aire might get rich very quickly, but many more ended in 
ruin. Miners were notoriously short of capital and were 
usually at the mercy of merchant money lenders or aviadores 
who advanced them just enough to buy necessary equipment 
and mercury, but not enough to expand or modernize produc­
tion.97 The aviadores were of course, only middlemen who 
linked the mining economy to the large Lima and Mexico City 
merchants.98
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Given the importance of the mines to the crown, they 
were granted preferential treatment in the distribution of la­
bor by royal officials. The mita in Peru, as discussed above,
provided the bulk of the labor for the mercury mine in
/Huancavelica and the silver mines in Potosi during the 16th 
and early 17th centuries, while in Mexico, it seems reparti­
miento did not provide the needed workforce and thus a combin­
ation of slave labor and 'free* wage labor was utilized.99 It 
should be noted that while the crown progressively limited the 
types of industries allowed to use mita or repartimiento labor, 
the last to lose this privilege was m i n i n g . 100
What manufacturing existed in America during the colonial 
era was mainly in the manufacture of coarse textiles, usually 
destined for Indian workers in the mines. Textiles were pro­
duced in workhouses called obrajes which were found everywhere 
throughout the colonies (although Queretaro in Mexico and 
Quito in Peru were centers of production) and worked for the 
most part by servile labor. Exploitation of Indian labor in 
the obrajes was particularly brutal and, although steps were 
taken early to reduce or abolish Indian servitude in them, all 
regulations were ineffective.101 Indians, including women and 
children six to eight years of age were kidnapped and forced 
to work long hours in dark unhealthy textile m i l l s . F o r  
Gongora, miners and obraje operators were virtually in the
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same boat, they were "...fundamentally dependent on the power 
of the State" for access to the labor inputs of their 
industries.lQ3
Most other kinds of manufacturing in the colonies, if 
they did not use servile labor, did not alternatively take 
capitalist form. Neither did they escape (or v;ant to escape) 
State regulation. Most manufacturing (except cottage industry 
in the countryside) was organized into graft guilds or 
gremios.IQ4 craftsmen producing shoes, furniture, glass, 
leather goods, pots, candles etc., organized into guilds in 
order to prevent competition.1°5 Guild labor as well as the 
production process was meticulously regulated by guild 
ordinances which were given the force of law by the State. 
Economic and political at the same time, guilds represented 
the monopolistic corporatist pattern of Spanish colonial 
society. 10<*
Slavery
The slave plantation is often cited as a capitalist, 
institution by those who misunderstand the difference between 
commercialization and capitalism.10  ̂ Capitalism, it should be 
remembered, is a form of production constituting the combina­
tion of capital and free wage labor, of which slavery forms no 
part. Slave systems however, enjoyed great stimulus under the
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dominance of the commercial bourgeoisie which, as Genovese 
observes "...supported the existing system of production".108 
Its relationship to the growth of capitalism is ambiguous. 
Slavery, as Marx showed, fed the 'original accumulation of 
capital' in Western Europe, though not exclusively or pre­
dominantly.108 As soon though, as industrial capitalism 
becomes dominant, we find everywhere forces attempting to 
abolish the slave trade e.g. Britain110 or/and slavery it- 
self, e.g. the United States.U J '
Slavery was an early institution of labor in colonial 
Spanish America and it certainly did not presage the coming 
development of capitalist relations of production. Columbus' 
first inclination was to enslave the Indians he found on tl:?. 
Caribbean Islands, although the crown quickly eliminated this 
practice except for Indians taken in a 'just war". Thus, 
Indian slavery existed only in Chile, Argentina and Northern 
Mexico where hostile Indian tribes could provide justifica­
tion.11  ̂ For the most part though, slavery meant Black 
slavery and was closely regulated by the Imperial bureaucracy.
Black slavery was not without precedent in Spain itself. 
In fact, Black slaves seem to have accompanied the second vo­
yage of Columbus and were prohibited, unsuccessfully, by the 
crown from migrating to America in the Instrucciones of 
1501. The importation of Black slaves was extremely impor­
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tant to the colonization of the Caribbean Islands as Spaniards 
sought servile replacement labor for their enterprises, par­
ticularly sugar and gold production, when the Indian popula­
tion d w i n d l e d . O n  the mainland, the tropical and coastal 
areas received the bulk of imported slaves as the highland 
areas of both Peru and Mexico were fairly densly populated and 
thus did not present labor shortage p r o b l e m s . s t r a n g e l y  
enough, the greatest advocate for the introduction of Black 
slavery into Spanish America was the crown which sought to 
protect the Indian from the more onerous types of labor.
The slave trade to America began originally as a crown 
monopoly, although concessions for the importation of small 
numbers of slaves were made to individual colonists as 
payment for some meritorious act.^^ The crown administered 
monopoly was soon abandoned and, until the late 16th century, 
the supplying of slaves was contracted out by the crown through 
the sale of licences. This form became successful not only as 
a means of supplying all the colonies with slaves but also as 
an added source of income for the c r o w n .  I*** Even after the 
asiento or monopoly form of provisioning slaves was revived 
in 1580, the crown found that it could profit from the trade 
by collecting import duties and a bonus for every slave im­
ported. This form was not abandoned until 1773.^®
Although Black slaves could be found throughout the
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colonies, their concentration in particular areas, generally 
of cash crop production (and often coastal cities), put the 
onus of social control on the lower Spanish bureaucracy.
Any system of production in which the laborers* position in 
the social relations of production is juridically defined, 
as in slavery, requires an active role for the State. As 
Mellafe notes, the regulation of the relations between freeman 
and slave was a chief occupation of the State bureaucrats in 
Spanish America who maintained "...strict social controls, 
aimed at maximum economic yield and the preservation of a 
stratified, hierarchical society. . . " . Laws regulating 
slavery were promulgated by the crown and administered by 
its representative. Purchase and sale of slaves, legal 
ownership, manumission, the rights of slaves and their 
punishment for crimes, including running away and/or becoming 
renegades or cimarrones, were all within the purview of the 
State bureaucracy, -^l
Regulation and social control by the State and its 
agencies here, as in many other areas, deteriorated as the 
colonial period wore on. As slave revolts became more and 
more common by the 18th century, slaveowners had to fall back 
upon their own resources in order to control their workforces. 
At the same time, a growing floating population of vagabond 
mestizos and escaped slaves made rural colonial Ame3:ica
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particularly u n s a f e . T h e s e  were to create political
tensions and problems of social control throughout the late
123Bourbon and into the independence period.
Estate, Corporation and Castas
Spanish American colonial society, like that of Spain,
was organized in a hierarchy of estates and corporations,
not social classes. Social class, in which social status is
derived from one's economic' position, differs from
societies based on estate and corporation in which social
status is derived through politico-legal definition. The
implications of each are important in understanding the role
and place of the State in society. In the former type of
society, ownership of property, wealth, and/or success in
economic pursuits denote social status, while the State's
role is in simply guaranteeing these founts of social status.
In the latter, the State holds a central position in the
ascription and recognition of social status. In order to
maintain or increase one's social status, recognition by the
State is indispensable. Therefore, in the case of the estate/
corporate society the role of the State is direct, while in
125class society it is indirect.
Colonial Spanish America never had an 'estate system' 
proper in that the political-representational function of 
estate was absent.*26 But, as Lyle McAlister argues, the
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ethnic-cultural groups of the American colonies tended to
constitute an estates system.127 por McAlister, the fact that
social status was juridically defined in the case of Spaniards
(white peninsulares and creoles), Indians and castas can be
recognized as an estate system even though it developed in an
IPS"ad hoc fashion". * This hierarchic system was accepted 
throughout the colonial period as the natural order of things 
so, as McAlister argues, "Social unrest took the form of 
drives to improve the status of the individual and the group, 
not efforts to change the system".129
Spaniards were accorded specific rights or fueros 
including exemption from tribute and the right to hold 
positions in the higher corporations, bureaucracy, clergy 
and military. Similarly, Indians were accorded a specific 
juridical status in that they were subject to the tribute 
while exempt from other taxes such as the sales tax or 
alcabala, the inquisition, and the regular courts. Castas, 
who I will deal with below, similarly had a juridically defined 
status.^ 0  In addition, a corporate structure was superimposed 
upon the system of estates, as it was in medieval Europe.
Social status and one's 'place' in society was often defined 
by one's corporate membership in guilds, the church, 
universities, the army or militia, and the municipalities which 
conferred on its members a special juridical status.131
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The social hierarchy of early colonial days quickly be­
came problematic with the rapid intermingling of the races and 
called out for State regulation. Although it was the policy 
of the crown to prevent this intermixing, it was impossible 
to halt. ̂ 2  women formed a very small part of the white
emigration to the colonies in the early years*-^, ana only 
approximately one-third of the Slack slaves imported were 
womeni341 intermixing was inevitable on the part of both 
Black and white men with Indian women.
Although these were not the only forms of race mixture, 
given the various combinations that could occur once race 
mixture got underway, they did form the basis of a society 
graded hierarchically in terms of 'whiteness'.135 a  quite 
complex formal-legal system of discrimination based on caste 
was instituted which existed until the end of the colonial 
era (and informally, up to this day).136 This 'pigmentocracy’ 
received official sanction which included restrictions on the 
right to wear certain clothing, membership in guilds and other 
corporations, positions in the bureaucracy, access to schools 
and universities and the holding of ecclesiatic positions.137
Far and away the largest group of castas were the mesti­
zos who were, for the. most part, a complex mixture of the 
white, Indian and sometimes black races. Mestizos fairly soon 
became the majority of the. population throughout the colonies
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as the white population did not grow as dramatically, the In­
dian population declined and the Black population was re­
stricted by the slave trade.^ 8  Having literally no place in 
colonial society - being neither white and having the privi­
leges of that status, nor Indian and having the protection 
(for what it was worth) of the crown and access to communal 
lands, the mestizos were seen by both Spaniards and Indians as 
degraded.^ 9  por the white creoles, they were both useful and 
dangerous. Useful as intermediaries between them and their 
slaves or Indians in the capacity of foremen or slavedrivers, 
and dangerous because of their unrootedness and tendency to­
wards vagrancy and unlawfulness.^40 Mestizos aspired to white 
creole status and thus shunned 'legitimate' work in a society 
that always seemed labor poor. This disgruntled mass was 
later to form the backbone of the armies of Independence, and 
the basis of support for the caudillos of the early 19th 
century.^41
The Church
The Roman Catholic Church in colonial Spanish America 
served, up till the middle of the 18th century, as the crown's 
chief agency of social control and as adjunct to the colonial 
bureaucracy. In fact, since the Spanish crown acquired the 
patronato (a concession granted by the Pope giving the Spanish
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monarch the right to appoint individuals to ecclesiastical 
positions, collect church tithes, and review and approve all 
church policy - including that emanating from the Pope him­
self) , the church in Spanish America had always been an arm 
of the State.
The chief contribution of the church to Spanish rule in 
America was its role in identifying obedience to the State 
with obedience to religion. For the Indians of Peru and 
Mexico this was particularly potent for their own indigenous 
State organizations evinced a similar combination of State and 
religion. Their 'conversion' to Christianity by the church 
did much to legitimize the authority of the secular Spanish 
administration. Where the authority of the secular adminis­
tration was often rebelled against by the Indians, the 
clergy's authority always stood firm. Always the representa­
tive of the crown, the clergy was given the responsibility of 
protecting the Indians from rapacious Spaniards and creoles, 
even though these often complained that the clergy monopolized 
the services of the Indians for their own purposes.143
To a large degree, where State authority and church 
authority began and ended was fuzzy. The role of the church as 
an arm of the Imperial bureaucracy infused secular authority 
with religious justification and s a n c t i o n s . S o  identified 
was religion with the State that "treason against the State
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was equated with heresy..."145 The Inquisition, exported from 
Spain by the crown, and under its sole direction, acted as a de­
fender of the State, censoring not only religious materials, but 
political and philosophical ideas found dangerous to the politi­
cal order.146 While hardly the heinous institution history has 
branded it (at least in America)14^, the Inquisition did pro­
vide the crown with an effective deterrent to creole opposi­
tion. Useless and counterproductive as Henry Charles Lea may 
characterize it148, the Inquisition was extremely effective. 
Even if it did nothing, its presence and occasional actions 
were enough to cause Spaniards and creoles (who were solely 
under its jurisdiction) to walk the straight and narrow.
The church performed many social functions that ingra­
tiated all classes to it. Almost all education in the colonies 
was administered by the church through its monastaries, 
colegios, universities and schools of the regular and secular 
clergy.150 In addition, the church was the chief founder of 
hospitals, poorhouses and other charitable institutions.151 
But of all the important social functions of the church, 
nothing compared with its role as colonial banker. The 
church grew to be the richest institution in America from 
years of receiving donations of,land and money from the faith­
ful, Charles Gibson estimating that its ownership of one half 
the land in the colonies would not seem unreasonable.152 The
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church, with its enormous income from its haciendas, planta­
tions and sale of services, was able to lend out money, 
usually to landowners living well beyond their incomes, and 
thus came to hold mortgages on an enormous amount of land.153 
By these mortgages, much land was encumbered by dues to the 
church (a certain portion of the loan was to be repaid out of 
the operating income of the hacienda) while creoles v;ere en­
abled to live in an 'aristocratic1 style.-*-54 Thus the rela-* ~ 
tionship between the hacienda and the church was symbiotic - 
the hacienda provided incomes for the church in the form of 
annuities, mortgages, gifts, and tithes, while the church 
provided the hacendado with social control and ready cash in 
the forms of loans.1^5 when, in the late 18th century, the 
Bourbon State took over these mortgages and attempted to li­
quidate them in order to fill the royal coffers, panic struck 
the colonies and many hacendados were ruined.156
Commerce
Trade between Spain and the colonies, it is well known, 
was a monopoly of the crown. The function, of trading with 
the colonies was delegated to the consulado of Seville, a 
corporate merchants guild which served as another bureaucratic 
arm of the monarchy, while at the same time profiting from 
holding the trade monopoly. Similar merchant guilds were
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organized in Lima and Mexico City.157 In addition to the 
merchant guilds, the crown set up the Casa de Contratacion 
{Board of Trade) which regulated trade in the interest of 
the monarchy and restricted it to the privileged few. All 
trade was routed through a very few ports, as to allow tight 
control of who traded and what they traded in order to 
facilitate the collection of royal taxes and to prevent the 
illegal export of bullion. Only official ports could receive 
ships and goods from Spain and send ships and goods back. 
Veracruz (an entrepot for Mexico City), Portobello ( a transfer 
point for goods on their way to the west coast), Callao 
(entrepot for Lima), and Cartegena (another transfer point for 
goods proceeding to or from Lima) were the only cities duly 
authorized. In effect, trade could be officially conducted 
only through the Lima and Mexico City consulados.15® This 
monopoly of the larger merchants of the consulados, usually 
peninsulares, discriminated against local creole merchants 
and consumers who were gouged by the high prices they were 
required to pay for goods from Spain. High prices and high 
profits were built into the system as these merchants 
profited by keeping supply short and prices high.15®
Merchant groups in America and Spain were not two 
separate groups. Having personal contacts, preferably 
familial, with members of the Seville consulado was generally
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a pre-requisite to membership in the American consulados.
These trading families maintained their privileged position 
by financing loans to the crown and jobs for colonial bureau­
crats who either had to buy their office or were required to
160leave a security payment with the crown. Local trade, on
the other hand, was fairly open. It seems that almost every­
one, hacendados, bureaucrats and clergy, in the upper reaches 
of colonial society engaged or invested in trade, even though 
many may not have wanted to be identified as merchants.
While the Spanish colonies were highly commercialized 
for this era, the fact that buying and selling was engaged in 
to such an extent should not seduce the observer into the 
belief that a bourgeois society was emerging. As Gongora 
argues, in the case of the particularly enterprising new 
Basque, Cantabrian and Navarrese merchants, they "...were 
passionately interested in acquiring titles of nobility and 
were full of enthusiasm for genealogy, ...and they frequently 
acquired titles of nobility or the habits of the military 
orders. The 'bourgeois' life style was still alien to their 
collective consciouness. Their habits of thrift and diligence 
were at all times typical for an immigrant class, and never 
in our opinion, developed the characteristics which would 
make it possible for us to describe, these merchants as a 
'bourgeois c l a s s ' " , T h e y ,  like all others in colonial
111
society, aspired to the seigniorial idea.
Bureaucracy
The fact that so much of the economic and social life of
the Spanish American colonies was regulated by the crown
created a society that was highly politicized and thus made
the State bureaucracy the focal point of all attention.
Practice, however, rarely followed form in the colonial
bureaucracy. But, whether it was corrupt, influenced by
Spaniards or colonials, followed or did not follow royal
163instructions and decrees is immaterial. What must never
be lost sight of is that this bureaucracy mediated social 
relations throughout the colonial era. Regardless of what 
individuals thought of the practices of various members of 
the bureaucracy, they still recognized its legitimacy through 
the crown.
Prior to the Bourbon raforms, the colonial bureaucracy
was a system of hierarchic yet overlapping authority. A
common structure of authority was reproduced at all levels
of administration in an executive and judicial body melded
together - King and Council of the Indies; Viceroy and
164Audencia; Governor or Corregidor and Cabildo.  ̂ Each 
nominally judicial body shared power with the executive but, 
the executive was always superior and the ultimate decisions 
were his. All decisions, however, even those of the viceroy
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were required to be submitted to the Council of the Indies 
and needed the ultimate approval of the King.^6  ̂ Although 
the viceroys were the superordinate authorities in the 
colonies, many other officials were not chosen by them and 
thus, could not be removed by them. The fact that any 
official could independently petition the King directly, 
created havoc with the authority of the viceroys^^®, while 
the great deal of overlapping of administrative responsibility 
created conflict that could only be solved by appeal to the
King and Council.^67
Of more interest here is the local administration which 
had to deal with the everyday life of colonial America. 
Provincial governors and corregidores (they were generally 
synonymous if not in title, then in function and powers) were 
appointed either by the monarch or viceroy, with the consent 
of the Council. These administrators combined in their hands 
the distribution of local justice and the local police
ICOpower. The corregidor of both Spanish and Indian towns
presided over the cabildo and was given the authority to 
intervene in its affairs.
Although originally appointed by the viceroy and audencia, 
corregidores and other local officials were later appointed 
predominantly by the monarch as, in an attempt to supplement 
the hard pressed treasury, more and more colonial offices were
.113
s o l d . 169 As such offices were sold, they came to be seen more 
and more as means to grow rich. Favoritism towards certain 
colonists who could pay grew rampant as it was local officials 
who could help or hinder one's access to the great resources 
controlled by the bureaucracy. Higher bureaucrats */ere not 
immune from this sort of corruption as, according to Stanley 
and Barbara Stein, "...they strove for consensus among con­
flicting groups on the basis of bribery not equity. In this 
fashion powerful interests in effect manipulated viceroys who 
found in colonial office economic opportunities lacking in the 
metropolis."17 0
Two important points should now be clear from the above 
brief description of the Spanish American colonial regime.
One is the absence of capitalist production. The other is 
the important role played by the Imperial bureaucracy in the 
regulation and distribution of land, labor and trade.
The goals of the crown in the settling of the Americas 
were always geared towards the needs of the Spanish State.
From the earliest settlement of the Caribbean islands as 
simple trading entrepots to the discovery and exploitation of 
the vast silver mines of New Spain and Peru, there was no 
intention on the part of the Spanish State to create in 
America, or Spain for that matter, a capitalist economy.
Many commentators have, in fact, pointed to the debilitating
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effects of the large bullion infusions on the nascent capi­
talist sectors in Spain after the American discoveries.1?1 
For the varied forms of social relations of production - 
tribute, unpaid personal service (or serf) labor, forced 
'wage labor', slave labor, debt peonage and guild labor - 
coupled with economic monopoly in land, trade and manufacture 
based on political privilege obtained legally or through 
graft - to be considered 'capitalist' is to define capitalism 
as a useful concept out of existence. As Gongora points out, 
"...eighteenth century society (in Spanish America) cannot be 
described as 'bourgeois' in any sense of the word, if one 
bears in mind, for example, that in addition to this more or 
less compulsory attachment to the land Negro slavery still 
persisted as an i n s t i t u t i o n . .172
For those who point to the highly commercialized nature 
of Spanish colonial society as an indication of the presence 
of capitalism, we need only to point out the conditions of 
production under which the commodities traded were produced 
and the limited extent of exchange. As indicated above, the 
bulk of goods produced in Spanish America for trade either 
to Spain or within the colonies were produced under non­
capitalist relations of production. Legal trade, and a good 
deal of contraband trade, dealt in the transfer of bullion 
for European goods, while internal trade dealt ', in the
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provisioning of mines, or cities which were basically adminis­
trative centers devoid of any production t h e m s e l v e s . M o s t  
people in fact provided for themselves and had access to the 
means subsistence, no matter how tenuous or inadequate. The 
reports from various areas in the colonies of labor shortages 
in the 18th century, coupled with reports of widespread
1 *7 Avagrancy indicate a very low level of proletarianization. 
Although large numbers of Indians were tied to the market 
economy* through the need to raise cash for taxes and goods 
forced upon them by corregidores, and/or by producing goods 
sold in Spanish markets, they always maintained, in some 
measure, their own communal social relations of production.
They became 'market creatures' only to the extent that 
they had to.
Spaniards and creoles were interested in profit and 
becoming wealthy, yet the compulsion to profit was dramatically 
different than would appear in a capitalist economy. In a 
society in which a seigniorial ideal prevailed, to make it, 
to be successful required one to approximate the aristocratic 
ideal of becoming a lord of the land.^^ Wealth acquired in 
trade, mining, farming, graft, tribute and bureaucratic 
employment went into the purchase of land and titles of 
nobility to enhance one's social status, or the purchase of 
bureaucratic positions as a naans to the other two. The logic
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of interminable accumulation as an end in itself, the hallmark 
of a capitalist ethic, never pervaded Spanish colonial society.
The varied systems of social relations of production and 
land tenure which existed in the colonial era were made 
possible by the Spanish Imperial bureaucracy. The regulation 
and distribution of privileged access to the important 
resources and trade of the colonies prevented competition for 
these from breaking out into open conflict between the various 
owning classes by displacing it to one between the colonists 
and the bureaucracy. Further, the reproduction of the various 
labor systems required the intervention of the State at some 
point. It must be remembered that the colonial elite was 
always relatively small in numbers in relation to the large, 
mostly alien, population and thus force and ideology were the 
primary means of extracting surplus labor. These were provided 
by the bureaucracy through law, the church, and police 
(militia and army).
Regardless of how corruptand tied to creole interests 
the bureaucracy became during the 17t.h century, the legitimacy 
of the bureaucracy was never challenged by colonials or 
Spaniards. Disputes with and within the bureaucracy occurred 
quite naturally in a system in which overlapping hierarchies, 
shared jurisdiction and a combination of subservience and 
autonomy prevailed*^ and where redress was sought by appeal
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to another or higher authority, or the paying off of crown 
officials to look the other way.1-^ As John Leddy Phelan 
suggests, the flexibility inspired in the expression 'I obey 
but do not execute' permitted the bureaucracy wide latitude 
in adjusting their actions to local conditions without, 
however, de-legitimizing the system.1-̂ 8
This flexibility was, in fact, the secret to the longev­
ity of Spanish rule in America. Its undermining by Bourbon 
reformism in the late 18th century was to create much of the 
tension that vented itself in the Wars of Independence and 
upheavals of the first half of the 19t.h c e n t u r y . T h i s  
flexibility created a highly centralized bureaucratic regime, 
which overlaid a regional power structure that retained a 
good deal of autonomy within it. As 0. Carlos Stoetzer 
claims, "The Spanish Empire in America was actually built on 
the federative basis of its many towns and provinces".1-80
Regional autonomy was not alien to the Spanish political 
experience. Spain, the first of the centralized Absolutist 
States, was itself only nominally centralized. As the Steins 
relate, "The marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, often con­
sidered the birth of the modern Spanish State, resulted not 
in the unification of the Kingdoms of Aragon and Castile but 
in condominium in which the two parts of the 'Spanish Crown' 
co-existed as separate entites with separate laws, taxation
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systems, coinage and trading patterns".1®! Similarly the 
Basque provinces, although associated with Castile, retained, 
"...recognition of local privileges including freedom from 
Castilian taxation and military recruitment and most striking 
of all, maintenance of a customs frontier which gave the 'tax 
exempt provinces' the status of foreign nation in trade with 
Spain".I®2
What made this regionalism possible for so long, accord­
ing to Perry Anderson, was "The supply of huge quantities of 
silver from the Americas..."!®2 The Spanish State, unlike 
other Absolutisms in Western Europe could "...dispense with 
the slow fiscal and administrative unification which was a 
pre-condition for absolutism elsewhere. The stubborn recalci­
trance of Aragon was compensated by the limitless compliance 
of Peru".1®4 Herein lies the secret to the Spanish State's 
relative autonomy from powerful, geographically based, classes.
The basis for this regionalism in the Spanish American 
colonies, as in Spain, was the cabildo. The town has always 
been central to Spanish development and the same is true of 
the colonies.185 Urban development in Spain has its origins 
not as in Northern Europe with trade and the rise of the 
bourgeoisie, but in conquest and the need to administer newly 
acquired areas. The town was the outpost of the central 
power and its liberties were sanctioned as privileges
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deriving from the King who permitted some amount of self 
government.188 indeed, this balance of central State and 
local autonomy crystalized only in the Spanish town. In the 
colonies, the first act of the conquistadors was to establish a 
town and municipal government from which to administer the 
newly conquered territory. All social, political and economic 
life revolved around the town as it provided the basis for the 
exploitation of the surrounding countryside.18? Much like 
medieval Italian City States, the colonial town included more 
than just the town proper as its administrative and economic 
authority extended deep into the surrounding area.
During the first half of the 16th century, the cabildos 
wielded enormous power.188 Their decline in the subsequent 
period, usually associated with the sale of offices and the 
system of corregimiento,189 does not necessarily indicate the 
triumph of the central bureaucratic administration in con­
trolling regional autonomy but rather the co-opting of the 
bureaucracy to regional interests. It is no surprise therefore 
that cabildos re-generated in the latter half of the 18th 
century when the collusion of powerful local interests and the 
colonial bureaucracy was attacked and reformed by the Bourbon 
monarchy.190
The 17th century decline in mining and trade with Spain, 
coupled with the rise of fairly self-sufficient and prosperous
1?0
economies in the colonies, is often cited as an indication that 
the colonies wrested their economies from the clutches of the 
Spanish crown.^91 Such conclusions misunderstand the objec­
tives of the Spanish State. The colonial economies and their 
relationship to Spain were always the result of the interest 
of the Spanish State. That interest in the 16th century was 
the quest for European imperium. When that failed in the 17th 
century, it became holding (unsuccessfully) what it had won 
in the previous century.^®** War was expensive and, although 
the burden of taxation was felt most in Castile, the bullion 
from America made these adventures possible.^93
With hindsight, it is easy to see disaster in these 
policies but, according to the assumptions of the State, they 
were undeniably in its interest. First, in the exploitation 
of the colonies for its benefit the State contracted out the 
resources of the colonies to individuals and groups, satisfied 
that through their efforts it would be able to skim sufficient 
revenues off the top. This technique had worked admirably 
during the re-conquest and, in America, closer crown super­
vision never allowed the rise of an aristocracy as had occurred 
in Spain. The Stats was uninterested in all occupations but 
mining and the wealth that could be accrued from it and thus 
kept tight control over that sector.-^4 Its indifference to 
all other production and areas of the Empire is clear. In the
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Caribbean and other strategic-defensive areas of the Empire 
no effort was made to develop the resources or substantially 
halt the development of resources in those areas. Paraguay 
was, for the most part, given over tothe administration of 
Jesuit missionaries, much to the chagrin of the other 
colonists and bureaucrats alike. Chile provided Peru with a 
buffer against the hostile Indian tribes to the south. 
Argentina held Spanish claims to the Atlantic coast against 
the Portuguese while serving as a dam to prevent Peruvian 
silver from illegally leaving America. The Caribbean Islands 
served as strategic way stations for the silver flotilas.
The fact that prosperous economies grew in these neglected 
areas as a result of inattentiveness or, in the main areas 
of colonization by supporting the mining economy, was a 
result of crown policies, not their abrogation.
That Spain did not participate in this prosperity 
through colonial imperialism is related more to the fact that 
it could not, given the underdevelopment of its own economy 
which itself had been ravished by the bullionist policies of 
the State, than to the colonials wresting control of their 
economies themselves. This becomes clear in the 18th century 
when, through the Bourbon economic and administrative reforms 
in Spain, Spain began to develop the kind of economy that 
could take advantage of its colonies. With the adjustment
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of the Spanish economy through the actions of the Bourbon 
State, Spain began to institute a new policy of imperialism 
in America based, not on the extraction of precious metals, 
but rather a more modern trade imperialism.
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CHAPTER IV
THE BOURBON REFORM ERA: THE MODERN ABSOLUTIST
STATE IN COLONIAL SPANISH AMERICA
The Eourbon reforms of the latter half of the 3 8th 
century and che Wars of Independence are crucial to an 
understanding of the origin of the underdevelopment in 
ISth century Spanish America. A re-invigorated Spanish 
State, now under the direction of a modernizing Bourbon 
dynasty attempting to readjust the relationship between 
Spain and America on a basis of 'trade imperialism' 
intensified old tensions and conflicts held in check by the 
Imperial bureaucracy and, at the same time, introduced new 
tensions and conflicts. The new policies of the Bourbons 
not only called for a readjustment of the economic relation­
ship berween Spain and America but, more importantly, a 
political readjustment. In order to give the State adminis­
tration greater extractive capability, the balance between 
central State bureaucracy and local interests had to be done 
away with. Bourbon re-centralization in the form of the 
Intendencies destroyed that balance and led to a crisis of
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legitimacy which was only worsened by the fall of the Royal 
government in Spain during the Napoleonic Wars. This crisis 
of legitimcy, characterized as it was by tensions and con­
flicts between elements of the old Hapsburg bureaucracy and 
the new Bourbon bureaucracy, and compounded by tensions and 
conflicts caused by economic reforms (particularly trade and 
taxation), could not be contained once the basis of the 
regime, the monarchy, was removed with the abdications of 
Charles IV and Ferdinand VII.
The Wars of Independence were less liberation struggles 
against Spain than they were civil wars between the elites in 
Spanish America. With the legitimacy the Crown conferred 
upon the bureaucracy in Spanish America removed, the admin­
istration itself became a battleground for contending economic 
and political interests. This fact explains the more con­
fusing aspects of the 'liberation* struggle in Spanish America. 
On the one hand it has been seen as progressive, as an attempt 
to go further in the direction of the Enlightenment both 
politically and economically. According to this view, the 
Bourbon reforms only whetted the appetites of the creoles 
for economic development2 and their contact with the political 
ideas of the Enlightenment only spurred them on to seek 
greater political freedom, ultimately moving them in the 
direction of political independence.^ On the other hand,
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the struggle has also been seen as reactionary, a revolt
against the 'new Absolutism* of the Bourbons which destroyed
the symbiotic relationship between the Spanish colonial
bureaucracy and local interests. This of course included
economic interests which, hurt by Bourbon economic reforms,
sought a return to the previous restricted system of trade
4and labor control by which they had profited.
The conflict and instability of 19th century Spanish
America had its origin in the breakdown of the legitimacy
of the State during the Bourbon reform period and the civil 
warfare of the Wars of Independence. Nineteenth century 
conflict and instability were indications that the civil war 
had not ended with the winning of independence. In fact, it
was exacerbated by the fact that the State itself was the
prize of political conflict. Neither the Hapsburgs nor the 
Bourbons left to the Spanish Americans any workable formula 
for the creation of the class solidarity necessary to create 
a legitimate State. How these conflicts were worked out and 
the State re-built in the various Spanish American countries 
bears more on the origin of underdevelopment in Spanish Amer­
ica than any recourse to explanations which emphasize inter­
national trade. A brief analysis of the Bourbon reforms here, 
and the Wars of Independence in the subsequent chapter, will 
lay the foundation for a discussion of the 19th century
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origins of Spanish American underdevelopment.
The Bourbon Reforms & Spanish Americas Response
The 17th century decline of Spain in relation to coun­
tries which had become more powerful, not by sitting on a 
lode of silver, but by encouraging capitalistic development, 
reached its nadir by the turn of the century. The decadence 
and infertility of the latter Hapsburgs mirrored the similar 
fate of Spain as more powerful neighbors, principally France 
and England, stripped it of its European Empire and imposed 
a new dynasty upon the State. The new Bourbon monarchy how­
ever began a process of reform which it hoped would reverse 
the decline. This reform program closely followed the ex­
perience of French Bourbon absolutism, centralizing political 
power in a unitary bureaucratic system and stimulating trade 
and production within and between Spain and Spanish America.^ 
Although a discussion of the Bourbon reforms in Spain itself 
is beyond the scope of this study, some mention of them is in 
order as their seeming success in Spain led to some of them 
being transferred to America.
Most important among the reforms was political reform. 
The Administrative and political confusion caused by early 
unification was rectified. Local autonomy, which had been 
an important aspnot of Kapsburg absolutism, was obliterated
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by the incorporation of all the kingdoms of Spain (except for 
the Basque Provinces) into one centralized bureaucracy. Sep­
arate administrations were suppressed in Valencia in 1707, 
Aragon in 1711, Catalonia in 1716, and Majorca in 1715. 
Bureaucratic direction was centralized in the Council of 
Castile in 1707 and, at the local level, in regional Inten- 
dents in 1749.6 The Intendents were anned with broad fiscal 
and military authority and, it was hoped, would stimulate 
trade and production by reducing internal trade barriers.?
During the reign of Charles III (1759-1788) the pace of 
reform in Spain quickened and in America was begun in earnest. 
As Spain suffered military and strategic reverses in its 
alliance with France against Great Britain, the need for 
economic reform with the aim of generating greater revenues 
for the state became clearly apparent. In Spain, the State 
encouraged greater agricultural and manufacturing production 
while loosening the bindings which held trade in the hands of 
the Cadiz monopolists. During the later half of the 18th 
century, Spain's long moribundtextile industry revived and 
began organizing production on a truly capitalist basis.9 
Other manufacturing was encouragedlO while agriculture, 
principally grains and Mediterranean crops, such as olive 
oil, wine and fruits, were given impetus.H Both internal 
and external trade were encouraged, particularly with the
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American colonies, yet in neither case was the 19th century 
type 'free trade' practiced. Trade was highly protectionist, 
geared towards the economic and industrial development of 
Spain.12
As with all early capitalist development, the role of 
the State was extremely important in Spain during this period. 
Though hardly an example of a successful State induced trans­
formation^, it was, nevertheless, a genuine effort within 
the context of the aims of the State. The Bourbon reforms 
in America and Spain, it should be emphasized, were aimed at 
shoring up the State in the face of internal and external 
challenges, not economic development in itself or the greater 
well being of the incipient bourgeoisie. In fact, the 
Spanish State under the Bourbons was invariably an aristo­
cratic State. Although the economic reforms encouraged the 
formation and growth of the bourgeoisie and increased the 
administrative and fiscal powers of the bureaucracy, the 
aristocracy was not ignored. Between 1768 and 1797 the 
numbers who could claim nobility was reduced by the crown 
by 43%, lending greater prestige and exclusivity to the 
higher nobility.14 Its dominance in landownership, social 
prestige and high bureaucratic position was never challenged.15
Although Bourbon political and economic reforms in 
Spain may be interpreted as an effort to encourage capitalist
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development in the interest of the State a la the French 
Bourbons, the reforms as applied to Spanish America must be 
seen in a different light. Only Spain was to form the basis 
for a capitalist core nation - Spanish America was to be its 
colony and fuel its growth. The Bourbon reforms in Spanish 
America were not its 'capitalist revolution' - they were its 
introduction to capitalist colonialism.
The keystone of the whole Bourbon reform program then 
was the policy to readjust the political and economic rela­
tionship of Spain to her American possessions. The Bourbons 
sought to impose a capitalist colonial policy on the 
Americans. Spain’s economy would be stimulated by a trade in 
which the Americans produced raw materials for 'factory' Spain 
while providing her industries with a protected market. 
Production and trade thus stimulated, the State's revenues, 
through taxation, monopoly and investment, would expand. Yet, 
in order to achieve this result economic reform alone was not 
enough. Given the enormous role played by the bureaucratic 
machinery in the economy, political administrative reform 
became imperative. Below, X shall examine these reforms in 
broad outline, not in order to evaluate their success or 
failure, as this does not affect the thesis presented here, but 
rather to indicate the nature and degree of tensions and 
conflicts they produced and which were to carry over into the
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early national period and exacerbate the formation of new 
States in Spanish America.
Given the close connection between the State and the 
economy in 18th century Spanish America it i3 impossible to 
separate political and economic reforms - all political re­
forms had an economic content and all economic reforms had a 
political content. Chief among the reforms in South America 
proper was the geo-administrative reorganising of the Empire. 
Out of the Viceroyalty of Peru was carved two additional 
major administrative centers - the Viceroyalty of New 
Granada in 1739, and the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata 
in 1776. Of the two, the establishment of the latter was 
more important both from the Crown's point of view and in 
terms of the effect it had in creating conflict. Peru not 
only lost administrative and economic hegemony over the la 
Plata region (modern day Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay) 
which was virtually worthless, but also the valuable region 
called Upper Peru (modern day Bolivia) which held the rich 
silver producing mines at Potosi.1  ̂ Not only was a good deal 
of the silver of Upper Peru redirected towards Buenos Aires 
but long established trade networks for the provisioning of 
the mines and interregional trade between Lower Peru and 
western Argentina were disrupted. In addition, bureaucratic 
posts, particularly lucrative spots in Upper Peru, were made
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more difficult to acquire by the scores of office seekers in 
the once supreme Viceregal center at Lima. In John Fisher's 
words, "The double blow of commercial and territorial reor­
ganization threatened the interests of the powerful merchant 
and office holding groups as well as the general prosperity 
of the Viceroyalty
The Crown's purpose in elevating the la Plata region to 
Viceregal status was military-defensive as well as adminis­
trative-economic. Fearing attack of the rich interior pro-
/vinces through the back door of the Rio de la Plata by 
Portugal (Great Britain's ally) Charles III sent a large 
military expedition with Pedro de Cevallos, the first Viceroy 
of the Rio de la Plata, to dislodge the Portuguese from their 
stronghold at Colonia del Sacramento directly across the 
river from Buenos Aires.^ The Viceroyalty was made to 
include the rich provinces of Upper Peru because it obviously 
would not have been viable otherwise. Even as a small pre- 
viceregal colony, Buenos Aires required a subsidy from the 
Lima treasury. With the increased expense of becoming a 
Viceregal center, some tributary area had to be attached. 
Herbert Klein has shown that fiscally, even with the increased 
taxes imposed by the Bourbons and greater prosperity created 
by the quickening of economic activity induced by 'comercio 
libre', the province of Buenos Aires would never have been
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able to support a Viceregal administration without the reve­
nues provided by Potosi.3-9 Yet, although not fiscally 
profitable, a large amount of trade was funneled through 
Buenos Aires which, presumably, stimulated the Spanish economy 
and thus provided increased revenue to the Spanish State.20
Regardless of what other results they produced, the 
Bourbon reforms in America were designed to increase revenue 
for the Spanish State. Fiscal and economic-trade reforms were 
crucial and will be discussed presently, but more important, 
if this goal was to be met, was administrative-political re­
form. The Crown perceived that if it was to be successful 
in harnessing the wealth of America for the benefit of the 
Spanish State, the close relationship between local interests 
and its bureaucracy in America had to be broken. The new 
forms of surplus extraction required administrators who were 
less tied to local interests than the Hapsburg type bureau­
crats and thus, a bureaucratic reorganization of both 
hierarchy and personnel was called for.
The creation of Intendencies throughout Spanish America 
by 178623-, was designed to root out corruption in the Imperial 
bureaucracy which the Bourbon reformers believed stood in the 
way of the Spanish State's fuller exploitation of the colo­
nies. Juan de Ulloa, an early reform minded bureaucrat found, 
in the Peru of the 1750's, that from the corregidores on up to
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the Viceroy a trail of corruption in which administrators were 
paid off for favors was endemic and led to bad governemnt.22 
Similar charges of corruption can be found, especially with 
regard to the corregidores and alcaldes mayores, in the 
visitas of Jos^ de Galvez to New Spain and Antonio de Areche 
to Peru.23 Though modern historians have generally agreed with 
the Bourbon reformers' characterizations of the relationship 
between the Hapsburg bureaucracy and creole interests as being 
corrupt, it is hardly a fair evaluation and gives the impres­
sion that there was something 'wrong' with the system. From 
another perspective though, that of the Spanish American 
creoles, there was a good deal that was 'right' with the' 
system. For them, it was functional and did not constitute 
a corruption of the system - it was the system.24 James Scott 
has observed this apparent paradox and has argued that such 
'recurring acts of violence and corruption are thus more 
successfully analyzed as normal channels of political activity 
than as cases of deviant pathology..."25 What the Crown would 
find by attempting to close off this channel of political ex­
pression and reduce the creoles to the status of subservient 
colonials was grumbling, resistence, and the sabotaging of 
its policies.
The major 'evil' the Intendents were supposed to rectify 
was the corregimiento. They were also to tighten up on the
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collection of taxes and to stimulate production and trade in 
their provinces. The corregidores (alcaldes mayores in New 
Spain) were royal officials who supplemented their meager 
salaries (when they were paid at all) through repartimiento 
or the forced sale of goods, to Indians in their districts.26 
In order to pay for these goods the Indians were forced either 
to work the lands of local hacendados to whom the corregidor 
would distribute such labor, or to grow cash crops on their 
own land which could be sold in Spanish markets (these pro­
ducts were of course not sold in the market by the Indians 
themselves but by the corregidor, who acted as a middleman, 
making profits for himself).27 The repartimiento served two 
important functions in the colonial economy. First, it con­
nected the Indians to the Spanish economy and provided mer­
chants with a ready market for their goods. Second, it 
forced the Indians to produce for the Spanish economy at 
below subsistence renumeration ,ihus assuring Spaniards and 
creoles any Indian produced surplus. Connected to this 
system were merchants, landowners and other bureaucrats who 
may have had money tied up in this trade or who profited by 
looking the other way. It was in fact one of the major 
surplus-appropriation tools of the colonial era.
Corregidores also collected Indian tribute due the 
crown since it was established in 1579. Corregidores tended,
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though, to cheat both the crown and the Indians by preparing 
double tribute lists - one for themselves, and one for the 
Crown. The corregidor's list was much longer than the Crown's 
and thus, the corregidor could skim off a good portion of what 
was owed to the crown.28 in fact, in New Spain Gcflvez esti­
mated that 50% of the Indian tribute was pocketed by alcaldes 
mayores.29
The instituting of the Intendencies which were designed 
to end these abuses and provide greater revenue for the Crown 
has been characterized by Stanley Stein as 'internal free 
trade'.20 Through the elimination of the corregidores and 
their repartimiento,trade with the Indians was to become open 
for many small traders, reducing prices for the Indians and 
stimulating greater production on their part. The monopoly 
of the corregidores was to be broken and the Indians 
attached to the colonial economy directly through the market.31 
The tribute tax would be collected for the benefit of the 
Crown, not the corregidor and his cohorts. In addition, all 
other taxes, principally the Royal fifth and alcabala (sales 
tax) would fall under the supervision of the Intendents with 
the aim of eliminating f r a u d .32
The instituting of Intendencies in America was subjected 
to resistence in both Spain and America. In Spain, it is 
clear that the reform was blocked at every step by those
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whose interests (both political and economic) would be ad­
versely affected by it.33 Although Galvez first proposed 
Intendencies for New Spain in 1768, it was not until 1782 
that the reform was brought to America, and then only in the 
new Viceroyalty of Bio de la Plata. It was not until 1786 
that the reform was established where Galvez had originally 
proposed it - New Spain, the richest and most populous 
colony.34
More important though, was the opposition the Inten­
dencies engendered, and the tensions and conflicts they 
created in Spanish America. Resentment against this new 
and powerful layer of bureaucracy was immediate within the 
old Hapsburg bureaucracy. Viceroys and Audencias did not 
take the reduction of their powers and status g r a c e f u l l y .35 
Disputes and conflicts arose immediately between Viceroys 
and Superintendents who were to take over the fiscal adminis­
tration of the Viceroyalties.36 This reduction of the fiscal 
authority of the Viceroys was recinded and the Superinten­
dencies abolished when the intransigence of the Viceroys 
made the new system unworkable.3? Conflicts between Viceroys 
and Intendents over jurisdiction became endemic, with Viceroy 
Croix of Peru recommending, in 1789, the abolition of the 
Intendency and the restoration of the C o r r e g i m i e n t o . 38 The 
Audencias, Royal law courts whose role included administra-
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tive and consultative functions, similarly resisted and sub­
verted the reform. John Lynch argues that, "The introduction 
of the Intendents into Upper Peru provoked a reaction on the 
part of the Audencia (of Charcas) which completely shattered 
the united front of Spanish Government in this part of the 
Empire, and created a tension which contributed in no small 
way to the undermining of the colonial regime in Upper 
Peru".39 Since the Intendents had judicial jurisdiction at 
the local level, it was inevitable that a clash between these 
institutions would develop, especially when one saw in the 
establishment of the other a diminution of its jurisdiction 
and status.40
If the establishment of the Intendencies distressed 
the older elements of the Spanish American bureaucracy, it 
distressed merchants and large landowners even more. With 
the abolition of the corregimiento, these important elements 
of colonial society could see only ruin. Not being able to 
legally compel them to pay or labor, merchants withdrew credit 
from their trade with the Indians while landowners, who had 
profited through labor distributions made to them by 
corregidors, lost a source of free labor.4^ In New Spain, for 
example, cochineal and cotton production and trade declined 
dramatically with the abolition of the repartimiento.42
The crux of the problem was that the Indians would not
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work for the Spaniards or creoles without some compulsion 
being exerted by the authorities. True, tributes were raised 
and better collected, but repartimiento directed Indian labor 
into projects and production the Spaniards and creoles de­
sired - abolition made this all the more difficult. In the 
colonies there was sustained protest throughout the last qua- 
ter of the 18th century against the abolition.of repartimien­
to.43 It never really died out in the colonial era though. 
Subdelegates, subordinates of the Intendents who often were 
creoles {and many times former corregidores), continued the 
practice of repartimiento although in a less formalized and 
more intermitent way.44 These subdelegates, due to their 
very low salaries (5% of tribute collected),45 continued 
repartimiento but, at least in the Peruvian sierra, they used 
it simply as a means of supplementing their meager wages by 
the forced sale of goods, not as a means of forcing Indian 
labor into the colonial economy. They therefore, in John 
Fisher's words, "...contented themselves with making them 
(the Indians) pay for goods without bothering about how they 
obtained the money. As a result, many communities which had 
been relatively prosperous were now stripped of their wealth 
and property"4® In the end, the formal abolition of 
repartimiento satisfied very few in Spanish America. Rather, 
it only worsened old tensions and conflicts and created new
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ones. Merchants, landowners, Intendents, Subdelegates,
Indians and reformers found in the new situation only chaos.
The relationship between the Intendents and the cabildos 
is more problematic than that between them and the Viceroys or 
Audencias. According to most observers, the cabildos were in 
a state of decline and decadence when the Intendencies were 
instituted. 47 i*he Intendents are generally given credit for 
reviving the cabildos and, by inference, giving them the 
strength to perform a very important and leading role in the 
independence struggles. Intendents did have much to do with 
the revival of the cabildos as important administrative and 
political institutions. Where town governments had dis­
appeared, Intendents re-established them. Where interest in 
serving on them was weak, Intendents forced service upon the 
citizens. Where town revenues were sparse and inadequate, 
Intendents found new sources of income.48
In the early years of the Intendencies evaluations of 
Intendents by these newly revived cabildos were generally 
favorable. Town life had greatly improved with the greater 
civic activity and revenues of municipal g o v e r n m e n t . A f t e r  
about the first 15 years of the Intendency, though, the rela­
tionship between the Intendents and the cabildos deteriorated 
and became conflictual.50 The most common explanations of 
this phenomena have been, on the one hand the poorer qualtiy
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of Intendents under the administration of Charles IV and 
Godoy52, and on the other hand, the rising aspirations of the 
cabildos once they had been revived by the Intendents.^2 In 
both these explanations there is some truth, but there was 
more to the revival of the cabildos than this. Magali 
Sarfatti and 0. Carlos Stoetzer have argued that the revival 
of the cabildos has a great deal to do with the diminuation 
of creole presence and influence in the Spanish colonial 
bureaucracy proper. As creoles lost influence and position 
there, the cabildos once again became important as representa­
tives of creole i n t e r e s t s . 53 in fact, Stoetzer sees a direct 
relationship between creole exclusion from viceregal office 
and the revival of the cabildos.54 There can be no doubt, 
however, that Crown officials directed creole influence and 
energies into the cabildos in order to better control them.
While creole influence increased within the authority- 
weak cabildos, it decreased in other, more powerful insti­
tutions. In Lima, for example, after having dominated the 
Viceregal administration through an overwhelming majority on 
the Audencia and in other offices, the creole share of offices 
decreased throughout the Bourbon period.55 The Crown, its 
other reforms apparently threatened by such dominance, began 
a policy of exclusion against creoles for bureaucratic office 
in America. The newly formed Audencias of Buenos Aires and
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Cuzco were made up of peninsulares with one exception^® and 
creole representation on the Audencias of Lima57 and Mexico 
City58 was systematically reduced. As the Bourbons: 
tightened the screws on creole placemen, it became more and 
more difficult to secure a bureaucratic position. Few 
creoles were allowed to become Intendents, and even access 
to lower bureaucratic positions was denied the creoles. 
Although Jacques Barbier has shown that, at least in Chile, 
however, creole influence could survive and even thrive in 
such an atmosphere given the peninsular and creole tendency 
to create family alliances.59 Even though creoles still 
held a preponderance of bureaucratic offices in the lower 
ranks towards the end of the colonial era, the perception 
that the tide had turned against them and that promotion 
into the higher bureaucracy would be closed to them caused 
deep resentments against peninsulares. The introduction of 
the Intendencies only hardened their displeasure as they saw 
a new wave of peninsulares take posts which they felt they 
should have by right.60 Creoles in fact were demanding they 
get all the bureaucratic positions in America5^ and Juan Egaffa, 
a contemporary, claimed that exclusion from high office was 
one of the major reasons for the Wars of I n d e p e n d e n c e . 62
Administrative reforms under the Bourbons began a shift 
away from the Church as a major prop of the colonial system
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in favor of the military.®-* The first attack on the Church
was, of course, the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767. The
Jesuits, who disputed the 'divine rights' doctrine of
absolutist kings, supported the universal monarchy concept
of the Pope and, resisted the secularizing of political power 
64in Spain. Their overwhelming influence in the Spanish 
American society, economy and educational system thus made 
them formidable competitiors to Charles Ill's drive for com­
plete control of the colonies.®® Their expulsion not only 
removed this threat, it also freed up a great deal of Jesuit 
owned land which the Crown sold for its own profit.®®
Reaction to the expulsion by most Spanish Americans 
was outrage (although in Paraguay, because the Jesuits so 
dominated the economy, the creoles supported the expulsion). 
Of the 650 Jesuits expelled from New Spain, 450 were native 
creoles®7 and riots immediately broke out in Guanajuato,
San Luis Potosi and San Luis de la Paz while resentment 
was widespread.69 In New Spain D.A. Brading writes,
"...the Visitation (of Galvez) and the Expulsion marked a 
turning-point in relations between the Spanish monarchy and 
that small colonial establisment which had hitherto governed 
Mexico".70
Diminution of Church influence and power did not end 
there. Throughout the latter half of the 18th century, the
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Church saw itself subjected to greater ignomies. In 1753, 
the religious clergy lost the right to occupy parishes in 
Indian villages?!, while in 1774, tithe collection in the 
colonies was taken away from the Church and given to the Royal 
bureaucracy.?2 The establishment; of the Intendencies also 
diminished the status of the Church by subjecting it locally 
to the patronato of the Intendents.?3 Intendents, directly 
responsible for the construction and maintenance of Churches 
and cemetaries, the conduct of the clergy and the collection 
of tithes, created tensions not only between them and the 
clergy, but also within the clergy between the lower clergy, 
directly supervised by the Intendents, and the upper clergy, 
supervised only by the Viceroys.?^
In addition to these affronts to the clergy, a con­
scious policy of reducing their fueros (special privileges 
which prevented their being brought before secular courts) 
was undertaken. For many of the lower clergy who suffered 
on meager pay, the loss of the fuero was an outright attack 
on the only social distinction they held.75
The reduction of the status of the clergy affected both 
upper and lower clergymen but, for later developments, the 
feelings of the lower clergy are more important. Recruited 
predominantly from creole families in economic adversity, 
the lower clergy was filled with creoles who seethed at their
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misfortune. Victims of downward social mobility, many creoles 
found in the Church the last bulwark between them and social 
oblivion.^ New attacks on the Church and its status only 
made them more alienated from the system and ripe for 
oppositional action.^
The administrative reforms of the Bourbons were made 
necessary by their attempt to create out of their American 
possessions 'real colonies' which would benefit Spain. The 
administrative reforms though, were designed to work together 
with commercial and fiscal reforms which were geared towards 
the extraction of greater surpluses from the colonies.
These commercial and fiscal reforms have been viewed by 
historians as the most important aspects of the Bourbon 
reforms. They were seen by contemporaries, on the one hand, 
to have caused criticism and protest for disrupting a per­
fectly well run system and, on the other to have not gone far 
enough and thus, provided the impetus for the Wars of Inde­
pendence.^® This apparent paradox only indicates the very 
real tensions and conflicts they created in Spanish colonial 
society and points to the origin of conflicts within the 
colonial elite which were to continue into the national 
period.79
The thrust of the commercial reform - 'comercio libre'- 
was to abolish restriction and monopoly in the Spanish trade
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with the American colonies. Between 1765 and 1776 tariffs 
were lowered, the monopoly of Cadiz and Seville abolished and 
other Spanish ports allowed to trade with the Caribbean.
When, in 1778, 'comercio libre' was extended to the mainland 
and formalized, Buenos Aires, Peru and Chile were added. In 
1789 Venezuela, whose trade had hitherto been the exclusive 
monopoly of the Caracas Company, and New Spain, the wealthiest 
colony in America, were integrated into the system,®®
Though by 1789, 'comercio libre' was geographically 
unlimited within the Spanish Empire, trade between Spanish 
America and foreign ports was strictly prohibited. Although 
a wide range of foreign goods were sold in Spanish America by 
Spanish merchants, these were subject to high duties both on 
arrival in Spain and then again in the colonies.®* These 
restrictions were, of course, little different from those of 
other colonial powers.®2 As John Fisher argues, "...it was 
typical of the general European pattern of the period...".83
With 'comercio libre' no longer were Spanish merchants 
and creole producers bound to the inefficient fleet system. 
Goods could be shipped to and from America at any time and a 
larger number of ports could send and receive goods. Trade 
between Spain and America expanded dramatically, though not 
as dramatically as Baring's estimate of a 700% increase®4, and 
Spanish goods, which at the end of the 17th century made up
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only 15% of the goods exported to America, rose to more than 
50% of the goods sold by 1792.8  ̂ The system though, did not 
change overnight and, up till the end of the colonial era, 
the traditional pattern of trade continued to survive. In 
Spain, c/diz continued to dominate the export traded, while 
in America, although Buenos Aires did become a major port,
Vera Cruz (Mexico City) and Callao (Lima) still remained the 
major import and export centers.8?
In America, 'comercio libre* had differing effects on 
the various classes and geographic areas but, in all cases, 
it was to cause controversy, tension, and conflict. In Peru 
and New Spain which had been the chief beneficiaries of the 
old monopoly system, the Consulados of Mexico City and Lima 
were loud in their denunciation of the new system of trade.88 
Few were, however, ruined by 'comercio libre* because the 
bulk of trade still passed through the large merchant houses 
in Cadiz where the Mexico City and Lima merchants had superior 
contacts.8® Nevertheless, these merchants who had once 
monopolized all of the American trade now had to put up with 
competition from new men who geared their operations to the 
new market conditions.®8
In New Spain, the crown established new Consuldados 
in Vera Cruz and Guadalajara, and Vera Cruz became a new 
major center of trade.®^ As the New Spain trade fell more
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and more into the hands of Vera Cruz merchants who expected 
a smaller return on capital, the larger Mexico City merchants 
accelerated their transformation into landowners and miners.92 
The enormous increase of silver production in New Spain at 
this time can, in large part, be attributed to the dramatic 
rise of investment capital made available by merchants getting 
out of commerce. In Peru, competition came principally 
from the merchant communities in Chile and Buenos Aires as 
merchants in these colonies were granted their own Consulados 
and thus captured a good deal of the trade that would have 
been funneled through Lima.
Obviously the new conditions of trade tended to serve 
the interests of some while hurting those of others. The new 
men of commerce, principally Basques and Montaneses, saw the 
opening up of commerce as a great opportunity to get ahead 
while the monopoly merchants found that the markets now con­
stantly flooded with cheap goods undercut their previous
Q Apractices and high profits. ’Commercio libre’ though, had 
other, maybe more serious, effects in disrupting the American 
economy and creating tensions and conflicts. Many local 
industries which had grown up in the colonies during the 16th 
and 17th century period of mercantile neglect by Spain saw 
themselves ruined by the competition from imported goods from
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Spain. In New Spain and Peru, the textile industry was hit 
hard by the influx of Spanish textiles. In Peru, the number 
of textile obrajes was reduced by half by the end of the 18th 
century, victims, to a large degree, of Spanish textiles 
brought overland from Buenos Aires."  Textile production in 
Quito and Tucuman similarly suffered.96 New Spain, by the 
end of the 18th century, the textile industry in Queretaro 
and Puebla was 'suffering crippling competition from exports 
from E u r o p e " . W i n e  production in western Argentina was all 
but eliminated with the influx of Spanish aguardiente, and 
any internal production which directly competed with goods 
from Spain declined."
Other industries, particularly agricultural cash crops - 
cacao, indigo, tobacco, coffee, cotton and hides, saw a 
dramatic rise in their fortunes. Yet, none was more impor­
tant, as always, than silver mining. Both of the principal
mining centers, Peru (also Upper Peru now in the Viceroyalty 
sof Rio de la Plata) and New Spain, saw a dramatic rise in 
silver production in the last half of the 18th century. In 
fact, 'comercio libre' and colonial silver production fed 
off one another as the main export of the colonies - used to 
pay for the enormous rise in imports - was silver." Even 
Buenos Aires, whose economy some argue rose on the basis of 
the export of hides!", really lived off the silver it
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extracted from Upper Peru through its monopoly of trade.101
If commercial reforms were not enough to disrupt the 
colonial economies, the Crown, following its plan of expanding 
its extractive capability in America, increased the number, 
rate and classes of people subject to Imperial taxes. Not 
only did the Spanish State seek to reap the bounty of mer­
cantilist trade, it also sought the benefits of direct taxa­
tion. While many of the taxes and imposts which had held 
back trade between Spain and America were lowered or 
abolished^^, sales taxes, and tribute from the Indians and 
castas were increased and better collected. In the colonies, 
Indian tribute rolls were reformed, adding many more tributees 
and thus increasing total revenues.^03 in Peru, during the 
Areche visitation (1777-1782), tribute collections jumped
1,000,000 pesos a year by 1778 to about 4,000,000 pesos and 
to 5,838,852 pesos in 1779^04 and capitation taxes were ex­
tended, although unsuccessfully, to free blacks on the 
coast.105 In New Spain, tribute which had averaged about 
596,220 pesos a year during the 1760's jumped to 955,813 
pesos in 1779.^06
The alcabala, or sales tax, which had hitherto been 
farmed out to private individuals, was, in all the colonies 
by 1776, collected by an army of Royal officials who, once 
the Intendencies were established, were supervised
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exclusively by Peninsular Spaniards.10  ̂ Customs houses,
staffed by paid Royal officials, now dramatically increased
108the revenues taken in by the Crown through sales taxes.
In New Spain alone, total receipts rose from 1,488,690 pesos 
in 1775 to 2,360,252 pesos in 1779 and later to about
3,000,000 pesos.109 In Peru, the alcabala was increased 
from four to six per cent and, with the increasing efficiency 
of the fiscal system, many merchants, landowners and miners 
who had once escaped taxation found themselves forced to 
pay.110
The commercial reforms and taxation policy of the 
Bourbons clearly agitated social, economic and political 
life in the Spanish American colonies. Greater taxation 
touched off tax revolts throughout the colonies, and a com­
mercial system, through which the colonies were drained of 
their surpluses, only exacerbated social relations between 
all groups in colonial society. In societies primarily 
based upon subsistence production, where no fundamental 
change in the mode of production had occurred but more sur­
plus was extracted, it is not surprising that fairly violent 
revolts by all classes would ensue.
Revolts, particularly of the lower classes, were cer­
tainly not unknown in the period before 1750. In fact, they 
were quite common and understandable given the rigid class
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system of the colonial era.^^- But, after 1700, and partic­
ularly after 1750, the number of revolts grew with 32% of all
112the revolts in the colonies occurring after 1750. After 
1750, tax revolts were endemic throughout the colonies. In 
1776 riots broke out in Santiago de Chile with the publica­
tion of decrees reforming the tax system and these protests 
ultimately led to the recinding of the decrees and the removal 
of the Contador, Gonzalez B l a n c o , j n 1779, free Pardos in 
Lambayeque, Peru resisted the 'military contribution' imposed 
upon them by Visitor Areche.114 Anti-tax revolts also broke 
out in New Spain^^, bUt were generally low pressure affairs 
compared with those in the poorer colonies of South America.116 
The most serious of the revolts occurred in the Vice­
royalties of Peru and New Granada. The more important of the 
two revolts, the Tupac Amaru revolt in Peru, clearly indi­
cated the pressures put upon the system of production by 
Bourbon commercial and tax reforms. The revolt, which burst 
out on November 4, 1780 when Jos/ Gabriel Condorcanqui 
(Tupac Amaru II), a curaca of Tinta, seized the Corregidor, 
Antonio de Arriaga, charging him with extorting excess
repartimiento from the Indians and, ten days later, had him 
117executed. The revolt spread rapidly throughout the sierra 
and melded in with other revolts which were going on contem­
poraneously. On January 1, 1780 revolt broke out in
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Arequipa, while conspiricies were discovered in Cuzco,
118Moquegua, Huancavelica, Huaraz Pasco and La Plata. In
December 1780, Oruro in Upper Peru was taken over by Indians
*and half-castes led by Jacincto Rodriguez, a wealthy Spanish
miner, while by January 1781 the Puno area was also in revolt*
In the La Paz region, an Aymara''Indian, Julian Apaza who took
the name Tupac Catari, initiated a seige of La Paz in the
middle of March 1781 and to the North, Tupac Amaru's nephew,
119Andres, led a revolt in the corregiwiento of Larecaja.4"^3 
Revolt spread elsewhere in the Viceroyalty, from Cuzco to 
Tucuman and, by the end of 1781, it seemed that the whole 
sierra was in revolt. Though the Tupac Amaru revolt had 
specific grievances against the system which included the 
repartimiento, the corregidores, the mita, and the alcabala, 
its extent and social make-up makes it more complex and indi­
cates the wide dissatisfaction caused by the commercial and 
fiscal measures taken by the Bourbons.12®
The Tupac Amaru revolt was not just a tax rebillion.121 
The economy of the whole area of rebellion had been hit par­
ticularly hard by administrative, commercial and fiscal re­
forms. By separating Upper Peru and Lower Peru which had, 
up to the creation of the Viceroyalty of Rxo de la Plata in
1776, been one economic/commercial region, hardships were
122created for all classes while commercial reforms coupled
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with higher taxation siphoned the life blood out of the pro­
ductive heart of Peru. As tribute and taxes rose and were 
sent to Lima, less and less of the surplus produced remained 
in the sierra which must have caused merchants, landowners, 
miners and corregidores to extract a greater surplus from 
their laborers. This explains the vacillation cf creoles 
and Spaniards within and without the Tupac Amaru rebellion. 
While the revolt addressed the grievances of all those ad­
versely affected by the Bourbon reforms - the owning classes, 
poor mestizos of some property, and Indians, - the movement 
impossibly tried to hold such a contentious alliance together. 
As the revolt strengthened and moved from success to success, 
those who relied upon the State to insure their superior 
economic and/or social position over the Indians, including 
Indian curacas, very quickly moved from support or neutrality 
to open opposition to the movement.*23
The Spanish State's response to the rebellion was not 
to adjust the system in favor of Indian or creole grievances. 
Although repartimiento and mita were abolished (only to arise 
surrepticiously in a more destructive form - see p. 150-152) 
tribute collections rose and tax relief was nonexistent. 
Imposed upon the sierra was the Intendent system while creoles, 
now considered unreliable and potentially rebellious, were 
watched over by regular Spanish troops.124 In the Crown's
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opinion, the creoles could no longer be trusted to administer 
or protect its interests in the colonies.
The reaction o£ the Crown to the Tupac Amaru revolt 
which was early abandoned by the sierra elite and became a 
predominantly Indian rebellion was in sharp contrast to its 
reaction to the Comunero Revolt which broke out in Socorro, 
New Granada in March-April 1781.^25 ^he impetus for the 
revolt which brought an army of 20,000 creoles, mestizos and 
Indians to threaten the capital of the Viceroyalty at Bogota* 
was very similar to that of the Tupac Amaru revolt - taxes. 
The grievances of the comuneros revolved around the imposi­
tion of higher taxes, higher prices for tobacco and aguar­
diente which had become Crown monopolies, and restrictions on 
the growing of tobacco imposed by Visitor Gutierrez de 
Pineres. The alcabala was raised from four to six percent 
with the addition of a sales tax for the Armada de Barlovento 
(Windward Island Fleet) and was better collected with the 
switch from tax farming to direct collection by royal offi­
cials. For the comuneros though, the reform of the tobacco 
and aguardiente monopolies were a greater source of discon­
tent, The tobacco monopoly not only raised the price of 
the good, outraging consumers, it also restricted its 
growing throughout the colony. Many small property owners 
(who made up the bulk of the comuneros), therefore, lost the
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only cash crop they had. Although restrictions on the pro­
duction of aguardiente was not an issue, its price rise 
coupled with that of tobacco was a main focus of popular 
rage.
The Comunero Revolt began in March 1781 with tax riots 
by the lower class people of Soccoro. By April, a good por­
tion of the elite of Soccoro had joined the rebellion and had 
become its leadership. The participation of the elite tempered 
the riotous activities of the lower orders and made the re­
bellion, in terms of property damage and loss of life, a low 
gauge affair. Under elite leadership, the Comunero Movement 
became a coalition of upper class creoles, mestizos and 
Indians (although the Indian component was infinitesimally 
less important than in the Tupac Amaru revolt). Uniting 
the towns and villages along the road to Bogota* to the cause, 
the Comunero leadership was able to get the Viceregal 
authorities to capitulate to all their demands - fundamentally 
the dismantling of the Bourbon reforms.
Once back in control though, the new Viceregal authori­
ties, principally in the person of the new Viceroy Archbishop 
Antonio Caballero y Gongora (who had negotiated the capitula­
tion as Archbishop of Bogota*) began a process of pacification 
which was in sharp contrast to the draconian measures taken 
by the authorities in Lima in the wake of the Tupac Amaru
168
rebellion. The capitulations were annuled and the ringleaders 
either exiled or made politically impotent, but tax relief was 
granted in a reduction of the price of tobacco and aguardiente 
and the suppression of the sales tax for the Armada de 
Barlovento. Because the elite of Socorro was so heavily in­
volved in the rebellion, the new Viceroy's policy was aimed 
at separating the elite from the lower classes so that such 
a dangerous coalition never form again. Harsh in its treat­
ment of lower class leaders - the only one executed was 
Jose*Antonio Galan a lower class leader - the Viceregal 
authorities attempted to shepherd the creole elite back into 
the Spanish fold through conciliation and compromise.
The Spanish State's distrust of American creoles led 
it to seek a de facto alliance with groups it felt could 
countervail the pretensions of the creoles. Mestizos and 
pardos who, under the 'society of castas', found themselves 
locked into subordinate social positions began to be favored 
by a new policy of the State.126 Though one had to be wealthy 
enough and few were so, a cedula de gracias al sacar which 
conferred legal 'whiteness' on the bearer could be pur­
chased.12  ̂ in 1795, pardos who were granted cedulas de 
gracias al sacar were authorized to receive an education, hold 
public office and enter the Church.12® Reaction to this 
policy by creoles, especially in Venezuela where the black
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population clearly overwhelmed the white, was predictably 
hostile.^ 9  Even though the 'society of castas' had been 
breaking down through large numbers of mestizos and pardos 
'passing', legalizing and encouraging the social mobility of 
these groups was a threat to creole domination of the laboring
classes.1^
Bourbon alienation of Spanish American creoles con­
tinued unabated into the begining of the 19th century when, 
in 1804, pressed for revenues with which to fight his war 
against Great Britain, Charles IV decreed the amortization of 
Church held mortgages in the American colonies. Known as the 
rConsolidac.ion de Vales Reales', this policy sought to appro­
priate the funds of pious foundations and chantries, paying 
these funds 5% interest for the money 'borrowed'.131 The 
calling in of these loans by the State had disastrous effects 
on creole landowners, merchants and miners and had a depressing 
effect on the whole colonial economy. *̂*2 As the Church had 
been a major creditor for the colonials^^, few owners of 
property were not affected. Although the Crown did attempt 
to soften the blow by requiring only 40-50% of the loan im­
mediately, with the rest in installments over a 10 year 
period!34f many landowners found it impossible to pay back 
their loans on such short notice and many lost their 
property. To make matters worse, there were so many selling
property in search of hard cash that most properties were 
sold for only a fraction of their real worth and a good deal 
of property could find no buyers at all, ̂ 5  In New Spain, 
the richest colony, 12,000,000 pesos were siphoned out, with 
smaller amounts from the other colonies ^he levy was so 
onerous that while other colonies were beginning to revolt 
against Spain with the abdications of Charles IV and 
Ferdinand VII, the most loyal colony, Peru, asked only that 
the amortization decree be recinded.^^
The revolts, protests and dissatisfaction with the 
Bourbon reforms were not only with the reforms per se but also 
with the style of rule which the new Bourbon administrators 
brought with them. Throughout the Hapsburg period and up to 
the reign of Charles III, Spanish rule had always been media­
ted through a bureaucracy in which creoles had some input.
As John Leddy Phelan has argued in the case of New Granada, 
"Until the arrival of the regent visitor general, Gutierrez 
de Pineres, the creoles were accustomed to a government of 
compromise, concilliation and accomodation in which some 
creoles actively participated in the decision making pro­
cess" .13® The, what Phelan calls, "Hapsburg system with its 
complex blending of centralization and decentralization... "3-39 
was abrogated by the Bourbon State by its uncompromising de­
meanor .
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This change was indicative of the change in the philos­
ophy of government brought about under the Bourbon rulers.
The Hapsburg Absolutist State's political philosophy, true 
to its medieval origins, mirrored the later medieval thinkers, 
principally Francisco sdarez who, following St. Thomas, 
stressed the limitations on political power, the popular 
origin of sovereignty, a kind of 'social contract' between 
the people and their King, resistance to unjust rule and 
government by consent under the rule of Natural Law.140 
Thus, the King sought to be just to all of his subjects 
and if his policies were unjust it was because they were 
badly administered or the King did not understand local con­
ditions. If any of these conditions held, the King, intent 
only on ruling justly, would adjust these policies. In the 
Spanish American context, during the Hapsburg era, if 
colonial bureaucrats found great opposition to decrees or 
policies of the Crown they would suspend them by 'obeying 
but not executing1 them - acknowledging the legitimacy of the 
King but recommending against the rules - and informing the 
king as to the proper adjustments necessary to make them 
just.141 Bourbon rule, on the other hand, reflected the idea 
of the 'divine right of kings'. According to this idea, of 
which the regime of Louis XIV of France was the. consciously 
emulated example fcr the Spanish Bourbons, the king's
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authority was derived from God, absolute, devoid of compromise 
or consent. All the orders of the king or his ministers re­
quired unquestioning obedience, resistance to 'unjust* 
policies forbidden as the aim of justice became secondary 
to the achievment of order, peace and stability.^*2
This constitutional innovation brought about by the 
Bourbon reformers was to condition, more than any other 
aspect of the reforms, the crisis brought about by the 
Napoleonic invasion of Spain and the removal of the king from 
authority. For, in the midst of an ongoing constitutional 
crisis in the American colonies, the only thing that held 
together all of the contentious factions, the king, disap­
peared .
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THE CRISIS OF THE COLONIAL STATE: THE SPANISH
AMERICAN WARS OF INDEPENDENCE
For dependency writers the Wars of Independence expressed
the economic maturity of Spanish America. Accordingly, the
independence movements were primarily movements for economic
freedom. Andre Gunder Frank argues that,l
The driving force of the 1810 Revolution was the 
complex of demands by a bourgeoisie determined to 
seize power, to achieve self determination and to 
control both economic power and the political 
power vested in the state apparatus... The creole 
bourgeoisie was aware that the colonial system 
barred them from access to the political power 
that was the key to a new economic policy designed 
exclusively for their benefit.
while Juan E. Corradi believes that, 3
The growing disparity in the rate of economic 
development between the various parts of the 
Spanish empire was accompanied by a weakening 
of the bonds that held them together. The politi­
cal and social unity of the metropolis and the 
colonies... became increasingly tenuous on account 
of that uneven development.
and Fernando Henrigue Cardoso and Enzo Faletto claim that,3
The advances of modern capitalism had placed 
Spain in the role of intermediary between the
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colonies and the new industrial Europe. As a result 
of these political vicissitudes, merchants and es­
pecially producers in Latin America came to view 
colonial relations as an obstacle to be surmounted.
They wanted to establish direct links with Great 
Britain...
and so, "The Wars of Independence were waged to achieve a 
political order and a different 'pact' with the new metrop­
olis. * That this was the ultimate result of independence is 
not in doubt, however, as Stanley and Barbara Stein argue, 
"...it would be a gross simplification to state that this 
was the principal goal of the early insurgents".^ In fact, 
they justifiably fault the popularity of this interpretation 
for "clouded" versions of the post-independence era.**
The economic grievances of the Spanish Americans dis­
cussed in the previous chapter did not cause the final break 
with Spain. The movements for independence, rather, evolved 
out of the conjunction of two crises; the crisis of the 
American bureaucracy which began with the implementation of 
the Bourbon reforms; and the crisis of the Spanish State 
with the Napoleonic usurption of the Spanish crown. It was 
only once the king, the connective tissue of the empire, had 
disappeared that tne bureaucratic crisis in America would 
allow Spanish American grievances with the Bourbon reforms 
to clearly affect the outcome of the crisis.
The independence movement in each colony had its own
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specific character even though the origin and outcome of the 
movements was essentially the same. The different character­
istics themselves were a result of the particular grievances 
of the colonial elite against the Bourbons fend amongst them­
selves) and how these and the actual movements for autonomy 
were worked out. Although it is impossible to give a full 
account of the independence movements throughout Spanish 
America here, what follows will analyze the nature of the 
movements in general with special attention given to a few 
specific examples.
The movements for independence in Spanish America were 
not, in their origin, independence movements at all. When 
the crisis of 1808 - the abdication of Charles IV and 
Ferdinand VII, the overrunning of the Peninsula by Napoleon's 
armies and the imposition of a new dynasty with the accession 
to the throne of Joseph Bonaparte - unfolded, there were few 
among the 'revolutionaries' in America who would have en­
visioned an outcome that included a permanent break with the 
Spanish Crown.7
With the news from Spain the Americans immediately 
rejected the French usurption and declared their loyalty to 
the Bourbon dynasty.** The question that the French invasion 
raised then was not loyalty to the monarch but rather where 
sovereignty lay in his absence. The answer to the question
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in Spain came about when the various town cabildos set up 
juntas to lead the resistance against the French and they 
ultimately joined together to form a Junta Central which 
gave some semblance of central authority.9 A solution was 
not so easily found in Spanish America though. First, the 
authorities who represented the King had not been unseated 
by the invasion yet, the legal basis for their authority, 
the king, had been. Second, the Spanish Americans not only 
questioned their authority, but were concerned as to the ac­
tual loyalty of these officials to the 'legitimate* king, 
Ferdinand VII, as these officials had been appointed by the 
administration that had handed over the Crown to the French. 
Third, the conflicts within the Spanish American colonial 
bureaucracy created by Bourbon administrative re-organization 
rose to the surface without the mediating hand of the Crown. 
What ensued was a scramble by the various sectors of the 
bureaucracy (now including the cabildos) for support 
amongst the creoles, Spaniards and other elements of colonial 
society in their internal disputes. Finally, the revolution 
in the relationship between Spain and the colonies initiated 
by the Bourbons exploded upon the consciousness of the 
Americans when the Junta Central took up where the Bourbons 
had left off and demanded the obedience of the Spanish 
Americans not on the basis of their representation of the
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Crown, but rather their being the legitimate authority of 
the Spanish nation. The Americans generally rejected this 
formula, opting rather for the old Hapsburg formula which 
defined their relationship to the other parts of the Empire, 
including Spain, through the king and only the king. The 
movements thus sought, and generally accomplished, the un~ 
seating of the top Spanish administrators. They ultimately 
declared autonomy from the Junta Central (and later the 
Regency) but generally declared in favor of Ferdinand VII.
The movements became genuinely independentist only after 
the return of Ferdinand VII to the throne in 1814. His un­
compromising absolutism and repression of the American move­
ments made an accomodation with the crown impossible.
The Movement In The R^o De La Plata 
The Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata was the only 
Spanish American colony in which the crisis of the colonial 
bureaucracy came to the surface before the loss of legitimate 
authority in Spain. An unauthorized invasion of Buenos Aires 
by the English General William C. Beresford in 1806 (and a 
second invasion by General John Whitelocke in 1807) threw all 
the Viceregal authorities into disarray and fundamentally 
changed the balance of forces in the Viceroyalty by the time 
of the crisis in Spain.
With the first invasion and occupation of Buenos Aires
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by Beresford, Viceroy Sobremonte and his administration fled 
the city while the city's main corporations, including the ca- 
bildo and Consulado, swore their loyalty to the English King.11 
Buenos Aires was re-conquered, not by the Viceroy who bided time 
in Cordoba collecting a force he felt sufficient to expel the 
British, but by a Frenchman in the service of the Spanish Crown, 
Santiago Liniers, who, with a force of about 1,000 given to him 
by Ruiz Huidobro, the Governor of Montevideo, defeated the 
British.1^ with the British defeated and the Viceregal admin­
istration in disarray, the cabildo with the other city corpora­
tions - civil, ecclesiastic and military, - organized a council 
of war which forced the Viceroy to give military command of 
the colony to Liniers. Such a formula was preferable to the 
Viceregal authorities - Viceroy and Audencia - to the full re­
moval of the Viceroy from office and a further crisis of the 
administration.11 It was at this point that the political ba­
lance in Buenos Aires began to turn in favor of the creoles.
The threat of further invasion led to the great expan­
sion of military forces dominated by creoles. Although the 
apprehension of the Spanish dominated cabildo to this develop­
ment can be seen in their attempt to get control of this 
force through Spanish born officers, there was general agree­
ment in the colony as to the need for this force.14 When the 
British attached again in 1807 and captured Montevideo from
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the hapless Viceroy Sobremonte, he was deposed by the council 
of war and Viceregal authority was transferred to the reluc­
tant Audencia.15 The subsequent British invasion of Buenos 
Aires by General Whitelocke then went down to defeat at the 
hands of the creole and Spanish military forces led by 
Liniers and Martin Alzaga, alcalde and Spanish born leader of 
the cabildo.16
Liniers ultimately became provisional Viceroy1?, but 
he soon fell out with the Spanish dominated cabildo as he 
moved towards an alliance with the Viceregal bureaucrats 
and the military force he had created to repel the British. 
With the turn of events in Spain in 1808, suspicions of dis­
loyalty arose on both sides. Liniers* French birth, his 
admiration for Napoleon and his attachment to the Viceregal 
officials of Charles IV made him suspect to both Spaniards 
and creoles. His acceptance of the Seville Junta Central 
though, did not allay these suspicions. Both Spaniards and 
creoles began to suspect the Junta Central as, rather than 
dismissing discredited Viceregal officials, it clung to them 
as the surest way to uphold the continuity of the Empire.18 
Into this mix of suspicions was thrown the intrigues of 
Ferdinand's sister, Princess Carlota Joaquina of Portugal, 
who took up residence in r £o de Janeiro to escape the French. 
Princess Carlota represented a solution to the crisis for
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Viceregal officials in that the royal mantle would again 
legitimize their rule. In a similar fashion, some creoles 
supported the cause of Carlota because they feared the 
autonomist leanings of the Spanish dominated cabildo. 
Recognition of Carlota, they felt, would check these designs 
of the cabildo. On the other hand, many opposed Carlota on 
traditional grounds, opposing Portuguese expansionism in the 
River Plate.19
The Spanish dominated cabildo brought matters to a 
head in October 1808 when it attempted to depose Viceroy 
Liniers and, in imitation of Montevideo, set up a local Junta 
controlled by the Spaniards of Buenos Aires and loyal to the 
Seville Junta Central. The successful Spanish coup of 
Montevideo was not repeated in Buenos Aires as the forces 
of the Cabildo, led by Alzaga, were outmaneuvered by the 
creole military force under the command of Cornelio Saavedra 
who threw his support to Viceroy Liniers. ^  The leaders of 
the coup attempt were exiled to Patagonia but tensions 
between those who had supported the cabildo and those who had 
supported Liniers did not ease. The Junta Central sought to 
solve the crisis by appointing Baltasa: Hidalgo de Cisneros 
the new Viceroy in August 1809.
Cisneros very briefly united the warring parties in the 
Viceroyalty, disbanding some of the creole military units,
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ressurecting some Spanish units defeated in the coup as 
militia and readmitting Alzaga and his compatriots into 
Buenos A i r e s . Y e t ,  events in Spain undid all of Cisneros' 
peacemaking. By May 1810, news arrived that French armies 
had overrun Seville, the Junta Central was no more and the 
prospects looked awfully dismal for Spanish resistance. The 
Viceroy attempted to suppress the news for as long as he 
could, fearing the worst, but was forced to relent when events 
in Spain became common knowledge. On May 18, he officially 
published the sad news from Spain.22
The creole military force created by Liniers for the 
defense of the Viceroyalty now became the arbiter of its 
future. The creole elite officers forced the Viceroy and 
cabildo to hold a cabildo abierto (open town meeting) which, 
with the reluctance of the cabildo, deposed the Viceroy and 
set up a local Junta, loyal to Ferdinand VII, to take over the 
administration of the Viceroyalty.23 With the Spaniards cowed 
by their defeat at the hands of Liniers, afraid of the mili­
tary superiority of the creole elite and having no love 
for Cisneros (he had opposed their interests by opening up 
the port to British trade in order to fill his depleted 
treasury with the resulting import taxes) the field was left 
open to the creoles.24
Similar justifications for creole accession to power
were heard in every part of Spanish America where a junta 
movement appeared. It was argued that once the legitimate 
government of Spain had fallen, sovereignty reverted back to 
the people who could then confer it upon anyone they chose. 
Since the Junta Central had argued the equality of Spanish 
America with Spain, the Spanish Americans had the right to 
set up their own juntas for their defense in the absence of 
the King. Although in the context of what this movement 
was to become such views became revolutionary, they did not 
break with traditional Spanish political and legal thought.25 
With the legitimacy of the State in question, both creoles 
and Spaniards sought to fill the vacuum in Spanish America - 
in the case of Buenos Aires, the creoles won.25
The Movement In Chile
In Chile, the loss of the legitimizing hand of the 
Crown brought to the surface conflicts based on the specific 
grievances of the creoles in the colony against the Bourbon 
regime. As in Buenos Aires, once the authority of the Royal 
officials began to be questioned, the various bureaucratic 
institutions and creole and Spanish factions vied for control 
over the colony.
The two chief grievances of the Chilean creoles were 
first, the increased difficulty in obtaining positions and 
advancement in the colonial bureaucracy upon which many less
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fortunate creole families depended2^, and second, Chile's 
colonial status vis-a-vis the Viceregal capital at Lima 
(since the decline of the agricultural regions in the vicinity 
of Lima in the late 17th century, Chile became the major 
source of wheat for Lima - the Lima merchants controlled this 
trade, manipulated the price of Chilean wheat, keeping prices 
artifically low to the detriment of Chilean producers). In 
fact, the Chilean Independence movement was always more 
directed at Lima then it was at Spain.29
As in Buenos Aires, loyalty to the monarchy was un­
questioned with no indications of disloyalty even after the 
news of the abdications reached Chile.29 What was unfortunate 
for the Royal bureaucracy in Chile, though, was that in the 
same year the colony lost its king, its popular Governor,
Luis Munoz de Guzman, died and was replaced by the less com­
petent Francisco Antonio Garcia Carrasco. Garcia Carrasco 
was either easily manipulated or understood the tenuous 
position of Spanish authority in America with the loss of the 
King, for he first fell under the influence of elements of 
the creole elite and, when it seemed his administration was 
tottering, gravitated towards the Spaniards.30 in his two 
years in office, Garcfa Carrasco managed to alienate the 
Royal Audencia, the cabildo of Santiago and the creole 
aristocracy.^
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Garcia Carrasco alienated the Spaniards in Chile when 
he came under the influence of Juan Martinez de Rozas, a 
creole tied to the wealthy Mendiburo family of Concepcion. 
Martinez de Rozas convinced Garcia Carrasco that, given the 
crisis in Spain, the cabildo of Santiago was best suited to 
direct the defenses of the colony and thus, its membership 
should be increased by 12 regidores, including himself and 
a disproportionate number of creoles.33 Spaniards were 
further enraged when a representative of the Seville Junta 
arrived in Santiago with a request for 100,000 pesos and 
Garcia Carrasco had him sent to head the garrison at the 
Chilean Indian frontier.33
Garcia Carrasco's fortunes truly declined when he 
alienated all in the colony by his involvement in the 
Scorpion Affair. It seems that either Garcia Carrasco was 
a partner with, or had been duped by Martinez de Rozas in a 
scheme to seize a British merchant ship, the Scorpion, in 
October 1808 under a letter of Margue rather than seizing 
its goods as contraband. The difference was that taken under 
a letter of Marque, the cargo of the Scorpion was considered 
spoils of war and the treasury was deprived of the 300,000 
peso cargo which went to Martfnez de Rozas and his cohorts.31* 
This incident upset every sector of opinion in the colony and 
severely damaged the credibility and authority of Garcia
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Carrasco's administration. Creoles and Spaniards began 
agitating for his replacement, creoles though, for a junta.35
These agitations led Garcia Carrasco to interfere with 
cabildo elections in Santiago and, when this tactic failed, 
he had arrested three prominent Chilean creoles who he thought 
were conspiring against his administration. The protests of 
the cabildo and ecclesiatic cabildo against this move, and 
the Audencia's fear of revolt, convinced Garcia Carrasco 
not to send the three to Lima for trial but rather to hold 
them in Valpraiso. News, which later turned out to be false, 
that Spain had fallen to the French, led Garcia Carrasco, 
on July 12, 1810, to send two of the alleged conspirators to 
Lima for trial. The uproar over this act led to his fall 
and the events which were to lead to the formation of a local
•a e  /Junta. ° As the creole cabildo plotted to overthrow Garcia 
Carrasco, the Spanish Audencia diffused the situation by de­
posing him themselves and designating the prominent creole, 
Mateo de Toro Zambrano, Conde de la Conquista, as 
Captain General. ^
The Audencia's move had a generally calming effect on 
the agitated colony but this was not to last. Pressure was 
almost immediately brought to bear on Toro Zambrano by two 
opposing groups. One group, centered in the cabildo, was 
made up of creoles who agitated for a local Junta because
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they distrusted the Royal officials (as in Buenos Aires, fear 
that Royal officials would turn the colony over to the French 
or Portuguese was prevalent). The other, centered around the 
Audencia and included the clergy, top Royal officials and 
some creole aristocrats who sought to maintain Royal officials
in power.
Toro Zambrano was finally convinced to call for a 
cabildo abierto after the agitation of the cabildo group 
reached a high pitch with the impending arrival of the new 
Governor, Francisco Javier Elio, who was noted for his anti­
creole feelings (Elio had led the Spanish coup in Montevideo
against the creole supported Viceroy Liniers in the Rio de 
39la Plata). In addition, news from Spain added to the high 
level of suspicion and tension. First, news arrived of the 
fall of the Seville Junta Central and its replacement by a 
Regency at Cadiz. This Regency denounced past Spanish dis­
crimination against the colonials, asked for their recognition
and suggested that they might set up their own local Juntas on 
✓the model of Cadiz. Further news informed the Chileans of 
Ferdinand's denunciation of Godoy (Charles IV's favorite), 
and his appointments in the Royal bureaucracy for 'whore- 
mongering, French sympathies and disloyalty". Since many 
Royal officials had received their appointments from that 
administration, practically the whole colonial bureaucracy
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was suspect.4t*
The cabildo abierto installed a creole dominated Junta 
to take over the administration of the colony with Toro 
Zambrano as its life president. A congress made up of repre­
sentatives from the whole colony was called for while the 
cabildo and the Audencia were retained. All of this was 
done with expressions of genuine loyalty to Ferdinand VII and 
was ultimately recognized by the Regency in Cadiz and Viceroy 
Abascal of Peru41 (it seems that Abascal was suspicious of 
these developments and would have liked to have ended them 
but Lima was too dependent on Chilean wheat and he was other­
wise occupied putting down junta movements in Upper Peru and 
42Buenos Aires ). The justification for the movement was, as
in Buenos Aires, not revolutionary but traditional -
sovereignty fell back to the people once the monarch could no
longer exercise it and they had a right to confer it on another
43for their own well being.
The Junta Movement Elsewhere In Spanish America 
Elsewhere in Spanish America similar movements broke out. 
In Upper Peru, junta movements, one in Chuquisaca led by the 
Audencia and another in La Paz led by the cabildo, broke out 
but were suppressed, the former by Viceroy Cisneros, the 
latter by Viceroy Abascal.44
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In New Granada, the first junta appeared in Quito on 
August 10, 1809 when creoles deposed the President of the 
Audencia and placed the Marquis de Selva Alegre and the Bishop 
of Quito at the head of the government.45 The Quitefios had 
acted out of fear that the Napoleonic conquest of Spain 
would be transferred to America and that the only solution 
was for the Americans to declare their independence. The 
Quitenos also feared the Spaniards of the city who, they be­
lieved, planned to assassinate the creole nobility on 
August 19.46 The movement was, however, smashed, not by 
the Viceregal capital at Bogota where the Quitenos had 
sympathy among many creoles, but by the Viceroy of Peru who 
unleashed a violent repression which only confirmed the 
Quitenos worst fears. '
In Caracas, the creoles reacted frightfully to Napoleon's 
occupation of Spain fearing a French invasion of America would 
unleash the forces which overturned the slave system in Haiti. 
The creoles in Venezuela already suspected the Viceregal 
authorities of trying to undermine white creole supremacy by 
their administration of Bourbon reforms favorable to pardos 
and slaves. Creole attempts to set up a junta which they felt 
would assure their security and predominance were met by 
repression and the incitement of the pardos and slaves against 
them by the Royal administration. When news of the fall of
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the Seville Junta Central arrived, the creoles acted, deposing 
the Captain General and instituting a junta loyal to 
Ferdinand VII.48 By the end of 1810, most of the Viceroyalty 
of Mew Granada was lost to the Spanish administration.
All junta movements, however, were not so successful.
In New Spain, the Audencia and Consulado short-circuited a 
move by Viceroy Jos/* de Iturrigaray and his creole supporters 
in the cabildo to install a junta in 1808. The Spanish 
Audencia deposed Iturrigaray, put in their own Viceroy, re­
pressed the creole challengers, organized its own military 
force and encouraged Spaniards in the Provinces to seize 
power.48 The reaction to the Spanish coup led directly, by 
1810, to the movements of Hidalgo and Morelos which reflected 
the weakness and vaccilations of provincial Royal officials,
even though these movements were ultimately put down by the 
50capital.
Lima: Bulwark Of Spanish Administration
In America
The movement for local juntas arose in Peru also but 
only at the provicial level and, it seems, never infected the 
Viceregal center at Lima.8^ Few areas in Spanish America, 
though, suffered the Bourbon reforms to the extent of Lima - 
loss of territory and thus control over bureaucratic
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appointments when New Granada and Rio de la Plata became ad­
ministratively independent under the Bourbons, loss of its 
trade monopoly in South America, the imposition of higher 
taxes, discrimination against creoles for high office, Indian 
revolts and agricultural administration.52 Lima joined the 
general movement for independence in Spanish America only 
when San Martin's Army entered the city in 1821.53
Several factors contributed to the relative stability 
of Lima when the balance of the Royal administration on the 
continent was crumbling. The Peruvian elite, both creole 
and Spanish, was inordinately privileged in a veritable sea 
of under-privilege. On the coast, and particularly in Lima, 
this elite was far outnumbered by blacks, morenos, mestizos 
and Indians. Out of a total population 63,809 in 1813, 
whites comprised only 32% in Lima and, out of a population 
which reached 1,115,207 for the entire Viceroyalty they com­
prised a meager 12%.5  ̂ Indian and slave revolts bred inse­
curity which tended to attach this elite to the Viceregal 
administration which, it felt, would maintain the social 
hierarchy.55
Even with the loss of a great deal of the old viceregal 
territory, Lima's position as the capital of the Viceroyalty 
enabled it to drain resources from, and control the trade of, 
the productive highland provinces. Bureaucratic control of
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the provinces from Lima made this all possible and few who 
benefited were in favor of innovations in government that 
might have threatened the system.56 Further, the vast majority 
of the Lima elite depended not on agriculture or even commerce 
but on bureaucratic appointment. Lima was a consumer/ 
administrative center par excellence. Timothy Anna has esti­
mated that only 26.3% of the elite could be considered pro­
ducers (not of course that they themselves produced but that 
their income and wealth were derived from the ownership of 
productive establishments) while 41.7% were regular or 
secular clergy, 18.2% were in the Royal service and the 
balance were escribanos, lawyers, doctors or titled nobles, 
bringing the occupational elite dependent upon the Viceregal
cntreasury to 67.2%. An elite so tied to the Royal adminis­
tration would have to have been very sure that it was in its 
interest to revolt, as Anna remarks, "The Peruvians would 
not revolt until the Royal regime lost authority".58
Maintenance of the Spanish Administration in Lima also 
had a good deal to do with the capable and politic hand of 
Viceroy Abascal. Abascal navigated the administration through 
stormy periods of creole discontent and regional highland re­
volts against the hegemony of Lima. Though Lima and the 
Viceroyalty were riven by the same sort of inter-bureaucratic 
rivalries and creole discontent with the Bourbon reforms as
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the rest of Spanish America, a strong, determined hand at the 
helm could hold things together.59 This was even more remark­
able in that on top of provincial revolts, Chilean insurgency, 
the challenge from the Rio de la Plata, bureaucratic infighting 
and creole agitation for relief from Bourbon commercial and 
fiscal reforms, Abascal had to maintain his authority and 
calm in the colony with his position weakened by the authori­
ties in Spain who announced to the Americans that 'your des­
tinies no longer depend upon Viceroys, Governors and 
ministers'60. The colonists were also invited to send 
representatives to the Spanish Cortes which drew up the 
Constitution of 1812. Under this constitution, the Viceroy's 
authority was further undermined by the institution of elec­
tive cabildos, freedom of the press, the abolition of Indian 
tribute and Royal monopolies and the institution of a mini- 
cortes in the colony within which the Viceroy would be only 
the 'superior political chief' sharing power with local 
elected representatives.6 -̂
The Wars Of Independence And The Crisis 
Of The State In America
Although the economic and social grievances of the 
colonists in Spanish America were undoubtedly important con­
ditioning factors in the junta movements, the success of 
Abascal in holding together the Viceroyalty of Peru underscores
204
the essentially political nature of the junta movements. 
Bourbon reorganization of the Spanish American bureaucracy 
not only destabilized internal relations within the bureaucra­
cy, but, at the same time, closed off traditional Hapsburg 
avenues of redress which had inured the creole elite to the 
system at a time when the creoles had mounting grievances 
with Bourbon commercial and fiscal reforms. As Jorge 
Dominguez argues^^,
Traditional elite political participation, which 
was neopatrimonial, had also been accommodated 
within the empire. The elite sought access to 
governmental jobs, military privileges or 
economic advantage; it opposed governmental 
efforts to set it free. Even under conditions 
of economic growth, traditional elites sought 
to increase access to government in traditional 
ways....Goals were typically adjustive or back­
ward looking. Many sought to restore lost rights 
or circumstances. Others resisted change or 
sought to adjust their position within the 
system.
Thus, it is not so surprising that once the Bourbon regime 
had proved its incompetence to the Spanish American creoles 
by not only mishandling colonial affairs but also Spanish 
international affairs - in being instrumental in the loss of 
Spanish Independence - they reacted in a very traditional 
manner to protect their interests and what they felt were 
the interests of the Crown, Rather than seeking change, 
creoles who took control of the colonies through the junta 
movements attempted to maintain traditional patterns and
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policies of Spanish rule. This intent, however, could not 
reproduce the order and harmony of the Hapsburg era which 
the creoles sought. As discussed earlier®^, the Hapsburg 
system made possible the existence of various forms of social 
relations of production and land tenure - as well as a 
system of trade - which were essentially contentious, only by 
mediating the conflicts between and within them through the 
colonial bureaucracy. Not only did the legitimacy of the 
Crown and the adjustive practices of a State that was rela­
tively autonomous make these various interests harmonious, 
it was a major aspect of their maintenance. Thus, what was 
considered by some creoles to be their traditional legitimate 
rights and interests conflicted with what others felt to be 
theirs. As Frederick Stirton Weaver argues®^,
The differences in the local forms in which 
production was organized and surplus appro­
priated created a regional diversity far 
more important than the superficial uni­
formity that standardized colonial adminis­
trative organization and selective aspects 
of the Spanish culture lent to diverse 
places.
Not only did fledgling creole States have to contend with and 
try to harmonize such interests, they found it almost impos­
sible to assert the interest of the State over those 
contending interests and the interests of provinces which, for 
all intents and purposes acted as States with their own State
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interests. The junta movements removed the lid from a boiling 
pot and conflict boiled over and engulfed Spanish America 
until a new formula for elite harmony was worked out.
The conflicts which engulfed Spanish America from 1810 
into the national period were not the result of innovations 
which the creoles sought to introduce into the political, 
economic and social systems of the colonies. They were 
rather the result of the clash of competing elites who sought 
to impose their traditional rights and interests against one 
another and, fledging States' attempts to assert the tra­
ditional rights and interests of the State in societies in 
which the State had lost its legitimacy.
The events in the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata sub­
sequent to the installation of the junta on May 25, 1810 
best illustrate how this complex of forces worked to create 
the anarchy which engulfed much of Spanish America in the 
first half of the 19th century. Upon its accession, the 
Junta of Buenos Aires attempted to assert its authority 
throughout the Viceroyalty of Rxo de la Plata. Assuming the 
authority of the Spanish administration, the junta attempted 
to hold together all the provinces which had made the Vice­
royalty possible. The junta expected change neither in the 
political nor in the economic hegemony of Buenos Aires - but 
the provinces were not to be very cooperative.
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Paraguay, which had been, since its incorporation into 
the Viceroyalty, an unwilling tributary, sought to maintain 
its own autonomy in the face of the rapid political changes 
in Buenos Aires.^ Under its Governor-Intendent, Colonel 
Bernardo de Velazco, Paraguay met the call by the Buenos Aires 
junta for submission and the sending of delegates to a general 
congress with a careful and cautious response swearing 
obedience to the Regency in Spain, for maintaining fraternal 
solidarity with Buenos Aires (but not recognition of its 
superiority) and the formation of a junta of war to defend 
Paraguay.
The junta of Buenos Aires responded by sending a mili­
tary force under the command of Manuel Belgrano to force the 
Paraguayan authorities to submit. He was unsuccessful, 
having been defeated twice by a Paraguayan creole militia 
force which, though it did depose Velazco for his incompe­
tence in meeting the military challenge from Buenos Aires, 
nevertheless maintained the policy of autonomy. The 
Paraguayans, under the leadership of Jo3e Gaspar Rodriguez 
de Francia, thus began the process of creating a Paraguayan 
State. ^
The junta was more successful, at least initially, in 
asserting its authority in the interior and littoral pro­
vinces, yet these ultimately revolted against it. By 1820^
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the State thrown up by the junta movement of 1810 precariously 
controlled only the province of Buenos Aires. This disastrous 
disintegration of the State which ended in its complete 
collapse after the Battle of Cepeda was the direct outcome of 
its attempt to re-establish traditional Viceregal hegemony in 
Upper Peru. The assertion of its authority in Upper Peru was 
seen as crucial by Buenos Aires in its attempt to maintain 
the traditional pattern of administration, finance and trade 
that had existed since the founding of the Viceroyalty. As 
pointed out earlier68, Buenos Aires could not maintain its 
large bureaucracy nor finance its external trade, except 
with great difficulty, without the silver from Upper Peru.
More than in any other Viceregal center (except perhaps 
Lima) the elite of Buenos Aires depended on bureaucratic 
position and trade.69
The problem of the loss of Upper Peru (Buenos Aires' 
military expedition was defeated by Abascal's troops) was 
made immediately apparent when, in order to continue the war 
against the Royalists in Upper Peru and Western Argentina, 
urban wealth, acquired by the State through draconian forced 
loans and 'contributions', was quickly exhausted.70 This 
exhaustion of urban sources of revenue led the State to 
shift its support, at least in the provinces, to those whose 
wealth was generated directly by the land. The State needed
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men, horses and food in order to prosecute the war and thus, 
production finally asserted itself in a system in which it 
had always been subservient to trade and political adminis­
tration.^1 Perhaps the best example of this was State support 
for the regime of Martin de Guemes in Salta.
This policy proved to have disastrous results for the 
State when it was applied to the Banda Oriental (Uruguay). 
First supporting the rural forces of Jos^ Artigas against 
an intransigent and Royalist Montevideo, Buenos Aires 
created a formidable enemy in Artigas and his littoral 
allies when it abandoned his movement to liberate the Banda 
Oriental. The reasons for the support given to the Artigas 
movement by Buenos Aires and its eventual abandonment of it 
conformed to the interests of the State at each specific 
moment. Yet, both positions were to set the stage for its 
ultimate collapse. Certainly the Royalist challenge just 
across the River was one good reason for supporting Artigas. 
But, more important was the need of the State at Buenos 
Aires to eliminate the autonomy of Montevideo which had pre­
sented itself as a direct threat to the hegemony of Buenos 
Aires throughout the Viceregal era.^3 Buenos Aires' pre­
eminence in the region was assured through its control of 
internal and external trade accorded it through its political 
position as the Viceregal capital. The better harbor on the
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other side of the River at Montevideo was a constant source 
of dismay (during the colonial era a good deal of contraband 
trade - not subject to control or taxation by Buenos Aires - 
wa3 funneled through Montevideo) during Viceregal days that 
turned into outright fear and hostility with its self pro­
claimed independence from the Junta of Buenos Aires in 
1810.74 Buenos Aires only jettisoned Artigas and his move­
ment when an even greater threat than the Royalists in 
Montevideo appeared - a Portuguese army in Montevideo 
threatening Buenos A i r e s . 75
While the State at Buenos Aires encouraged the rise of 
rural elites to influence in the urban administrations of 
the provinces, it showed that it was not only rapacious in 
its demands for the resources of the provinces but that it 
would not protect their economic interests any better than did 
the Bourbons. In order to raise further revenue for the war, 
the State opened up the port to British and American ships 
which flooded interior markets with cheap goods and stole 
the Buenos Aires market away from interior p r o d u c e r s . A f t e r  
1815, the provinces began opting out of their union with the 
State at Buenos Aires.77 The response of Buenos Aires was 
to attempt to impose a centralist form of State on the pro­
vinces through the Constitution of 1819. Ine State tried to 
enforce it and the provinces reacted in kind. The ephemeral,
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almost nonexistent now, authority of the State at Buenos 
Aires collapsed when confronted with the defeat of its mili­
tary forces at Cepeda on January 20, 1820 at the hands of 
the combined forces of the littoral provinces.78
The ruralization of the bases of political power 
fomented by the policies of the State at Buenos Aires affected 
Buenos Aires itself after 1820. Forced back upon the resources 
of the province of Buenos Aires alone, the political elite of 
Buenos Aires, who reconstituted the political system on a 
provincial basis, made it possible for rural based elites to 
rise in influence. First, in order to reduce the cost of 
the military (which had been the major drain on the revenues 
of the State) the provincial authorities disbanded much of the 
army and based the security of the Province on rural militia 
under the control of the estancieros (ranchers).7® Second, 
they proceeded with a policy of reconstructing the provincial 
economy on the only basis now possible - the export of hides 
and other cattle based products.80 This ruralization of the 
bases of political support for the State was a process which 
continued throughout the crisis of the 1820's and culminated 
in the rise of Juan Manuel de Rosas in 1829.8^
Similar processes and forces were at work elsewhere 
during the Spanish American Wars of Independence. Lima, which 
was reluctantly liberated by Argentine and Chilean troops
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became a quagmire for San Martin. The Lima elite lent only 
lackluster support, funds became extremely scarce and his army 
fell apart while the Royalist army threatened it from its 
highland retreat.8  ̂ san Martin failed to liberate Peru because 
he based himself in Lima which not only had been exhausted 
financially by its support of the Royalist cause up till 1821 
but was now cut off from the source of its wealth - the Andean 
highlands.83
With San Martin's withdrawal in favor of Simon Bolivar - 
who did not make the same mistakes and instead based his 
forces in the northern province of Trujillo - Peru was finally 
'liberated' and the Spanish Army in America d e s t r o y e d . 84 Yet, 
as in Argentina, the war ruralized the political bases of 
power. The State administration organized at Lima was to 
suffer a lack of legitimacy and authority and constant inva­
sions from provincial/military caudillos until, with an in­
dependent source of finance (guano), the capital under the 
leadership of Ramon Castilla could again subdue the pro­
vinces.85
The independence movement in New Granada was wracked, 
from the begining, with regionalist sentiments which led to 
the collapse of the movement in Colombia and Royalist resur­
gence and invasions.85 In Venezuela, Royalist fomented a 
race war against the creole insurgents and then crushed
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their movement with Murillo's invasion in 1815.8? Although 
New Granada was finally liberated under the leadership of 
Simon Bolivar, and the various provinces united into the 
State of Gran Colombia, the centrifugal forces which plagued 
the other former colonies asserted themselves there too.
Gran Colombia disintegrated into Colombia, Venezuela and 
Ecuador but, even this did not end political strife.88
Nor was the Spanish army in America immune from the 
disintegration caused by political factionalism. In both 
New Spain and Peru, the last bastions of Imperial power in
4
America, the Viceroys were deposed by military revolts 
initiated by political conflict. In both colonies, ani­
mosity between officers who supported the absolutism of 
Ferdinand VII and those who supported the Constitution of 
1812 'burst into the open'.89 in New Spain, Viceroy Juan 
Ruiz de Apodaca was deposed and replaced with Field Marshall 
Francisco Novella when he resisted the re-proraulagation of 
the Constitution of 1812.90 The constitution was implemented 
in earnest by the liberals but, conservative creoles and 
Spaniards led by Colonel Augustin Iturbide revolted, 
destroying the Spanish regime in New Spain forever.91
In Peru, Viceroy Jocguin de la Pezuela was deposed under 
very similar circumstances. According to Margaret Woodward, 
liberal constitutionalist officers in Pezuela's army
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revolted against him in 1821 when he delayed promulagating, 
and showed little support for, the Constitution of 1812.92 
Pezuela was replaced by General La Serna who was more 
acceptable to the liberal officers but, when in 1823 the 
constitution was again overthrown in Spain and the absolu­
tists regained power, Viceroy La Serna's army was to receive 
a blow from which it would not recover. General Pedro 
Antonio OlaSfeta, a creole who commanded the Royal army in 
Upper Peru, received the news of the overthrow of the con­
stitution before La Serna and revolted against the Viceroy, 
overturned the constitutionalist authorities in Upper Peru 
and declared to the King that he was the only truly loyal 
officer in Spanish America for the three past years. 
Confusion and demoralization pervaded La Serna's army when 
the King supported Olaneta, even making him Viceroy of the 
R^o de la Plata (a very hopeful appointment) over the objec­
tions of La Serna.94 Olaneta's revolt then drove the last 
nail into the coffin of Spanish military power in America 
because, with a demoralized and under strength army,
La Serna was forced to meet the insurgent armies at Ayacucho 
and was defeated.95
In Richard Morse's words96f
The collapse of the supreme authority activated 
the latent forces of local oligarchies, 
municipalities, and extended family systems
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in a struggle for powe%and prestige in the 
new, arbitrarily defined Republics...In the 
absence of developed and interacting economic 
interest groups having a stake in constitutional 
process, the new countries were plunged into 
alternating regimes of anarchy and personalist 
tyranny. The contest to seize a patrimonial 
State apparatus, fragmented from the original 
imperial one, became the driving force of public 
life in each new country.
In Part III, the crisis of the State in Spanish 
America and its effects on the new nations' integration 
into the international economy will be discussed and 
analyzed.
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PART III: THE STATE ORIGINS OF DEPENDENCY IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY PERU AND ARGENTINA
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INTRODUCTION
SPANISH AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY IN
THE AFTERMATH OF THE WARS OF INDEPENDENCE
The aftermath of the Wars of Independence is presented 
by dependency writers as a crucial period in the histories 
of the Spanish American countries. For dependentistas, 
modern Spanish American underdevelopment really begins with 
its incorporation into the world capitalist economy after 
independence.* Although a great deal of emphasis is often 
placed by them on the creation of 'structures of dependency* 
during the colonial era, independence is presented as a 
critical historical break in which the opportunity for 
autonomous economic development was lost until the world 
capitalist crisis of the 1930's presented another.^ Indeed, 
independence did offer the Spanish American countries the 
opportunity for relatively autonomous economic development 
but the dependentistas have essentially misread the process 
and the struggle by which it was lost.
Following their insistence upon a purely economic in­
terpretation of the Wars of Independence, dependency writers
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have carried this type of interpretation into the first half 
of the 19th century insisting that the political instability 
and civil warfare of that era revolved around the consolida­
tion of power of an export oriented class. Andre Gunder 
Frank, whose interpretation is most emphatic on this count, 
has argued that the civil wars of the first half of the 19th 
century were essentially fought over 'nationalism' and 'free 
trade *.5 Frank contends that,*
For half a century the two parties struggled 
for control of the state and for the decision 
as to which of the two policies would prevail.
The "European" party, which favored the closest 
possible relations of dependence on the European 
metropolis, and which therefore had the firm 
political and military support from that quarter...
while the other, or "American" party's,5
...roots were in the interests of the provinces, 
which sought: protection for local industries 
struggling against the ruinous competition 
imposed upon them by the "European" policy of 
the cattle raising exporters (in Argentina)...
While Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto are more
realistic in arguing that political and social elements
had important effects on the struggles that wracked Spanish
America in the first half of the 19th century6, they
essentially agree with Frank arguing that,^
After independence, the problem of national 
organization in Latin America consisted in 
keeping local control of an export-oriented 
production system while creating a system of 
internal political alliance that would permit
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the group that maintained relations with the 
outside (the world market and national states 
of the central countries) a minimum of internal 
power to preserve stability and represent the 
economic domination of the export-oriented 
production sector.
While this was certainly the result, the struggle was not
expressed in these purely economic terms. Rather, the crisis
of the post colonial era in Spanish America was essentially
political and it was not a foregone conclusion that Spanish
American countries would turn to the international economy
to solve it.
Although Cardoso and Faletto may argue that "...one of 
the principal motives of the Independence movement was to 
find a new link with the outside...”8, according to 
D.C.M. Platt, independence did not transform Spanish America 
into a major exporter of foodstuffs or raw materials or a 
major market for importers.8 Although a period of intensive 
exporting to Spanish America, principally by the British 
whose export production was bottled up by Napoleon's control 
of the continent, did ensue with the opening up of the ports 
upon independence, it was short lived and highly speculative. 
British traders came to Spanish America to sell their wares, 
not to buy Spanish American products. They were interested 
in specie and only when that was unavailable did they search 
for something else they could return to Britain.^-8 The
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market for European goods was, in any case, extremely limited. 
For the most part, the population was involved in subsistence 
production and even those who were involved in the money 
economy had little excess income to spend on imported 
manufacturers. The needs of most people were, thus, still 
met by local household and handicraft production.11 
According to Platt, even native textile production, often 
assumed to have been destroyed by the importation of cheap 
British goods, hardly disappeared from local consumption.12
British traders had very little interest in the pro­
ducts of Spanish America and, in fact, Spanish America had 
very little to sell. Most countries paid for the bulk of 
their imports with specie or funds acquired through loans.13 
In Argentina specie made up almost 28% of the value of its 
exports in 182514, while in Peru most imports were still 
being paid for in silver in 1840.13 Those lucky few coun­
tries that did have an export commodity with which to trade 
for foreign goods found that the bonanza of dramatically in­
creased markets was either short lived or subject to severe 
slowdown once peace was restored in Europe. Argentina, for 
example, found that after a dramatic rise in demand for 
cattle hides and tallow in Britain the market slowed for the 
one and almost disappeared for the other when traditional 
Russian exports of these products reappeared.1® Even though
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Argentina wa3 relatively successful in cementing a link to 
the international market it was a weak one with, exports in 
1848 remaining at 1820's levels.1?
The fact is, Western Europe and its colonies with the 
addition of Southern and Eastern Europe and the United 
States, could supply themselves with food and most industrial 
raw materials without Spanish A m e r i c a . 18 in fact, Platt has 
found that though Spanish American trade did shift its direc­
tion from Spain to Northwestern Europe and the United States, 
and some new products were traded, Spanish American external 
trade remained fundamentally unchanged from the late colonial 
era into the national p e r i o d . 19 in essence, for British 
trade, Platt notes^O,
No reliable comparison can be made between the 
volume of British manufacturers reaching Latin 
America before or after emancipation. But 
what does emerge from such random estimates is 
that the pattern and constituents of the trade 
between Britain and Latin America were well 
established long before the breakaway from 
Spain. Once the excitement was over and the 
needs created by a decade of interrupted 
trade were satisfied, trade settled back into 
a familiar pattern, expanded for British 
cottons by their success in displacing 
Spanish cottons and German linens, swollen 
by new fashions and needs, supplemented by 
the demand of resident foreign communities, 
but not, in the final analysis so very dif­
ferent in volume or content from the trade 
with the Spanish Colonies.
The claim that merchants were a driving force behind
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Spanish America's opening up to the international economy2  ̂
is difficult to sustain. The majority of merchants in the 
Spanish American colonies had been peninsulares who, if they 
had not fled with their lives and what part of their wealth 
they could carry, were mercilessly taxed by penurious inde­
pendence governments in need of cash with which to carry on 
the war against Spain.22 Creole merchants often did not 
fare much better and, of course, had much less wealth. In 
international trade both were displaced by foreign merchants 
who had vital connections with the centers of export in 
Europe and the United States. Domestic trade, however, re­
mained in creole hands for the most part, although these 
were not the, super wealthy merchants of colonial days.2^
In Argentina, domestic trade became speculative - the antithe 
sis of the rigidly controlled mercantilism which dominated 
the colonial era - and therefore fraught with risk. Although 
one could become very rich, many were ruined.24 The more 
powerful merchants of the colonial consulados had been, from 
the start, against the opening of trade with foreigners and 
were willing to give the governments - rebel or royalist - 
grants or loans to compensate for the needed revenues which, 
it was thought, could only be raised through import taxes 
on foreign trade.2  ̂ Though merchants remained an important 
part of the elites in Spanish America, their influence was
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never decisive.
Producers of export crops had never been very important 
in the Spanish colonial regime given its principal reliance 
on the export of specie rather than bulk agricultural pro­
duce. They suffered even further as the wars of independence 
decimated vast agricultural areas which had been agro-export 
oriented. The slave based agriculture of Colombia and 
Venezuela was severely disrupted by the wars, as was the 
coastal agricultural zone of P e r u . 26 slaves were freed and 
inducted into the various contending armies while these 
armies fed off of the plantations and haciendas leaving them 
in a state of ruin.27 The large cattle raising areas of 
Venezuela and Uruguay were destroyed while the combination 
of the Wars of Independence and civil war even created a 
shortage of cattle in Buenos Aires province causing Director
Pueyrredon to order the closing of the saladeros (salting
28plants) in 1817. Indeed, agro-exporters of course became 
powerful and influential in the Spanish American countries 
in the 19th century, but not by their efforts alone. As I 
will show later, export interests were often brought to pre­
dominance by Spanish American States or the conditions of 
political crisis itself.
In reality, the effects of Spanish America's initial 
contact with the international economic system was less pro-
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found than dependency writers would have us believe. Granted,
some domestic production was adversely affected by competition
from foreign goods, but on the whole, much of it remained un-
29touched by this new trade. If commerce and production 
suffered, it suffered more from the effects of Bourbon eco­
nomic and political reforms, the closure of traditional markets 
due to new political boundaries and the devastation of the in­
dependence and civil wars.'*0 Nevertheless, economic disputes 
centered around the progress of the export sectors and its 
effect on domestic manufacturing and agriculture did have
salience in some areas as Miron Burgin's work on Argentina 
31clearly shows. However, one has to question whether in 
most of Spanish America, including Argentina, these disputes 
themselves were determinative in the creation of the export 
economies.
The evidence, as I will show, supports a rather different 
interpretation of the origins of dependency and underdevelop­
ment in Spanish America in the 19th century. This interpre­
tation holds that while having a decidedly economic basis, 
the forces which created the export economies in Spanish 
America were essentially political - tied to the creation of 
new States and the political conflicts over the form they 
would take.
The following chapters will explore the political
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conflicts between the various sectors of the owning classes, 
their ultimate economic basis and the policies of the States 
which led to the creation of the export economies as a 
solution to political conflict. The analysis will focus 
primarily on Peru and Argentina.
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CHAPTER VI
ECONOMIC CLASS CONFLICT IN PERU AND ARGENTINA 
THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF POLITICAL 
CLASS CONFLICT
Although the conflicts that wracked Spanish American 
countries in the first half of the 19th century had an 
essentially political nature they also had an ultimately 
economic basis. The social relations of production within 
Spanish America set the context within which the political 
battles of the era would be fought. That these conflicts 
emerged in a political frame of reference only indicates the 
non-capitalist nature of the economies themselves. Had they 
been capitalist economies we would expect the conflicts to 
be expressed, as Frank would have them, economically.1 Yet, 
Spanish America's heritage from the colonial period did not 
bestow upon it capitalist social relations of production nor 
did the 19th century bring with it substantial progress in 
that direction. Commercialization did make substantial 
inroads but not capitalist social relations.
For the same reason that the War of Independence was 
essentially a political struggle, so too were the conflicts
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between the owning classes in the 19th century. The role of 
the Spanish colonial State in regulating the access to and 
use of the factors of production - land, labor and commerce - 
politicized the economy and gave economic issues and con­
flicts a decided political character. This did not change 
with the independence of the former colonies. In fact, politi 
cal independence served to direct conflicts, with a vengeance, 
towards the nascent Spanish American States which, at this 
juncture, were extremely weak and not up to the task of 
regulating and harmonizing the conflictual interests that had 
been bottled., up by the Spanish colonial State.
Yet, without firmly tying them to a material basis, 
the political conflicts in Spanish America in the first half 
of the 19th century appear as battles exclusively over ideas, 
constitutions, beliefs and principles. Of course the pro­
tagonists of the conflicts perceived them as such but, they 
also reflected conflicts at the economic level 'which then 
conditioned their political attitudes.
This Chapter will survey the economies and social rela­
tions of production of Peru and Argentina in the first half 
of the 19th century emphasizing how inter and intra economic 
class conflicts shaped the political attitudes of various 
sectors of the owning classes. Chapter VII will analyze the
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political conflicts within the owning classes in these two 
countries.
PERU
Peru emerged from the War of Independence with a severely 
damaged system of labor control and surplus extraction. The 
role of the Spanish colonial State in the economy of Peru had 
been decisive and its collapse placed the Peruvian elite - 
both those involved in production and those not (bureaucrats, 
merchants and soldiers) - in dire straits.
In the sierra, which had been a major theater of the 
war, the decline of the commercial economy which had been 
proceeding ever since Upper Peru (Bolivia) was juridically 
separated from the Viceroyalty of Peru, moved apace as the 
independence war destroyed the mines and thus, the markets 
they provided sLerra agricultural.2 Production then, for the 
most part, fell back into local and subsistence production 
except for the one bright spot - wool production and export.3
The commercial and economic decline of the sierra 
coupled with the disappearance of the Spanish colonial State 
had serious repercussions on most landowners, miners and 
merchants in the sierra. Sierra landowners had never been 
allowed to completely dominate the socio-economy of the high­
lands owing to the Spanish State's fear of creating a landed
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aristocracy and need of Indian labor in the mines which 
filled the imperial treasury. Indian communidades were pro­
tected (however poorly) by the Church and State^ and, even 
with the decline of mining in the 18th century, only a few 
hacendados were able to expand their holdings and control of 
Indian labor given the reduced markets for their production. 
As Karen Spalding argues,5
The activity of the Indian villages limited the 
possibilities of accumulation open to the 
European landholder, forced to compete with the 
village producers who had to unload their pro­
duce in order to obtain money to meet their debts.
The available market was limited, and in the 18th 
century, since the mines were in decline, it was 
actually shrinking. There was space for the 
emergence of a relatively few wealthy landowners, 
whose wealth depended as much upon their relation 
to the colonial bureaucracy as it did upon the 
production of their estates.
In fact, Spalding claims that in the early 19th century, at
least in the Southern Peruvian highlands, landholding did not
become very concentrated and society was made up of large to
small landowners, petty merchants and traders and a growing
landless labor force made up of Indians and mestizos.**
The foregoing gives a picture of the Peruvian sierra
as a relatively fluid society in which given the large number
of small and medium producers and the survival of Indian
communidades, a system of purely economic domination would
have been difficult. It was. The predominant position and
control of t.he labor force of the hacendados in the sierra,
240
up until the end of the colonial era, had been maintained by 
their relationship with the State bureaucratic apparatus and, 
with its disappearance in the wake of the Wars of Indepen­
dence, some alternative means had to be devised.
The process of re-establishing landowner domination 
in the highlands was further complicated by the policies of 
early independence governments which, with the idea of 
winning the support of the Indian masses for the new regime, 
attempted to turn the Indians into a class of yeoman farmers 
who would form a major class support for the new Republican 
States.? In 1825 Bolivar decreed that,®
(1) the state could not require personal service, 
direct or indirect, without drafting a contract 
which established the wages of the Indians;
(2) provincial officials, judges, Church officials 
at all levels, hacendados, and mine owners were 
prohibited from employing Indians against their 
will; (3) labor drafts for public works had to 
affect all citizens equally: (4) the supplying
of the army could not be confined to the 
Indian but had to fall on all citizens equally;
(5) all work in the mines, haciendas, and other 
jobs had to be paid for in money unless the 
employee desired otherwise; (6) article 5 was 
to be enforced by local and provincial officials;
(7) the Church could not charge the Indian more 
for services than it charged others; (8) the 
civil authorities were to insure that the 
Church did not take advantage of the Indian.
Bolivar further decreed that the communidades be disolved 
and that their lands be distributed to their members as 
freeholds. The curacas, or Indian headmen, who Bolivar be­
lieved oppressed the communidad Indians were to be stripped
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of their role as hereditary political leaders of the Indians 
as well as lose much of their inflated landholdings.9
Had these decrees been promulagated in a vaccum they 
might have produced their intended results. But, in the 
context of the Peruvian sierra where the power of the State 
to enforce these decrees was almost non-existent, and the 
landowning class was fearful of additional competition from 
free Indian farmers and the loss of control over the high­
land laboring population, the reforms were doomed to 
failure. However, Bolivar was not so wrong to think that if 
hacendado control over Indian labor and the stifling effects 
of the Indian communidades could be removed, the stagnant 
sierra economy could be revived. Indeed, in the case of the 
Indian communidades, the interest of the Crown in the survival 
of these archaic social forms had been geared to preventing 
the rise of a class of independent Indian farmers. The 
Crown made sure that any economic differentiation amongst the 
Indians would be eliminated by enforcing regulations requiring 
periodic redistributions of community lands. Rich Indians it 
seems did not make up for the loss of tribute from Indians 
who became too poor to pay it.^®
That these reforms were not successful is not surprising. 
Though according to the original Bolivarian decree Indians 
were not allowed to sell their lands until 1850, a good deal
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was sold, or more often, stolen by virtue of hacendado con­
trol of the highland politico-legal apparatus, well before 
that date.11 The Constitution of 1828, in fact, made it 
possible for literate Indians to sell their lands before 
1850.3-2 This usurption of Indian lands though, did not 
occur wholesale and proceeded throughout the 19th and 20th 
centuries. Landgrabbing in the first .half of the 19th cen­
tury, however, indicated the weakness rather than the 
strength of the highland landowning elite. Lands were 
taken not because the hacendados could use them for ex­
panded production but rather so that the Indians could not 
use them free of their control and thus become a challenge 
to them. In any case, very little changed except that more 
Indians and communidades became tenants of the haciendas.
The hacendados by no means sought to proletarianize the 
Indians as they had neither the markets nor the capital 
for such a project. Rather, they assured themselves a cheap 
labor force which had at its disposal its own means of sub­
sistence. Rents, labor and personal services came free of 
charge if only the hacendados could maintain their local 
political predominance.
Yet, the hacendados had little advantage over the 
Indians in the market place without political control of the 
provinces and thus their preference for a decentralized
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national political system. Though the hacendados owned the 
land upon which the Indians lived and toiled, it was left in 
the Indians' possession. In some areas, particularly the 
wool producing areas of the Southern highlands, communidad 
as well as hacienda Indians competed directly with the 
hacendados for markets. Given that pastures were open and 
Indian sheepherders tended both their own and hacienda 
sheep together, the hacendados could not gain any advantage 
over the Indians in the marketplace through greater efficiency 
or more advanced technology.13 However, through their con­
trol of the local political system, they could prevent this 
equality in the market-place from creating a competing 
Indian elite. It is here that political control was indis­
pensable to keep the Indian population on and off the 
hacienda subservient. Drafts of gang labor, or faenas, 
called by local officials for 'public projects' (which often 
included the maintenance of hacienda gristmills or canal 
systems), requirements of personal service to local officials, 
fines, imprisonment, tribute collection and use of the legal 
system against the persons or/and property of the Indians 
assured that the dominance of the elite would be maintained. 
That such elaborate political-legal mechanisms were necessary 
to maintain the sierra landowning elite is evidence of their 
still relatively weak economic control over the land in the
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first half of the 19th century.
Although the dominant impression of the regime in the 
Andean highlands, at least from independence to the present, 
has been of a harsh system of unrelenting social, political 
and economic oppression directed at the Indian^, this may 
have been more apparent than real. Granted, some descrip­
tions, such as that of Henri Favre who found that in Moya 
and Cuenca during the 'good old days', "...it was sufficient 
to throw a ten centavo piece at the feet of the first Indian 
to come along to obtain all the labor needed to work the 
fields. If the Indian refused to work, he was thrown in 
prison and kept there until he agreed to carry out the task 
for which he had been 'paid'"16, starkly reveal the subser­
vient position of the Indians in the sierra - but this was 
not a completely one sided affair. Although they were 
generally able to move the Indians off of the fertile valley 
lands and into the less agriculturally viable lands in the 
mountains, the hacendados employed very little of the sierra 
labor force.17 Where Indians did work on hacienda lands, 
they often controlled production to the detriment of the 
hacendados as, "In some cases, "tied” peasants were able to 
build up considerable amounts of livestock and commercialize 
them on their own account; likewise, on arable haciendas, 
peasant colonos often had effective control over their
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production that could equal that of the hacienda itself."1® 
Even in the early 20th century, as Juan Martfnez Alier has 
found, hacienda owners had a great deal of difficulty getting 
the Indians to use the land as they wished and in removing 
the Indians from the land at all.*® Indeed, as the resis­
tance of the highland Indians to becoming coastal wage 
workers in the latter half of the 19th century indicates, 
the conditions of 'unfree' labor were to be more desirable 
than 'free' wage labor.20
If landowners were in a precarious position in their 
conflict with the highland laboring classes, the mine owners 
were all but ruined. Mining in the sierra, although it did 
see a boom in the late colonial era, was moribund by the end 
of the Wars of Independence. Generally, miners had never 
been particularly wealthy given the Crown's close control 
and interest in this industry and the problems of inadequate 
financing, technological backwardness, flooding of the mines 
exhaustion of ore bodies and inadequate labor supply which 
plagued the industry throughout much of the 18th century.2* 
The infusion of British technology and capital in the early 
19th century, though it breathed some life into the indus­
try, also failed principally, at least in the estimation of 
Shane Hunt, because of the small scale of production which 
required that miners join together in a guild, or gremio,
for large scale projects (such as drainage) and the perpetual 
lack of credit which forced miners to pay their workers in 
ore rather than wages.22 In fact, it was perhaps because 
mine owners did better when poor grades of ore were mined, 
given that they had to pay their workers in ore, that raining 
remained at so low a level of production and efficiency.22
The major problem for miners was in attracting a work 
force. With the mita abolished once in the 18th century2  ̂
and then again by Bolivar in the 19th25, they competed for 
labor in an environment in which most labor was either tied 
to haciendas and communidades or not highly mobile. The 
haciendas could offer the Indians security and subsistence 
whereas the mines, given their condition of continual failure 
and penury, could only be of marginal interest to the Indians. 
The association of mine work with the hated mita and the 
fact that many mines were far from major areas of Indian 
domicile condemned the mine owners to chronic labor short­
ages. In comparison to hacienda owners, mine owners remained 
chronically weak politically, apparently unable to attain the 
local power necessary to tip the scales of labor distribution 
in their favor.
Coastal haciendas which had been in decline since the 
late colonial period continued in a state of decline during 
most of the first half of the 19th century. Mostly sugar and
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cotton plantations based upon slave labor, they suffered 
directly from the policy of liberation governments offering 
slaves their freedom in return for service in the armies of 
independence.2 In addition, a great deal of the hacienda 
slave labor force simply disappeared in the confusion of 
Bocial and political instability that commenced after the 
War of Independence.27 The abolition of the slave trade in 
1823 (slaves though were legally imported again between 
1935 and 1839) dealt another blow to the coastal slavocracy 
which found that it could not replace its losses through 
massive re-importation.28 It is unclear though, given the 
sorry state of their enterprises, whether they could have 
afforded large slave imports in any case.
While slavery survived, it could not provide the amount 
of cheap labor necessary to revive the industry.28 Sugar and 
cotton production remained at low levels as coastal hacen­
dados erected a precarious system of tenant farming based on 
sharecropping, preferring the surety which dependable small 
rents provided.28 This system of tenancy, called yanaconaje, 
according to Jose' Matos Mar, "...represents an unequal union 
between a capitalist system of exploitation which provides 
land, water and capital, and a pattern of agricultural labor 
operating within a pre-capitalist system of land tenure".
In essence, the yanacona performed as a sharecropper,
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reducing the risks of cultivation to the landowner, purchasing 
his own seed and tools while handing over to the hacienda 
owner a portion of his production.3^
In 1854, President Ramon Castilla formally abolished 
slavery and thereby set the stage for the re-invigoration of 
coastal commercial agriculture. Castilla's government, 
flush with massive revenues from the guano trade33, re­
capitalized coastal agriculture by compensating slave owners 
300 pesos per slave. The State paid slaveowners for those 
slaves they still had in their possession and for many who 
had already left. By 1850, 25,505 slaves were compensated 
for at a cost of 7,651,000 pesos.34 Most of the former 
slaves moved out of the coastal agricultural regions to 
Lima or became brigands roaming the countryside while others 
remained, becoming yanacona or overseers of Chinese 
coolies.35
From the 1850's onwards, Chinese coolies filled the 
perceived labor shortage on the coast.36 Coastal hacienda 
owners flush with new wealth acquired in the guano trade or 
through slave compensations began, in the 1850's, importing 
large numbers of Chinese coolies who, although they came as 
indentured servants, existed in conditions of servitude not 
unlike, though sometimes worse than, the slaves they re­
placed.3  ̂ Paid in depreciated paper money which made it
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almost impossible to pay back their debts and thus free them­
selves, the Chinese labor force rebelled in a series of 
bloody uprisings in the 1870's.^® The Chinese trade was 
finally abolished in 1874 chiefly because of pressure from 
the British who, in addition, literally closed off this human 
traffic at its source.39 At least part of the coastal agri­
cultural depression of the late 1870's can be ascribed to 
the ensuing shortage of cheap labor.40
Since no manufacturing industry proper arose in Peru 
during the whole of the 19th century, no industrial proletariat 
developed in the urban centers. Manufacturers were either 
acquired through foreign trade or produced in shops which had 
not developed the production process much beyond the handi­
craft stage.41 In the first half of the 19th century Lima, 
the capital and largest city, actually lost people. Between 
1820 and 1836, Lima lost about 15% of its population.43 
Pardos, mestizos and Indians carried the burden of what 
manual labor there was in the urban areas.4  ̂ As in the 
coastal agricultural regions, in Lima it was believed that a 
severe labor shortage existed and explained the relatively 
high cost of labor.44
Peruvian social relations of production in the 19th 
century remained, as we have seen, fundamentally precapitalist. 
This fact was both a cause and effect of the perceived labor
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shortage which, in conditioning the views of the Peruvian 
owning classes, formed the economic basis of their political 
conflicts. Peru, of course, was not labor short, rather it 
lacked a free labor market.45 In the highlands, the hacen­
dados could not, and did not want to proletariani2e the 
Indians and thus they sought to immobilize them by controlling 
the land on which they worked and the socio-political environ­
ment in which they lived. The Indians, preferring to remain 
if not the owners, at least the possessors of the land were 
accommodated by the strategy of the hacendados. Where land 
was seen as the only sure means of subsistence, the Indians 
fought to remain attached to it. In any event, the strategy 
of the hacendados required direct political control of the 
sierra and thus they grew to prefer the type of State and 
State policies that would assure them of that control.
The coastal hacendados, who had borne the brunt of the 
restrictive colonial labor distribution system and thus had 
to rely on relatively expensive imported slave labor, did 
not fare any better and probably did somewhat worse during 
the early post colonial era. The Wars of Independence had 
only exacerbated their chronic labor shortages and early 
Republican legislation which sought to remove the restrictions 
on labor mobility between the sierra and the coast was in­
effective against the dam erected by the confluence of interest
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of sierra hacendados and Indians. Since a cheap labor force 
was not available to them internally, the coastal hacendados 
were forced to rely on a dying slave system, sharecropping 
and later, imported indentured servants. Real prosperity 
always eluded them. Given these conditions, coastal hacen- 
dados developed an ambivalent position towards the type of 
State they preferred. On the one hand they sought policies 
which would weaken the archaic social and economic system 
of the sierra hoping to tap into the sierra labor force and 
thus tended to support State political centralization. On 
the other hand, given that they too relied on pre-capitalist 
social relations of production which required local political 
control, they favored a weak decentralized State.
Argentina
Perhaps more than any other former Spanish American 
colony Argentina suffered the severe dislocations of both 
the break with the colonial system and the Wars of Indepen­
dence. Certainly more than any other Spanish American 
country its economy, society and polity were restructured by 
the events which gave it independence. As we saw in 
Chapter V, the sources of urban wealth which had sustained 
the bureaucrat-merchant elite of Buenos Aires dried up when 
the new State could not maintain the Viceregal lines of
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political and economic domination. With the traditional 
sources of urban wealth removed, the basis of political power 
became ruralized. A similar process of ruralization affected 
the Interior provinces but was more profound in that rather 
than discovering new sources of wealth in the countryside 
as did the elite of Buenos Aires, the disappearance of its 
traditional markets in Peru and Bolivia (Upper Peru) left the 
Interior elite with little to fall back on. In an effort to 
maintain their position, the elites of the Interior were 
forced to turn their economies inward in an attempt to 
isolate their provinces from the effects of foreign trade.
The task which occupied the elites in both areas, given the 
crisis, was the same - to institute or maintain control over 
the available sources of wealth, principally land and labor. 
However, though their aims were similar, the political 
requisites for the success of each threw them into a conflict 
that was to take most of the 19th century to sort out.
In Buenos Aires province, the bureaucrat-merchant 
elite began in earnest its conversion into a landholding 
elite in the 1820's after it became clear that the old Vice­
regal pattern of domination and trade could not be recon­
structed with the fall of the Directory in 1820. As John 
Lynch argues,4?
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...the decline of trade with the interior, 
the wartime destruction of the littoral 
cattle industry, and above all the 
irresistable competition of British mer­
chants dislocated the traditional economy 
and curtail the opportunities of local 
entrepreneurs. The increase in exports 
provoked by the British and the failure 
of the export sector to respond caused 
an outflow of precious metals, which was 
accompanied by an increase in local demand 
for currency. The time arrived when the 
traditional economy of Buenos Aires could 
no longer sustain the merchant elite.
From about 1820 many of them began to 
seek other outlets and, without abandoning 
commerce, to invest in land, cattle and 
meat salting plants.
It was in this ruralization of a portion of the Buenos Aires 
elite that the origin of Federal - Unitarian conflict lies. 
Those who remained faithful to the traditional power struc­
ture - principally professionals, politicians and 
intellectuals along with some merchants - became Unitarians, 
dedicated to the erection of a powerful centralized State 
centered in Buenos Aires. Those who turned their attention 
to the countryside and cattle raising - merchant-landowners - 
became Federalists, opposed to the nationalizing and cen­
tralizing tendencies of the Unitarians which they felt 
neglected or harmed the cattle raising i n d u s t r y . T h o u g h  
the political position of the Unitarians was conditioned by 
the economic class struggles on the land, they themselves 
had very little of an economic or social base, their fortunes
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49were tied to those of the State. They will be examined more 
closely in Chapter VII. It is rather the Federalists, those 
who went out to conquer the land and the people, and whose 
political attitudes were most conditioned by the economic 
class struggle to which we turn here.
Although there had been some considerable development 
of cattle raising in Buenos Aires province prior to 1820, it 
had always been constrained by lack of markets, competition 
with the cattle areas of Uruguay, insecurity arising from 
Indian attack, and the low social status accorded to land 
ownership in the Rio de la Plata.50 As a frontier area in 
the Spanish colonial system, Buenos Aires province became a 
haven for those displaced or discriminated against by the caste 
system in the colonies.5^ Large expanses of unclaimed land 
where the authority of the State was weak and a living could 
be made off of the thousands c£ cattle roaming the pampa 
nurtured a population of gauchos (cowboys) who were relatively 
independent and dangerous because of their equestrian and 
military-like skills.52 This relatively nomadic rural 
population had always been of concern to the Spanish 
colonial authorities who identified them as 1vagos (vagrants) 
y mal entretenidos (n'eer do wells)' first because they were 
thought to have stirred up and/or led Indian attacks on rural 
estancias (ranches) and second, because this large rural
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population operated, on the whole, outside of the colonial 
economy creating a labor shortage.53
As land under the legal ownership of estancieros 
increased in the early 19th century the problem of the con­
trol and use of this rural population became more and more 
acute. According to Silvio R. Duncan Baretta and John 
Markoff, "...as the value of cattle rose and the former 
colonies were threatened with political disintegration, the 
need to settle and discipline populations became more pressing 
than ever before".5* The War of Independence, the Indian 
wars, and the interminable civil wars only exacerbated the 
problem of controlling the rural population. Deserters 
from the armies swelled the nomadic rural population while 
civil war made it difficult to settle the people on the land
since the gaucho was needed as connon fodder in the political
55conflicts of the era. Further, land expansion directed 
against both the Indians and the rural population only made 
the gaucho more determined to elude peonization and thus be­
come a *vago', "In short, wars, forced recruitment, the con­
tinuous expansion of the great estates and the judicial 
repression of vagabonds continually created new wanderers 
and kept the old ones in movement".56
Prominent in the first half of the 19th century were 
legal efforts to control the rural population of the province.
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Legislation of this type was supported by all elites whether 
Unitarian or Federal, but not for the same reasons. The 
Unitarian Bernardino Rivadavia, "...gave Argentine vagrancy 
statutes their enduring force and form during the 1920*s".57 
The legislation of Rivadavia required that rural workers 
have a passport for travel within and without the province, 
have the written permission of an estanciero to leave his 
ranch and expanded the definition of 'vagos y mal entre- 
tenidos' to include any rural male so defined by the testimony 
of a justice of the peace. Anyone who broke these laws or 
who was defined as a vagrant was subject to several years of 
forced military s e r v i c e . ^ 8 The rural inhabitants found no 
relief under the Federalist Juan Manuel de Rosas who, while 
giving the impression that he 'understood the gaucho and was 
concerned with his welfare', enforced the vagrancy laws 
against the gaucho with increased vigor.50 According to 
Richard Slatta, "Rosas blamed the backwardness of the pampa 
on the ’throngs of idlers, vagrants and delinquents' that 
afflicted the countryside. He expended much of his adminis­
trative energies on converting those he considered idlers 
into sedentary, contractual ranch workers or cavalrymen for 
his army".60 During the Rosas era the repression of the 
rural population was carried out, for the most part by rural 
justices of the peace who patrolled the countryside keeping
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order at the behest of the estancieros.61
Although Unitarian and Federal policies against the
rural population were the same, the intent seems to have
been dissimilar. While the Unitarians were interested in
the health of the cattle raising industry, they were more
interested in creating the conditions for a stable farming
sector in which the ‘vagrant' population of the pampa would
have no place. For Rivadavia, the rural population of
Buenos Aires was 'an unproductive class, a deadweight,
harmful to public morals and a cause of social disorder'.62
His prescription was conscription into the army for the mass
of them, harsh rural labor laws and European colonization to
create an honest and hard working rural laboring population.6^
The Federalists'apparent reason for desiring such legislation
was the lack of available labor to work and expand their 
64ranches. As Slatta argues, the vagrancy laws had the 
effect of, "...curtailing worker mobility, it functioned 
much as the colonial labor systems of encomienda and 
yanaconaje in controlling the Indians in New Spain and 
Peru..."®5 However, although testimonies of labor shortage 
by landowners abound66 the primary reason for their desire 
for such harsh legislation, "...was to impose law and order 
in the countryside..."67
Not only did the estanciero seek to force the gaucho
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to work on his estancia, he sought to prevent the roaming 
gaucho from becoming his competitor in the market and a 
danger to his herds. The gaucho# who "...maintained his 
custom of free grazing on the open range and appropriating 
unmarked animals even after 'terratenientes1 (landowners) 
had gained title to most of the better lands..."68, became 
a rustler by definition and thus a threat to the estanciero. 
The low labor requirements of cattle raising indicates that, 
in fact, the estanciero's objective in controlling the rural 
population was not primarily his need for workers®®, but 
rather to monopolize the resources of the countryside - land 
and cattle?0 - because the only advantage he held over the 
gaucho in the raising of cattle was his legal ownership of 
the land and control of the local political-legal system with 
which he could prosecute the gaucho for being an 'independent 
entrepreneur'. What in fact often necessitated the need for 
more workers than cattle raising required was the fear of 
raids by gauchos and other landowners. Because wealth - the 
cattle - was so mobile, large bodies of armed men were needed 
to protect that wealth from neighboring estancieros and 
gauchos alike. These bodies of armed men formed the basis 
for elite armed struggle during the civil wars. In fact the 
landgrabbing of many estancieros who had no actual need for 
more land can only be explained by their attempt to deny the
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gauchos free possession of the land and cattle, make them de­
pendent on the estancia and then provide for them as an 
armed force with the land usurped.71
Control of the rural population necessitated a State 
that would promote the export of cattle products, enforce 
vagrancy laws, provide protection from the Indians and pro­
vide cheap, if not free, land to the landowners. In the 
absence of such a State the estancieros preferred local 
political control.
The elite of the Interior tended to favor local politi­
cal control too for not so wholly different reasons. The 
economies of the Interior had received a shock equal to, if 
not greater than, that of Buenos Aires from the War of 
Independence and civil wars. The Interior provinces held a 
strategic place within the Viceregal economy selling their 
produce in the mining areas of the Peruvian and Bolivian high­
lands in return for silver with which they purchased imports 
coming through Buenos Aires. The Interior also dominated 
the transport of both trades.
The definitive shutting down of this trade with the 
loss of Bolivia (Upper Peru) ushered in political and 
economic disintegration in the Interior.?2 The Wars of 
Independence also took a heavy toll on the Interior provinces. 
In La Rioja, for example, in 1819 the scarcity of cattle due
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to confiscations for the armies of independence became so 
severe that slaughtering for commercial purposes had to be 
reduced by half, while in Cordoba, in that same year, the 
province could no longer provide horses for San Martin's 
army.^3 civil war too took a heavy toll in the Interior 
as the march of armies across the provinces destroyed pro­
duction and commerce and both national and provincial govern­
ments scoured the countryside for funds to support their
causes.74
The same processes which ruralized the bases of 
political power in Buenos Aires affected the Interior pro­
vinces but the economic base which the Interior elite was 
forced to fall back upon was contracting, not expanding as 
in Buenos Aires. As the State in Buenos Aires monopolized 
the funds collected from foreign trade and trade in the 
Interior was in a state of ruin, public office and commerce, 
the two pillars of the Interior urban elite crumbled. 
Treasuries everywhere in the Interior provinces were empty, 
the public debt went unfunded, and the civil bureaucracy 
and military often went unpaid.75 Nowhere could sufficient 
revenues be found as, even Cordoba, the most populous 
(60,000) and prosperous of the Interior provinces, could 
barely raise 70,000 pesos in 1824.75
In the absence of policies by the national governments
26i
under the Unitarians or the Buenos Aires Federalists favoring 
their trade over foreign imported goods, the elites of the 
Interior provinces could only try to protect themselves 
against the total ruination of their economies through pro­
tectionism. Yet, as Burgin clearly argues, protectionism 
against Buenos Aires was not what they really desired, rather 
they sought to monopolize the Buenos Aires market for their
own goods.78
Protectionism did not however stem the decline of the
Interior economies. Aldo Ferrer claims that,
Given the factors conditioning its development, 
the economy of the interior did not change...
The output of each region went to the local 
market and a large part of the working pop­
ulation continued in subsistence activities.
In the Northwest, where exports actually 
declined, ...it is likely that the economy 
regressed from the levels it had reached in 
the 18th century and that the proportion of 
the labor force occupied in subsistence 
activities even increased.
Everywhere in the Interior provinces production suffered
primarily from the loss of markets and was sustained at low
O  Alevels only by inter-provincial trade.
To a large degree the disintegration of the Interior
economies reproduced the labor control problems found in
Buenos Aires province. Of the Interior James Scobie writes,8^
Among the lower classes, the constant insecurity 
and lack of employment resulted in the disinte­
gration of the family unit and the disappearance of
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trained, disciplined laborers. Landless,, nomadic 
masses increasingly replaced the industrious peons 
and skilled artisans. Many formerly prosperous 
areas now fell back on the rudimentary economy 
which had existed in seventeenth century Buenos 
Aires. The gaucho and the colonial estancia
invaded the Andean region...
In addition, the Interior provinces lost men, not only 
through conscription into the independence and civil war 
armies, but also through migration to the coast and other 
provinces in search of w o r k . 82 as Donna Guy shows, economic 
activities associated with men declined in many areas of the 
Interior leaving womens' household handicrafts the mainstay 
of provincial economies.
As in Buenos Aires province, draconian vagrancy laws 
were used against the laboring poor not only to create a 
cheap labor force but to immobilize the rural population.
In Tucum^n, for example, anti-vagrancy laws were enacted in
1823 and a 'ley de conchabo1, or forced labor law, put into
force in 18 32.84 Given the severe crisis prevailing with 
regard to labor control in the Interior, the vagrancy laws 
there contained many more provisions for worker registra­
tion and the capture of vagrants and they lasted much longer 
than in the coastal provinces.85
The need for such harsh legal control of the rural 
working classes in the Interior, as in Buenos Aires, indicated 
an extraordinary lack of economic control by the owning
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classes. It is perhaps for this reason that they clung to 
local political and administrative control, and thus. 
Federalism. However, if Unitarianism could have sustained 
the Interior elites by distributing to them a share of the 
revenues collected through the port of Buenos Aires, they 
would have been satisfied with a centralized national State. 
Unitarianism, though, denied them both the revenues, and 
political and economic autonomy and thus the Interior re- 
jected it for Federalism.86 Federalism however turned out 
to be a double edged sword for the Interior provinces as the 
political and economic autonomy they gained only prevented 
their complete ruin - Federalist Buenos Aires province re­
mained in control of the port, the import-export revenues, 
and the future of the Interior.
In both Peru and Argentina political conflicts between 
sectors of the dominant classes were the result of their own 
economic conflicts with their laboring classes. Already 
conflict ridden during the colonial era, relations between 
the dominant and dominated classes were further made tense 
by the ruinous economic effects of the Wars of Independence 
and the disappearance of the colonial administrative apparatus 
which had managed those conflicts.
Inter and intra economic class conflicts always had the 
potential of breaking out into open warfare during the colonial
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period but were held in check by the colonial State bureaucracy 
This was possible as long as the bureaucracy was viewed by all 
as the legitimate arbiter of such conflicts. But, its demise 
in the wake of the Bourbon reforms and the independence 
struggles meant not only that these conflicts might break 
out into the open but that they would affect the manner in 
which political power was exercised and constituted.
The economic systems of both Peru and Argentina were 
made up of a hodge-podge of non-capitalist forms of produc­
tion which each required definite political requisites for 
their maintenance and reproduction. What each required was 
often contradictory but, since their competition for the 
various resources necessary for production - principally 
land, labor and mercury (for silver production) - was 
mediated through the colonial bureaucracy's control of these 
resources, they did not face one another openly - either on 
the economic or political level. Independence, however, 
transformed the context of the struggles between elites whose 
dominance was based on conflicting social relations of pro­
duction. Without the independent hand of the colonial 
political-administrative apparatus, they were thrown into 
face to face competition at both the economic and political 
levels. Their conflicts, though, did not take on an economic 
form - this would have required a transformation to capitalist
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forms of production which/ of course, did not occur. Rather, 
their conflicts took political form in that each sector of 
the dominant class sought a State apparatus which would pro­
vide the political requisites necessary to exploit its 
laborers.
Thus, in both Peru and Argentina, inter and intra 
economic class conflict formed the basis for the political 
instability of the first half of the 19th century, and these 
conflicts were generally expressed politically, not 
economically. As political power and the State held a crucial 
position in providing the requisites of elite domination, how 
political power would be exercised and what form the State 
would take became the focus of owning class conflict. In 
Chapter VII the political conflicts that shaped the policies 
and form of the State in Peru and Argentina will be examined.
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CHAPTER VII
POLITICAL CONFLICT IN 19TH CENTURY PERU 
AND ARGENTINA: POLITICAL CRISIS
AND THE STATE
In the first half of the 19th century most Spanish 
American countries were the scene of intense and often 
bloody political conflicts. Though having a basis in inter 
and intra economic class conflict, these conflicts dealt 
essentially with how political authority would be recon­
stituted in the wake of the collapse of the colonial State.
At issue was which groups would be privileged by the new 
States and under what State forms and policies these privi­
leges would be alloted, as well as what would constitute the 
nation itself.
Although the Spanish colonial administration had been 
losing legitimacy throughout the Bourbon period, its final 
destruction hardly solved the problems its loss of legitimacy 
had created. However inefficient or discriminatory the 
Spanish State in America had been, it managed, even in the late 
Bourbon era, to assuage and mediate the disputes that the
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creole elite had amongst themselves. Though they may have 
been seething under the surface* "All of these social factions 
were bound together during the colonial period by a common 
denominator, their loyalty to the crown".̂  Independence 
governments, most of which were based upon town cabildos 
which were the only institutions capable at the time of 
exercising authority outside of the Spanish bureaucratic 
administration, were hardly credible replacements. The 
crisis of legitimacy, which plagued the colonial establish­
ment, infected them too and it became difficult for any 
authority to claim the kind of legitimate power represented 
by the king, once it was found that the system could be over­
turned. In fact, the popularity of monarchism with many ex­
hausted independence regimes can be explained by their search 
for some unifying force, above the fray, that could impose 
order.^
Spanish colonialism did not prepare the Americans for 
independence, although this is not meant in the conventional 
sense that it did not develop in the creoles an aptitude for 
government or that those who directed the new States were 
without political experience.^ indeed, those in charge had 
varied experience within the Spanish colonial bureaucracy as 
lawyers, bureaucrats, churchmen and soldiers.5 Rather, as 
Charles Anderson, argues, the nationalizing tendencies of
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absolutism and mercantilism did not touch Spanish America be­
cause the Spanish State deemed it in its interest that the 
economy, society and polity of Spanish America remain frag- 
roented with the Spanish State as the only unifying principle.0 
The result was that,7
Independence became not a process of mitosis, 
in which prior interaction had led to the 
emergence of more or less self sufficient 
organisms which could now go their separate 
ways, but a rending and tearing apart of the 
systemic substance about which social and 
economic life was organized....The separation 
from Spain did not serve to disentangle a 
network of economic and social systems from 
the strict regulation of absolute monarchy.
Rather, it severed the web of these relations 
and left a ragged edge of broken strands.
Fragmented socially and economically, the break with 
Spain only served to fragment Spanish America politically. 
Competition within the elite for privileges, wealth, honors 
and status that had been contained within the Spanish colonial 
administration, became, in its absence, a naked struggle for 
political power.® Those who had been favored by the colonial 
system tenaciously clung to those institutions and arrange­
ment which assured their domination, while those not favored 
attempted to destroy the old system and erect a new regime 
more in concert with their interests. As William Breezley 
succinctly states, "Spanish America, at the beginning of the 
national period, was characterized by a society in which there
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were numerous factions lacking a common ground for compromise 
because there was no agreed-upon loyalty or shared conception 
of a state idea".9
Political conflict and state formation in early 19th 
century Spanish America are integrally linked. At just the 
point when the elites required the intervention of the State 
to ameliorate or reconcile their differences, it had lost 
the requisite strength and legitimacy to perform that role.
The weakness of the State made elite conflict that much more 
serious because the State was seen as a tool that could be 
captured and used against one's opponents. The relative 
autonomy of the Spanish colonial State was replaced with 
administrations that were not only subject to bribery and 
influence (as admittedly was the Spanish colonial State) but, 
more importantly, outright manipulation and control.
Political conflict, thus, was directed at the State, 
particularly with regard to how the country would be structured 
socially and economically. The role of the State was crucial 
to all interests because of its central position in the main­
tenance and reproduction of the social and economic domination 
of Spanish American owning classes during the colonial period. 
As we have seen in chapter IV, the reforms introduced by the 
Bourbon State in Spanish America led to discontent and protest. 
With the disappearance of the Spanish colonial State after the
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Wars of Independence, discontent: and protest turned into 
direct action.
Below, four of the main aspects of political conflict 
in Spanish America during the first half of the 19th century 
will be examined in the national contexts of Peru and Argen­
tina - liberalism vs conservatism, centralism vs federalism 
(regionalism), church vs State, and the issue of caudillism.
Liberalism vs Conservatism
Although the conflict between liberals and conserva­
tives dominated other political conflicts in Spanish America 
in the first half of the 19th century (in fact the centralism 
vs federalism and church vs State conflicts were subsumed 
within it) there is a great deal of confusion as to who and 
what constituted these political tendencies. Excessive con­
centration on an economic interpretation of these tendencies 
has reduced them, as Charles Hale has noted, to the positions 
of for or against free t r a d e . H a r d  and fast delineations 
of these two groups tend to dissolve upon closer inspection. 
Liberals in Peru, according to Frederick Pike, were opposed 
to monarchism, urged the establishment of democratic institu­
tions, backed federalism, opposed a large standing army, 
sought legislative supremacy over the executive, and favored 
religious toleration and church-State separation. Conserva-
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tives favored a strong centralist State, hierarchic aristocric
government, a large standing army, executive predominance and
a State church.H However, as John Lynch points out,12
In theory liberals favored federalism, supposedly 
a decentralized and democratic form of government, 
while conservatives demanded a strong executive 
and central control. But when the opportunity 
occurred liberals would impose liberalism by 
central institutions in a unitary regime, such 
as that formed by Rivadavia and Sarraiento in 
Argentina. And to preserve their control in 
particular provinces, or if they happened to 
be the *outs', conservatives might well be 
federalists.
Nor did conservative politics mean conservative economics as 
Prank Safford's examples of the ’liberal' economic ideology 
of Mariano Ospina Rodriguez in Colombia and Lucas Alam^n and 
Esteban de Antunano in Mexico clearly s h o w .
The confusion over the definition of these tendencies 
is furthered, in the opinion of Safford, by giving them an 
occupational determination.^ Robert Schwartz, for example, 
argues the traditional identification of conservatives as 
landowners and liberals as wealthy merchants.^ This type 
of delineation, for Safford, cannot be sustained because 
landowners and merchants, as well as bureaucrats, lawyers, 
military officers and intellectuals can be found on both 
sides.16 For Safford, "There may have been a functional rea­
son for this - to survive, each party needed the various con­
tributions that could be made by landowners, merchant-
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capitalists, lawyer-ideologists and, certainly, military 
men.'1!?
Safford is perhaps exaggerating the balance of forces 
in terms of occupational equality between liberals and con­
servatives, but he nonetheless has indicated the pitfalls of 
such static analysis. Perhaps more promising is his sugges­
tion of dealing with the problem of defining these groups and 
their supports in terms of social location. Here, it is the 
relationship of various individuals or groups to the centers 
of institutional power which determines whether the individual 
or group leans towards liberalism or conservatism. In 
Safford1s words, "Those in the elite whose close early rela­
tionship to the structures of power gave them strategic ad­
vantages at the beginning of the republican epoch were likely
to end up being termed 'conservative', those who stood at a
IBgreater distance were likely to become 'liberal'". This 
should not be at all surprising, liberalism in the 19th cen­
tury was an ideology of protest, particularly against privi­
leges derived from close association with the S t a t e . I t  
was only natural that elements of the creole elite who were 
not favored by the colonial compact would find in this 
European bourgeois ideology an echo of their own dissatisfac­
tion.
Although creole liberal intellectuals in Spanish
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America may have generally accepted the liberal credo intellec­
tually, the evident selectivity they exhibited in its applica­
tion indicates only the lack of the appropriate conditions for
2 0its application in their countries, not opportunism. u 
Indeed, it was also that their liberalism was tainted with a 
large dose of Spanish medieval scholasticism which, as we 
have seen in Chapter V, leads many commentators to interpret 
the independence movements as 'liberal'. The creole 
ideologists of independence could appropriate some aspects 
of liberalism because on the issue of absolute power it 
mirrored their own scholastic thinking.21
A distinction should also be made between liberal and 
conservative politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals and 
the elements of the elite which they were representing.22 
Particularly in the Viceregal centers of administration like 
Lima and Buenos Aires21, there were large numbers of lawyers, 
bureaucrats and clerics who made their livings off of the 
administration and hundreds more who wanted to. These ad­
ministrators and potential administrators became conserva­
tive or liberal in much the same way as the economic elite 
although, more importantly, they became the ideologists of 
the others and fought the political battles in the capitals.
The ideological disputes received particular clarity and venom 
precisely because of competition within this group for
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political and administrative positions. However, this should 
not be construed to mean that the disputes had no social or 
economic content. As we have seen in Chapter VI, the inter 
and intra economic conflicts of the elite who were in charge 
of the surplus appropriating mechanisms led them to connect 
themselves with either the preservers of the status quo or 
reformers in the capital.
The roots of liberalism and conservatism in Spanish 
America during the first half of the 19th century are clearly 
linked to Spanish Bourbon reformism. Although there was 
general dissatisfaction with the reforms in America, the 
issue for many creoles was not the reforms themselves but 
rather that the expanded commercial economy and bureaucracy 
benefited peninsulares and not themselves. In Argentina, the 
liberal regime of Rivadavia was tied to the traditional 
Buenos Aires merchant-bureaucrat elite which had received 
only relatively minor benefits from the Bourbon reforms when 
compared to those received by the peninsulares and a very 
few creole merchants tied to them. The revolution against 
the Spaniards was theirs, they felt, and the Rivadavia pro­
gram reflected their attempt, even in the face of repeated' 
setbacks caused by the failure to secure Upper Peru, Paraguay, 
Uruguay and dominance over the Riverine and Interior pro­
vinces, to create an economy and society which they could
281
dominate commercially. The program of the liberal Unitarians
was based upon a critique of the Spanish colonial system which
argued that,25
...the economic and social backwardness 
of Argentina was owing not so much to 
her lack of material resources as to the 
economic and fiscal policies of the Spanish 
regime. Restrictions upon production and 
distribution, minute regulation of economic 
activities, oppressive taxes, all of which 
characterized Spain's economic policies, 
were contrary to the best interests of the 
colony but of the mother country as well.
The policy of restriction was based upon 
the notion that the interests of the state 
(treasury) were opposed to those of the 
individual.
This was, in fact, almost the same critique which the Spanish 
Bourbon reformers made of Spain itself in the 18th century.25 
It is not surprising that for the creoles the solution was 
similar, centralization of administration, reduction of 
regional autonomy, the development of agriculture and the 
freeing of trade. The Rivadavia plan called for the com­
plete dismantling of colonial restrictions, and the recon­
stituting of the economy on a more 'modern* basis under the 
aegis of a powerful yet paternalistic State.27 The goal of 
the Unitarians was thus an integrated national economy in 
which foreign trade, foreign investment and foreign immigra­
tion would play a major role.28
The opposition to the Unitarian plan, Federalism, cannot
282
rightly be called 'conservative', although in some sense it 
may be perceived as such. A distinction should also be made 
between provincial Federalism and porteno (Buenos Aires) 
Federalism, both of which had liberal and conservative ten­
dencies. Federalism on the whole stood for provincial 
autonomy in politics and economics against the central State 
and thus could appeal to rather different i n t e r e s t s . 2 9  i n  
the face of Unitarian supremacy in the executive and legisla­
ture, the mass of conflicting interests that made up the 
opposition could come to no other basis for agreement. Every 
interest that was threatened by the centralizing scheme of 
Rivadavia could at least agree on the need to halt it.20 
Perhaps what most turned the provinces against the Rivadavia 
plan was its call for the elimination of the provincial 
governments' institutional autonomy which had served as a 
major prop of the provincial elites. Local political control 
insured that they would control the local economy and not be 
forced to compete with the foreign or porteno merchants.
Yet, they were not against free commerce within the country 
itself and recognized the need for some kind of political 
and economic association with Buenos Aires and the rest of 
the provinces.21 Portefio Federalism tended to have greater 
conservative tendencies. The conservative portenos - estan- 
cieros (ranchers) and saladeros (owners of meat salting
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plants) - were perhaps the most privileged economic sector in 
Buenos Aires province and hadr more than any other sector 
except the politican-intellectuals, reaped the benefits of 
independence due to the breakdown of inter-provincial commerce 
and the opening of the economy to foreign trade. They opposed 
the Unitarians because they believed that the Unitarian policy 
of trying to force the provinces into a centralized State 
structure was chiefly responsible for the instability and war­
fare rampant in Argentina that was so harmful to their busi­
n e s s e s . ^  They also resented the Rivadavian constitution of 
1826 which would have nationalized the city of Buenos Aires 
and denied the province its import-export revenues. This 
they believed would lead to higher taxation in the province 
as the only means of financing a provincial government.^ in 
any case, the constitution would have negated the privileged 
position they had gained by virtue of controling one of the 
few remaining sources of national wealth, immersing them 
within a political and economic system in which their in­
fluence would be of less c o n s e q u e n c e . ^4 The effective elim­
ination of the Unitarians by Juan Manuel de Rosas' Federalist 
regime in Buenos Aires did not however remove the basis for
inter-elite conflicts over the form that the nation would
* /take. It continued in the conflict between porteno Federal­
ists and provincial Federalists. I will return to this
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conflict in the section on centralism vs federalism.
Liberalism and conservatism in Peru were more clearly 
defined than in Argentina because the harsh lines of the 
colonial past were more deeply ingrained there. The liberal 
tendency, which was predominantly urban based and had sat out 
the movements for independence - putting their faith in the 
liberal Spanish constitution of 1812, finally became the domi­
nant force in 1827 (at least in Lima) after a number of set­
backs at the hands of San Martin, whose interests, if not 
affinities lay with the more established or conservative groups 
in the capital, and Bolivar, who brought with him his own 
’foreign* administrators.35 The liberals, generally weak 
except in the capital, the depressed areas of the Coast in the 
environs of Lima and in some provincial towns favored a con­
siderably more open society than had existed during the 
colonial regime. They obviously hoped that a system based 
upon merit rather than inherited status would favor them. They 
preferred a relatively weak central authority which they could 
dominate and control through the legislature, the decentrali­
zation of political authority - though not federalism - 
presumably to afford coastal hacendados more direct control 
over labor distribution and control, and legislative control 
over the church and military - institutions seen by them as 
strongholds of colonial, and thus conservative, dominance.35
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The liberals in Peru were particularly successful in 
constitution writing, having created the constitutions of 1823, 
1828, 1834, 1856 and 1867. However, the application of these 
instruments was rarely effective. This was a result of two 
separate but related developments. First, the destruction of 
the old political structure and its legitimacy created a 
crisis in administration throughout the country. Promotion 
and appointment within the bureaucracy became capricious and 
filled with dangers and disappointments as the weak liberal 
establishment in Lima cast suspicion upon the loyalty of 
administrators far from Lima.3? And second, the military, 
that sector of the bureaucracy which because of its function 
was best able to retain its autonomy from the political 
center tended to become dominant, especially in Peru where a 
relatively professional army derived from the remnants of 
the Spanish army in America and the independence forces 
organized by Bolfvar was institutionally stronger than the 
State itself.38 a  military career thus became a surer en­
trance to political power than any civilian occupation.
Peruvian liberals concentrated their efforts on con­
trolling or eliminating the sources of competition with their 
State - the military and the church - which, at the same time 
were the bulwarks of conservative power. Liberals were not 
belcw, however, putting forth their own military caudillos
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if a military man could buttress their authority. Neverthe­
less, they chose relatively weak generals like Luis Jos£ de 
Orbegoso and Jose^ de La Mar who felt they could easily control 
and dominate and thus, were faced with defeat at the hands of 
more powerful conservative generals like Agustrn G a r a a r r a . ^ 9  
The liberal constitution of 1834 reflected their experiences 
with La Mar, Orbegoso and Gamarra in that it,*®
...gave to congress the power to designate 
the size and composition of the armed forces.
A supreme council of war was created, its 
members elected by congress, as a further 
means of establishing civilian control over 
the military.... £itl also stipulated that 
no additional commissions to officer rank 
would be given except as vacancies occurred 
and that promotions were to be based solely 
upon distinguished service on the field 
of battle.
Such legislation was, however, ineffective as the conservative 
provincial elite continued to provide backing for a host of 
military caudillos who captured the State, "...for the pur­
pose of guaranteeing a perpetuation of the status quo against 
the 'excesses' of the liberalism of the urban intellectuals".** 
Both the crisis engendered by military caudillism and the 
liberal - conservative conflict over the church in Peru will 
be discussed below.
Centralism vs Federalism (Regionalism)
Conflict over whether the political structure should be 
centralized or decentralized affected countries throughout
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Spanish America in the first half of the 19th century and was 
a result of two tendencies in conflict since the Bourbon re­
forms. As we have seen in Chapters III and IV, the political 
Bourbon reforms sought to centralize the old Hapsburg system 
of administration which lent the colonies a good deal of 
local autonomy. Obviously creoles were split on the merit 
of this reform depending upon whether their interests were 
harmed or furthered by it but, their general opinion was to 
see the hordes of peninsular administrators who attempted to 
reduce local autonomy as a threat. Within this opposition 
however, were two positions which were not to become important 
until after political power had devolved upon the creoles.
On the one hand there was opposition by those, principally in 
the viceregal capitals, who were denied positions in the ex­
panding bureaucracy because they were creoles, and on the 
other hand, those in the provinces who suffered the loss of 
local control. In addition, the geographic decentralization 
of the Viceroyalty of Peru instituted by the Bourbons and 
discussed in Chapter IV, which disrupted established patterns 
of political administration and commerce made the creation of 
nations out of the colonies that much more difficult and con­
tentious .
The centralist-federalist and regionalist conflicts 
were at the very heart of the problem of State formation in
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Spanish America. With the disappearance of the Spanish 
colonial State and two competing patterns of rule in con­
flict (the Bourbon and the Hapsburg) the conflict over State 
formation not only took the form of an internal battle within 
Spanish American countries but of international battles as 
well. In no other country in Spanish America was this conflict 
more a central fact of political life than in Argentina.
There, according to Joseph Criscenti, when the independence 
movement got underway there were two quite distinct tendencies 
regarding what constituted or would constitute the nation. In 
the provinces, particularly the Interior provinces, there was 
a strong following for a continental solution to the problem 
of nationhood wherein each province would become an indepen­
dent political unit in its own right, joined to a great 
federation of all the other provinces of the continent.4  ̂ This 
solution had obvious roots in the Hapsburg Viceroyalty of 
Peru. The tendency most predominant in Buenos Aires however, 
saw the nation as the geographic extent of the Viceroyalty of 
Rio de la Plata in which the provinces would be subordinate 
to Buenos Aires.43 This solution had its roots in the Bourbon 
Viceregal decentralization. A third tendency however, that 
was to prove almost indomitable in the first half of the 19th 
century was the autonomist tendency which had its roots in the 
conflict between the continental and Viceregal visions of the
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nation.
The continental tendency, which was represented by Jos^ 
de San Martxn and Carlos Maria de Alvear of the Lautaro Lodge, 
lost a great deal of support in the Interior when, as the war 
against the Spanish forces in America appeared to be headed 
for defeat, their monarchist leanings became apparent in the 
search by the Directory for a European aristocrat to preside 
over America.^ When the continentalist constitution of 
1819 in which the nation was defined as the 'United Provinces
of America* was rejected by the provinces, the disintegration
45of the Viceroyalty became complete.
Although autonomism within the continentalist tendency 
won out over centralizing monarchism, the conflict over what 
form the nation and the State would take did not end there.
The provinces went their own separate ways, forming their 
own decidedly centralist States and hoping for a continental­
ist solution that would preserve their political autonomy.
This continentalist tendency was most vigorous in C<5rdoba 
which, being the most populous and wealthy of the Interior 
provinces, became a natural opponent to Buenos Aires. As 
each province declared its independence and set up its own 
State structures pending a general congress which would de­
cide the future of the nation, Cc>rdoba made provisions for 
its advent by adopting, "...on January 30, 1921, a 'Reglamento
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Provisorio* which was to receive the approval of the 'authority 
of the confederation,' the 'General Congress of the States'. 
Executive power was vested in a 'governor of the republic', 
the legislature in a congress. With the consent of the General 
Congress of the States the governor could negotiate treaties 
with one or more provinces. "46 Tucuma*n and Cuyo followed 
Cordoba's lead enacting similar legislation while throughout 
the Interior autonomism led to further fragmentation of the 
Intendencies into provinces.*7
Although the autonomist tendency pervaded all of 
Argentina the Viceregal tendency still had a strong base in 
the city of Buenos Aires. This tendency came to be called 
Unitarianism. With the fall of the Directory, the Unitarians 
quickly became the dominant force in the Buenos Aires State. 
Rather than pushing their plan for the reconstitution of the 
Viceroyalty under the hegemony of Buenos Aires - which had 
already been rejected by the provinces at the Congress of 
Tucum^n in 1821^8 and was not popular with the conservative 
porteno estanciero-saladeros who, with the failure of their 
monarchist plans, became more and more autonomist-federal­
ist*^ - they bided their time hoping that success in creating 
prosperity and stability in Buenos Aires province would con­
vince the provinces of the value of becoming part of their 
plan for an Argentine nation.50 Although the Unitarian pro­
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gram did bring some prosperity to the province it could not 
overcome the opposition of the provinces and rural elites of 
Buenos Aires province who believed that the urban 'monocracy' 
which the Unitarians represented did not and could not attend 
to their particular interests.51
With the rejection of the Unitarian constitution in 
1827, the government of Rivadavia fell and its plans for a 
centralized national State were destroyed. Manuel Dorrego, 
a Federalist, was made governor of Buenos Aires province in 
1828 and proceeded to put the Federalist program into practice 
by recognizing the independence of the provinces and con­
cluding treaties with a number of them.^2 Dorrego, however, 
leaned too closely towards the interests of the provinces 
for the porteffo Federalists and they supported, according to 
Criscenti, the Unitarian General Juan Lavalle who, at the 
head of the national army returning from the war with Brazil, 
overthrew Dorrego. Far from bringing the peace and tran­
quility that the rural elites desired, Lavalle's execution of 
Dorrego brought a provincial invasion of Buenos Aires and 
they immediately shifted their support to Juan Manuel de Rosas, 
who was acceptable to the provincial Federalists and made a 
kind of unstable peace with the Unitarian army under General 
Joss' M. Paz in Cdrdoba.^2
The regime of Rosas will be discussed in Chapter VIII,
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but several aspects of his rule are relevant here. Rosas, it 
seems, as leader of the autonomist tendency in Buenos Aires 
Federalism would have been satisfied to have isolated the 
province and concentrated upon the needs of the class he 
represented until such time as stability in the region allowed 
the formation of a federation. However, the successes of the 
Unitarian Army in the Interior under Paz in 1830, forced 
Rosas to come to the defence of the provincial Federalists if 
only to protect his regime in Buenos Aires. Thus began his 
holy war against the 'savage U n i t a r i a n s ' . ^  With resistance 
to his rule in both Buenos Aires province and the other 
provinces by the 1840's, Rosas found that the only sure means 
of dominating his opponents was a powerful centralized State 
under his personal control. The provincial leaders were kept 
within the Rosas fold through the threat of armed force while 
in Buenos Aires province terrorist campaigns kept his oppo­
nents at bay. Rosas the Federalist, became Rosas the 
centralist.
Rosas ruled with an iron grip on the Federalist pro­
vinces and it was the Federalist provinces under the leader­
ship of Justo Jos^de Urquiza that overthrew him in 1852.
Yet, the overthrow of Rosas did not solve the problem of 
national organization, it eliminated the logjam created by 
Rosas, but not the fundamental conflict between Buenos Aires
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and the provinces. The power and wealth of Buenos Aires 
was built on the basis of policies which strangled the export 
trade of the Riverine provinces and denied the port market 
to the Interior provinces. Urquiza, who was successful in 
organizing all of the other Argentine provinces into a Con­
federation in 1852 was unsuccessful in getting Buenos Aires 
to join. This was chiefly because the Federalist plan called 
for the domination of the province of Buenos Aires by the 
Confederation through the separation of the port from the 
p r o v i n c e . i n  September 1852, a coalition of urban elites 
and rural caudillos (former lieutentants of Rosas) overthrew 
the puppet government of Urquiza in Buenos Aires.^ However, 
the military aggressiveness of the new government in 
attempting to bring the entire Confederation under its sway 
received swift reaction against it by the rural caudillos 
and the forces of the Confederation.®® These movements against 
Buenos Aires ultimately failed and the independent province of 
Buenos Aires and the Confederation fought an economic war with 
one another until the matter was settled on the field of 
battle with Urquiza's defeat by a porteno army headed by 
Bartolome' Mitre in September 1861.®® Mitre, now both governor 
of Buenos Aires and president of the Confederation, proceeded 
to enact the plan of Rivadavia and secure the dominance of 
Buenos Aires over the rest of the Argentine provinces.®®
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The issue of centralism vs federalism Cor regionalism) 
did not so dominate the political scene in Peru.61 Yet, as 
in Argentina, there were two aspects to this conflict - one 
rather mild conflict over the centralization or decentrali­
zation of the State and the other, over the geographic extent 
and balance between the regions that would make up the 
Peruvian nation. Neither of these conflicts tore Peru apart 
the way they did Argentina but, they contributed to the 
instability of the era and became grist for the mill of 
caudillo warfare.
Peruvian liberals, who, as we have seen, at least con­
trolled the legislative branch of early national governments 
evidenced an ideological preference for federalism and the 
decentralization of the State administration but did not 
follow this preference with action. The federalist faction 
within the liberal congress of 1823 suffered defeat as the 
liberal majority wrote into the Constitution a decidedly cen­
tralized political structure.6  ̂ Although all Peruvian con- 
stitutions except those of 1856 and 1867 rejected federalism, 
the federalist tendency existed with more reality in the 
actual political makeup of the country than any words printed 
in the constitution. The tradition of rewarding military 
leaders with the prefectures of the departments and basing 
national armies under the control of those prefects upon
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Indian tribute revenues collected at the department level, 
gave these military chieftains strong regional bases from 
which to challenge the central S t a t e . A t  times these 
military men represented legitimate regional grievances 
against what was considered the overbearing central adminis­
tration in Lima and at times they only represented themselves. 
Nevertheless, they gave regional animosities the destructive 
power they might not have had with central control over the 
military.65
Perhaps no reform went further to reduce regional in­
dependence than Ramc^n Castilla's abolition of the Indian 
tribute. In the sierra, local governments and warlords who 
relied upon that revenue became dependent upon the revenue 
passed along to them by the central State in Lima. However, 
as Frederick Pike comments, ".../itj produced a type of 
centralism that actually still further separated the various 
part of the country rather than binding them together. The 
longer this centralism...by the capital remained in effect, 
the more intense became the regional animosities that it 
generated.''00 Regionalism or federalism continued to be an 
issue in Peru throughout the 19th century but, as Jos^Carlos 
Marfategui relates, "Actually, the parties were not anxious 
to abolish centralism. Sincere federalists were not only few 
in number and scattered among the different parties, but they
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exercised no real influence on opinion. They did not represent 
a popular c a u s e . N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  the imposition of a cen- 
tralistic order on the departments and their reaction against 
it added to the political instability of the era and the dif­
ficulty in consolidating the State.
The definition of the geographical extent of the nation 
was a much shorter and violent affair. Two tendencies/ though 
they were not mutually exclusive, were evident and both had 
economic and political motives. As in Argentina, these ten­
dencies represented attempts by Peru to reconstruct the 
administrative and economic pattern of the Hapsburg Vice­
royalty by annexing Ecuador and/or Bolivia. Perhaps the more 
politically motivated of these movements was the invasion of 
Colombia (Ecuador was then part of Colombia) by President 
Jos^de La Mar in 1828 with the encouragement of the 'war­
mongering' liberal congress. The congress not only sought 
to annex Ecuador which had been disputed over by the Vice- 
royaltys of Peru and New Granada ever since the latter's 
establishment i n *1739®®, but also to destroy the Bolivarian
conservatives in Colombia, hoping for a liberal ascendancy
7 0there. La Mar?^ secured Guayaquil but was defeated by 
Bolivar's forces at Cuenca^ though, he was perhaps defeated 
more by a plot by Generals Agustin Gamarra and Antonio 
Gutierrez de La Fuente to discredit him on the field of battle
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by having Gamarra retreat and allowing defeat.73 Gamarra then 
forced the liberal congress to make him president and La Fuente 
vice president.74
The attempt to reconstruct the Viceregal patterns of 
administration and commerce on the southern flank with the 
annexation of Bolivia by Peru (or Peru by Bolivia) was per­
haps the more important and potentially beneficial to both.
The separation of southern Peru from Upper Peru (Bolivia) by 
the Bourbons in the 18th century seriously upset the regional 
economies of both, because they had formed, since at least the 
Inca period, one political, social and economic unit. The 
logic of the Bourbon reformers in separating them was, as we 
have seen in Chapter IV, strategic - to finance the Vice­
royalty of Rio de la Plata with the silver mines of Upper 
Peru. There was then good historical precedent and economic 
logic to the re-unification of these two areas. The attempt 
however, was only to increase instability in Peru and Bolivia 
and subject the former to invasion by Chile.
The idea of a Peru-Bolivia Confederation arose with the 
desires of Generals Andres Santa Cruz and Gamarra to re-unite 
the sierra, although each preferred unification under their 
own domination. Santa Cruz and Gamarra first agreed to the 
formation of a Peru-Bolivia Confederation when Gamarra was 
plotting to overthrow La Mar. The plan was for Gamarra and
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his army to march into Bolivia and pressure the president of 
Bolivia, General Jos^f de Sucre, to abandon the country. With 
Sucre gone, Santa Cruz, a native Bolivian, would assume con­
trol and declare for a Peru-Bolivia Confederation with him­
self as its head. Gamarra, having seized power in Peru, 
would join the Confederation and receive a high position in
the new S t a t e . ?5 Santa Cruz gained control of Bolivia but
76Gamarra betrayed him and ignored the agreement. However, 
given Santa Cruz's commitment to a Peru-Bolivia Confederation, 
Gamarra decided that it would be best if he acted first and 
prepared to invade Bolivia. Only the meiiation of the dispute 
by Chile in 1831 forstalled war between the two.??
The Peru-Bolivia Confederation became a reality in 1836 
under the leadership of Santa Cruz after a confusing and vio­
lent game of musical presidential chairs in Peru. These 
macabre events included an attempt by Gamarra to oust the 
legal president General Luis Jose"de Orbegoso, another deal 
between Gamarra and Santa Cruz to create a Peru-Bolivia Con­
federation once Gamarra had seized power in Peru, a revolt by 
General Felipe Salaverry against Orbegoso, and an alliance 
between Orbegoso and Santa Cruz against Gamarra and Salaverry 
which stipulated that Orbegoso agree to a Peru-Bolivia Con­
federation under the leadership of Santa C r u z . ? 8 The Santa 
Cruz-Orbegoso alliance ultimately won the internal struggle
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and Peru was divided into two republics - South Peru, headed
by Santa Cruz and North Peru, headed by Orbegoso. Santa
Cruz remained president of Bolivia in addition to becoming
the head of the entire Confederation. The Confederation had
a great deal of support in the Peruvian highlands with the
elites of both Areguipa and Cuzco believing that they had at
last been freed of the domination of L i m a . 79
In the end though, the Confederation really pleased no
particular region,®®
Lima resented the debilitating division of 
Peru and domination by a Bolivian. Southern 
Peru would have preferred union of only itself 
and Bolivia, a weaker Confederation that might 
have been controlled from Areguipa, the capi­
tal of the South. La Paz opposed the selection 
of Lima as the seat of the general government 
of the Confederation and citizens of both Peru 
and Bolivia objected to the impairment of their 
nations * independence.
However, it was the intervention of Chile rather than over­
whelming internal discord that sounded the death knell of 
the Confederation. Chile, under the sway of Diego Portales, 
feared its now powerful neighbor to the north believing that 
with his success in re-establishing the east-west axis of 
the old Viceroyalty, Santa Cruz would attempt to re-establish 
the north-south axis and swallow up Chile. In fact, Portales 
considered the destruction of the Peru-Bolivia Confederation 
as Chile's 'second independence'.®^ Chile also had a long
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standing trade dispute with Peru which was settled when 
Salaverry momentarily took over the presidency but was re- 
cinded by Santa Cruz, while Portales believed that Santa 
Cruz was behind an attempt to overthrow his conservative 
government.®^ In 1839, with the aid of the ever present 
General Gamarra, Chilean forces defeated Santa Cruz and the 
Confederation was dissolved - Peru and Bolivia receiving 
back their respective sovereignties.®® Gamarra, now presi­
dent of Peru again, made one last attempt to create a Peru- 
Bolivia Confederation and died trying. Gamarra was killed 
on the battlefield at Ingavr, Bolivia with the defeat of his 
Peruvian Army.®^
Church vs State 
Although the 19th century conflict between the church 
and State had economic and ideological aspects, it was pri­
marily a political conflict that centered upon what role the 
church as an institution would play in the new nations. The 
church, as one of the more powerful institutions of colonial 
society, presented a distinct challenge to the new Spanish 
American States because of its wealth, legitimacy and internal 
institutional strength. During the colonial period, as we 
have seen in chapter III, the church functioned as the right 
arm of the crown, forming an integral part of the State
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through the king's right of patronage over the Catholic church 
in America. Although the church was a bastion of conservatism 
and hierarchy within the colonies and thus a prop of the creole 
elites against the lower classes, it also functioned to con­
trol the creoles in the interest of the crown through the 
Inquisition and its restrictions on the use of the Indian 
labor force. The church’s monopolization of the economy in 
some areas like Paraguay** 5, and its role as chief rural credi- 
tor^G, often made it the object of creole disfavor.
When independence was won, the dual nature of the 
church's role in society produced contending reactions in 
favor of the church and against it depending upon the politi­
cal, economic and social goals of various creole factions.
The early attack on church wealth, for example, received 
support from almost all elite sectors. In the 1850's and 
1860's when most Spanish American States took over the finances 
of the church in order to raise much needed funds, they reduced 
the debts owed to the church by creole landowners to a frac­
tion of their value and liberals as well as conservatives took 
advantage of that windfall. In Peru, for example, though no 
figures are available, Arnold Bauer contends that these 
church obligations, "...evaporated in bureaucratic confusion; 
the documents of others were lost or disposed of in 'a most 
irregular manner'."®^ The lands of the regular clergy were
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confiscated or severely reduced by republican governments with 
little protest from the conservatives because these estates 
often competed for land and labor with theirs. They also were 
able to buy these properties from penurous governments at 
greatly reduced prices.®® The Inquisition/ hated by all 
creoles because it was directed at them, was swept away 
without protest, although the intolerance for un-orthodoxy was 
not.89
Attacks against the wealth of the church only became a
source of contention when it was recognized by the conserva­
tives that the social control and political roles of the 
church, which they sought to maintain, were being erroded by 
attacks on its wealth. However, both liberals and conserva­
tives, when in power, sought to bring the church under the 
control of the State; the liberals to expel church influence 
from temporal affairs, the conservatives to use it, much as 
had the Spanish crown, as an arm of the State. Both liberal
and conservative factions of the creole elite then, asserted
the right of the new States to the patronato of the Spanish 
kings. Neither sought an independent church and this put the 
Spanish American States at loggerheads with not only the church 
hierarchy but also with the Pope.90
In the early years of independence conflicts also raged 
within the clergy itself. High ecclesiastic positions in
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America had been dominated by peninsulares and thus, the lower 
clergy, which was predominantly creole, welcomed, and even 
participated in, the anti-Spanish independence movements. 
Often, liberal clergymen led the fight for State control over 
the church, especially in attacks on the regular clergy. 
However, this liberal interregnum did not last. As these self 
same clergymen became the rules of the national churches, they 
also became the most ardent defenders of the autonomy of the 
church.
In neither Argentina nor Peru did the church-State 
conflict ever reach the fever pitch or violence that it did
fllin Mexico. But, the conflict chat did exist was indicative 
of the difficulty the new States had in asserting their 
authority and legitimacy and managing elite conflicts. In 
Argentina, the church and its hierarchy was subjected to 
attacks by, and the control of, the independence regimes very 
early. The Bishops of Buenos Aires, Cordoba and Salta were 
removed from control over their churches by the civil 
authorities and replaced with priests who were considered 
'patriotic* while the clergy was used to propagandize the 
faithful as to the rightness of the new order.92 Without the 
higher clergy in control, the inherent conflict between the 
regular and secular clergy 'led to a fight with fists and 
knives' which the State often did nothing to halt, the better
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to control both sides.9 3 Church properties, especially those 
of the regular orders, were confiscated by the State while 
appointments to high ecclesiastic positions were made depen­
dent upon one's adherence to the independence cause. All 
churchmen were now considered, "...as another class within 
the State, and obliged therefore 'to share in the conserva- 
P tion of the whole, on the existence and increase of which the 
welfare of each part depends"* 94 The result of these attacks 
upon the church was a cowed and ineffective institution whose 
members, without the guidance of the hierarchy, suffered a 
'moral' and religious decline.
In 1822, Bernardino Rivadavia, then the principal minis­
ter in the Unitarian government, got the congress to abolish 
the tithe and ecclesiastical fuero, put church finances, 
(including those of the regular orders) under Stare supervision, 
restrict the regular orders' recruitment to those over 25 years 
of age and set the membership of ecclesiastic houses to a 
minimum of 16 and a maximum of 30. In addition, some regular 
orders were suppressed altogether and their property turned 
over to the State while the State was made responsible for 
funding the church.®® The reaction to these reforms was limited 
yet violent as ultramontane opposition developed led by 
Gregorio Tagle who, with the cry of 'religion o muerte' 
attacked the g o v e r n m e n t . This movement was supported by
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conservative port dno estanciero-saladeros who opposed the 
secularization program of the Unitarians.9®
With the rise of the Federalist Rosas in the 1830's, 
the church believed it had found a friend and supporter.
Rosas went to great lengths to reassert the temporal influence 
of the church although, only under his control and for his 
purposes. The clergy became ardent supporters of Rosista 
Federalism, denouncing the 'savage Unitarians' from the pulpit 
and extrolling the 'Holy Federal Cause*. Some fanatics such 
as Father Gaeta, "...draped his statues in federal colours 
and badges, and began all his sermons with the exhortation 
'Parishioners, if there is any filthy Unitarian savage among 
us, crush him'."99 Rosas regarded the Unitarians as 'enemies 
of Jesus Christ' and set to reverse the reforms of Rivadavia, 
returning church property, re-instating the Dominicans and 
even authorizing the return of the Jesuits. The Jesuits 
returned but were expelled again by Rosas when they refused 
to become part of the religious arm of his dictatorship.
Though the church was nurtured and protected by Rosas, it be­
came a State church, more so than any in Spanish America at 
the time.
Perhaps the chief basis for church-State conflict in 
Argentina has been the exercise of the right of patronage by 
the S t a t e . rr̂ e State has never conceded its right to
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appoint high ecclesiastic officials and rule on communications 
between the national church and Rome, nor has the Pope con­
ceded to the State the right to exercise these perogatives. 
This has led to conflict not only between the Argentine State 
and Rome but between the State and the national church. The 
national clergy, hoping to retain its independence vis-S-vis 
the State by putting itself under the authority of Rome, has 
been in continuous conflict with the civil authorities who 
desire to control it. Though this conflict has not been 
serious, it has remained a cause of considerable friction 
between the church and State throughout the 19th and into
t h e  2 0 t h  c e n t u r i e s . ^-03
In Peru, the secular clergy were early participants in 
the independence governments but these were the lower clergy, 
not the hierarchy. Liberal clergymen like Francisco Javier 
de Luna Pizarro and Mariano Jos^ de Arce were important 
figures in early governments and sought closer control of 
the church by the State.104 iower clergy of Peru were
predominantly creoles of either pure Spanish or mestizo ori­
gins who had been discriminated against by the crown's 
preference for peninsulares in high ecclesiastic appoint­
ments.̂ -05 It is hardly surprising then that a large con­
tingent of them would be ardent supporters of creole inde­
pendence. They were also in the forefront of the movement
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to reform the church and put it under the control of the 
State which was a reflection of their strong position within 
the congress and the resistance of their Bishops to the 
independence movement.
The bulk of the clergy, including the hierarchy, was 
not in favor of independence and was less in favor of the re­
forms introduced by the independence governments. The oppo­
sition of Archbishop Bartolom^ Maria de Las Heras to San 
Martin caused his expulsion from the country while Bolivar's 
policies of reducing the number of monasteries and convents, 
reducing Indian payments to the clergy, reducing the number 
of religious holidays, and filling bishoprics without Papal 
approval led to intense clerical opposition in the sierra, 
led by the only remaining Bishop in the country, the creole 
Jos^ Sebastian Goyenche of Arequipa. For his opposition, 
Goyenche was relieved of his authority, though not his 
office. ̂ 06
In the early national period both liberals and con­
servatives were apparently in agreement on the principle of 
State control of the church but with, it seems, two different 
visions of its role. Liberals wanted to reduce the influence 
of the church in politics and society while the conservatives 
favored a church dependent upon the State but functioning as 
a State directed social control mechanism against the lower
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classes.10? s>he usefulness of the Church for the conserva­
tives , and the reason for the need to curb it in the opinion
of the liberals, is obvious in an incident described by
S.S. Hill who traveled throughout Peru in the 1850's. Hill 
found that when the town authorities of Arequipa wanted a 
pile of dirt removed from an excavation in the town square 
they called upon the Bishop to help. The Bishop had a statue
of San Juan from a church in a nearby Indian village removed
and set upon the pile of dirt and declared to the Indian 
villagers that it would not be put back in their church until 
the pile of dirt had been cleared away.108
The conflict over church-State relations in Peru did 
not become an important issue until the conservatives took 
up the cause of the church in earnest in the late 1830's. The 
liberals felt that the only way to break the temporal power of 
the church was to weaken its internal cohesion which was based 
on hierarchy. They therefore began favoring the democratiza­
tion of the church. Liberals like Manuel Lorenzo de Vidaurre 
and Francisco de Paula Gonzalez Vigil called for democrati­
zation of the structures of the church, the abolition of 
ecclesiastic privileges, freedom of thought within the church, 
freedom from Papal authority and a return to the simplicity 
and poverty of the early church.109 In effect, the liberals 
were calling for the abolition of hierarchy and authoritari-
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anism in the c h u r c h . T h e  conservatives, who had been un­
concerned with past liberal attempts to put the church under 
the control of the State, saw this new liberal tactic as a 
threat to them and began supporting the church against the 
State, even to the extent of supporting ultramontanism.
Having changed their tack on the church-State issue, conserva­
tives began supporting churchmen like Bartolom^Herrera, a 
confirmed ultramontanist. m  The conservatives and Herrera 
came to believe that the only way to save Peru from the con­
stant instability and warfare of the age was for the people 
to be subject to the authority of the church. For Herrera, 
only the church could say what the law should be because all 
authority and sovereignty was derived from God. Herrera's 
position thus was not only ultramontane, it was intensely 
theocratic.
Though the debate continued on an ideological level 
throughout the 19th century, the political conflict between 
liberals and conservatives on this issue was solved by 
president Ram^n Castilla's compromise constitution of 1860.
In this constitution, the liberals won the suppression of 
separate ecclesiastical courts and fueros, the prohibiting of 
State collection of church tithes in favor of a State subsidy 
to the church and a system of public education that would end 
the monopoly of the church in education. The conservatives
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won safeguards to church wealth and property, relative 
autonomy to the church's internal organization, the perpetua­
tion of Catholic exclusiveness in Peru, and most importantly, 
a highly centralized authoritarian S t a t e . W i t h  this 
assured, the Peruvian conservatives abandoned the ultramontane- 
theocratic position of Herrera while the liberals, although 
they did try to reverse this 'defeat' in the constitution of 
1867, generally retreated from this battle.
The Rise Of The Caudillo
Caudillisiu, which arose throughout Spanish America in 
the first half of the 19th century, was more a result of 
political, social and economic conflicts within the elites 
than it was the cause of them. A combination of the break­
down of political and social controls and the militarization 
of Spanish American societies during the Wars of Independence 
produced this rather informal system of political power and 
recruitment which was bridled and then eliminated with the 
consolidation of strong central States in the late 19th 
century.
The phenomenon of caudillism is directly related to 
both the form and breakdown of the Spanish colonial State.
The form of rule within the Spanish bureaucracy which cen­
tralized executive, legislative and judicial power in the
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same office gave legitimacy to the form of one man rule that 
became the hallmark of caudillism.^^ The breakdown of the 
Spanish State apparatus in America saw no satisfactory replace-* 
ment, given the factionalism and conflict within the elites 
and weakness of the independence governments.116 In the 
countryside and provincial centers, however, strong authority 
developed upon those institutions at the local level which 
were able to weather the storm of the independence struggle 
the best - the military and the hacienda based militias. m
With the social control mechanisms of the colonial 
State breaking down, and large recruitments of mestizos and 
pardos by both sides into their respective armies, the career 
of arms became, for a small few of the lower classes, a means 
to rise to positions, either in the military or in politics, 
which they would never have attained under the colonial 
system. The implications of this breakdown of the rigid 
social system which this rise implied however, was exaggerated, 
perhaps, by its novelty. A very few of the lower classes were
able to rise in this manner despite the fears of the creole
119elites. Yet, in a sense, Caudillism and the instability it 
tended to perpetuate found ardent adherents. As Tulio 
Halperin-Donghi argues, "All that sector of the population 
which was not to receive its share of the new wealth, the con­
quest of which was held by many to be the only legitimate goal
3x2
of the new Spanish American states, could be classified among 
the potential supporters of civil war."120
Evidence supports viewing the caudillo as both the
expression of owning class rule and the expression of the
rural masses or 'folk', as E. Bradford Burns terms them.121
This is perhaps because caudillos performed contradictory
roles. On the one hand, some local caudillos, although they
lorded over the local population and were more times than not
members of the local elite, also protected the local people
from outsiders - either other caudillos or representatives
of the central government - who 'exploited' t h e m .  ̂ 2
Francois Bourricaud describes a scene from Jcse^Maria
Arguedas' novel Yawar Fiesta in which this protection of the
local population by the 'good* local patrdn is explained,123
When any of the authorities of Cajabamba - 
mayor or judge - did wrong, the people would 
come to Don Teodoro in demand of justice.
Then he, at the head of the people, would go
after the wrongdoer, make him get on a donkey, 
and ride him out of town with a band of fire­
crackers. The person expelled like that never 
returned. Don Teodoro explained: 'If we compain 
to the capital, they will pay no attention to us.
In Lima they laugh at the Provinces and dump 
their scoundrels on us.'
Even those caudillos who had their origins as representatives
of the central authorities like Juan Facundo Quiroga, the
Argentine 'tiger of the Pampas', could become the protector
of local values and economy.12  ̂ On the other hand, the local
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caudillo who was a member of the owning class (whether an old 
member or new one with lands acquired through war) preserved 
the traditional basis of domination - control over land and 
administrative positions. If he were not yet a member, he had 
to take into account the local power structure even as it 
opposed and feared him.^2^
In both Argentina and Peru, caudillism was an important 
aspect of the instability and conflict of the first half of 
the 19th century. In Argentina, the caudillism of the 1820- 
1860 period had its roots in the breakdown of both the Vice­
regal and independence political structures, the militariza­
tion of society with the interminable conflicts of the inde­
pendence and civil wars, and localist protectionism against 
the economic and political pretentions of Buenos Aires.
The breakdown of the political administration in 
Argentina and the ruralization of the basis of political 
power tended to place the leadership of both the Unitarian 
and the Federalist causes in the hands of military leaders.
For the Unitarians, the generals of the national army began 
to serve as its leadership while for the Federalists it was 
the rural estancieros at the head of their m i l i t i a s . T h e  
estanciero became a natural leader of the militia because of 
his ability to provide, organize and provision large numbers 
of men, even when the central government could not. James
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127Scobie describes the Argentine caudrllo as,
...usually a landowner and decendent of 
some powerful creole family. In the interior 
and on the coast, he gathered his gauchos 
and peons into irregular but effective cavalry 
forces. With this military power and through 
his economic and social influence, he became 
the government, ruling either directly or 
through puppets. Those with land and capital 
sought security in his shadow. The rapidly 
growing lower classes looked to him for 
protection.
In most provinces, local caudillos fought each other for
supremacy, the more successful ones, like Ricardo Lopez
Jordan of Entre Rios, Juan Facundo Quiroga of La Rioja,
Martin Guemes of Salta, Juan Bautista Bustos of Cordoba and
of course Juan Manuel de Rosas of Buenos Aires, becoming
128the chiefs and protectors of their provinces.
Rosas was not only the most successful of the caudillos 
but the only one who, for an extended period, was able to 
produce a system of national power based upon his domination 
of all the other provincial caudillos in the Argentine. In 
his own province of Buenos Aires Rosas attempted to diminish 
the powers of the local caudillos by building a strong pro­
vincial army not based upon the local estancieros.I29 His 
system, however centralized it may have been, did not last 
nor did it rid Argentina of caudillism because it did not 
institutionalize or legitimize the State itself. He was 
ultimately defeated by the caudillo governor of Entre Rros,
Justo Jos^ de Urquiza (who had been one of Rosas' most ardent 
supporters), who managed to put together a coalition of pro­
vincial caudillos for the purposes of removing Rosas from 
power in Buenos Aires and organizing a genuine national 
federal S t a t e . 130 The final extirpation of caudillism in 
Argentina was left to the governments of Bartolom^*Mitre and 
Domingo Sarmiento who, with the expanding power of the national 
State, put an end to provincial autonomy.131
Caudillism in Peru, at least at the national level, 
tended to be associated with the military proper. Many of 
the national caudillos of the early 19th century, like 
Agustfn Gamarra, Andres Santa Cruz, Jos^de La Mar and Ramon" 
Castilla held commissions in the Royalist armies during the 
Wars of Independence and only switched to the rebels after 
Peru was invaded by San Martin or Bolivar. These were 
generally men from modest backgrounds who, with the breakdown 
of Royal power were catapulted to national leadership in the 
absence of a strong, centralized State in Lima.132 Their 
armies, based in the populous and, at least in relation to the 
coast, prosperous sierra became the basis of regional and 
personal power with which they vied for the presidency of the 
nation.133
The caudillo's relationship with the owning classes was 
inherently problematic. Several caudillos, for example,
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Jos^de La Mar, Felipe Santiago Salaverry and Manuel Ignacio 
Vivanco had strong connections with, or were themselves 
members of, the upper classes. But, most of the others 
related to the elite on the basis of mutual suspicion. If
the State was too weak to put a brake on social disintegra-
>
tion, the owning classes were willing to acquiesce and support 
the strongmen of the military.*34 xt was not exclusively the 
conservative forces that put their faith in caudillism, the 
liberals of Lima and the coast also offered up their share 
of caudillos like General Orbegoso. If they could not impose 
liberalism through the constitution, they would try to with 
the mailed fist.*35
The regime of Ramon Castilla, military caudillo from 
Arequipa, did a good deal to finally end caudillism in Peru, 
although not in his own lifetime. Castilla strengthened and 
centralized the Peruvian State with windfall revenues secured 
by the government's monopoly of the guano trade. Under 
Castilla, the State itself became the greatest power base in 
Peru and its largesse began to produce a group - bureaucrats, 
merchants, businessmen and coastal plantation owners - who, 
in succeeding years, would form a class basis for an effective 
Peruvian State.*3® However, guano revenues were from the be- 
gining an unstable basis for the establishment of State power 
and it would take the maturation of this class generated by
the policies of Castilla's State to rid Peru of caudillism in 
the late 19th century.
States in Spanish America in the first half of the 19th 
century were inherently weak given the breakdown of the 
legitimacy and political structures of the colonial era. The 
pre-eminent post colonial problem in almost all Spanish Ameri­
can countries was the re-establishment of some kind of order 
and above all else, a powerful and legitimate State structure. 
As we have seen this was hampered by both the legacy of the 
colonial system and its destruction. Political conflicts 
wracked the new nations making a new political order almost 
impossible to construct. Yet, it was only through the recon­
struction of political order that such conflicts would cease 
to tear the nations apart. In the middle and latter half of 
the 19th century there began to emerge, in most Spanish 
American countries, States which began to consolidate a class 
basis for political order by managing the conflicts we have 
just examined. It was in the process of managing these con­
flicts and creating a basis for State power, that States had 
a profound effect upon the Spanish American economies. It 
was, in large measure, through these activities of the States 
that their economies became export economies.
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THE STATE AND THE ORIGIN OP THE EXPORT ECONOMY 
PERU AND ARGENTINA
The second half of the 19th century saw the beginnings 
of the consolidation of the State in most Spanish American 
countries and with that, the rise of full-blown export 
economies. Rather than the one creating the other there 
arose a dialectical relationship between the two, with the 
State clearly the determining instance. As we have seen, 
States in the early 19th century were relatively weak and 
clearly unable to manage the intense conflicts within the 
owning classes. In fact, the State itself was most often 
the object of those conflicts. Yet, the position of the 
State within a socio-economic formation - the space it occu­
pies as the 'public power' .- enforces upon those who occupy 
it the role of managing class conflict and creating a class 
hegemony within the dominant class, not only in the interest 
of the dominant class but, in the interest of the State 
itself.1
The economic role of the State is derived from this
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purely political role and, in performing this role it has 
economic effects. Absolutist States, for example, had the 
effect of encouraging the development of capitalism in 
Western Europe, not because they consciously sought to develop 
capitalism but because in encouraging bourgeois development 
the States were strengthened and thus were able to perform their 
political role - managing class conflict.2
In Spanish America, in the second half of the 19th 
century, States seeking to create political order in their 
countries steered, often unconsciously, their economies into 
the international economy as agro/mineral export economies.
There is no doubt that this v/ould have been impossible without 
the existence of the international economy and the increasing 
demand for agro/mineral products created by capitalist indus­
trialization in Europe. Nevertheless, Spanish American 
economies did not lock step to the tune of European demand 
without the mediation of their States. It was the internal 
constellation of political forces and the activity of the 
State in each Spanish American country rather than the pull 
of the international economy, that would decide how and to 
what degree they would be integrated into the international 
economy.^
In 1913, Francisco Garc^ Calderon in his Latin America; 
Its Rise and Progress observed that Spanish Americans had left
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foreigners to develop their national wealth. He attributed 
this to the inordinate 'bloating' of the State which necessi­
tated large customs revenues to pay for huge military and 
bureaucratic establishments.4 In this analysis he was not so 
far from the truth. The failure to create, early on, a 
unified ruling class in most Spanish American nations led to 
the growth of State structures which far exceeded what might 
have been necessary. The resources which these States needed 
in order to impose order on conflict ridden societies turned 
them towards the only sources of finance available to them - 
foreign trade. Unable to draw resources out of their own 
internal economies which were hardly within their control, 
Spanish American States, from the very beginning relied, almost 
exclusively, on the customs house. In this we find the first 
step in the creation of dependent economies.
The State And The Creation Of 
The Peruvian Export Economy
Peru in the 19th century is probably the clearest example 
of a State induced export economy. Not only was its first im­
portant link with the international economy, guano, made by 
the State itself, but succeeding links can be traced to the 
effects of that first tie. In the aftermath of the indepen­
dence wars the Peruvian economy was, as we have seen, almost 
prostrate. The coastal plantations, in decline since the
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colonial period, were in ruins; the mines never returned to 
their former productivity or wealth; and trade, dependent 
upon the other two, seriously declined. Early independence 
governments were bankrupt, surviving on forced and foreign 
loans.5 The State was forced to rely upon colonial taxes 
and the customs house for revenues which were substantially 
less than those of the colonial period.
Although the liberals who took charge of the government 
were dedicated to dismantling the colonial system, especially 
in the sierra, by force of circumstance they had to continue 
to rely upon the Indian tribute, now called the 'contribucion 
de indigenas1, for State revenues. The tribute was abolished 
in 1808, re-established in 1815, abolished again by San 
Martin in 1821 but re-instituted in 1826 when it became 
clear that no other source of income could be found.® The 
'contribucion* was the only source of revenue upon which the 
State could count, as revenues from customs were subject to 
the ebb and flow of commerce. Until revenues from the guano 
trade became important, the 'contribucion* provided almost
1,400,000 pesos of a total of about 3,000,000 pesos collected 
by the State, customs revenues making up the balance.
Tariffs in Peru were not, as with many other Spanish 
American nations, set for the sole purpose of raising reve­
nues. They were chiefly protective and this indicates the
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influence that the local craftsmen and artisans of Lima had on 
the liberal congress (which ideologically favored free trade) 
and the limited ability of the Peruvian market to absorb im­
ports.8 The tariff of 1826 provided for an 80% duty on all 
goods similar to those produced in Peru and 30% on all other 
goods. In 1828 the tariff was revised to completely prohibit 
the import of goods 'more or less similar' to those produced in 
Peru.8 Included on the prohibited list were olivesr olive oil, 
brandy, alcohol, rice, sugarcane, sulfur, cacao, coffee, shoes, 
leather, chocolate, vermicelli, flour, soap, liquors, corn, 
lard, butter, dried vegetables, horse harnesses and saddles, 
furniture, dried fruit, gunpowder, ready-made clothing, salt­
peter, salt, straw hats, tobacco, coarse wool and cotton cloth, 
tallow and wax candles.1° This tariff was abolished during the 
Confederation period but re-established with the return of inde­
pendence. H  Protection did have some beneficial effects, con­
tributing to a revival of the textile industry, but Peru had 
never beenj. an important producer of agricultural or manufactured 
goods and those sectors continued to languish.12 Its economy re­
volved around the mines in the highlands and these, despite go­
vernment aid in financing the miners' mercury debt and the infu­
sion of British capital and machinery, continued to weaken.*-3 
The lack of resources available to the State contributed 
as much to political instability in Peru as did political
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conflict itself. In fact, the two were inextricably linked.
If the State was to perform its function of managing the intra 
class conflicts of the elite, it had to have the resources 
necessary to impose order effectively. Only this would win 
it legitimacy in the eyes of the elite sectors. The State's 
weakness in the face of caudillos whose economic and political 
bases were beyond its control, led to a succession of caudillo 
led revolts whose aim was the capture of the State itself.
The spoils of success could enhance the power and wealth of a 
caudillo and his followers but such success bred further 
caudillo led revolts while the State never proved strong 
enough, regardless of what caudillo headed it, to impose 
order.H The central State was strengthened and political 
conflict attenuated only with the rise of Ramon Castilla to 
the Peruvian presidency and the discovery that guano, a 
fertilizer of which Peru held a virtual monopoly, could be 
marketed in Europe very profitably.
Castilla was a typical military caudillo of the first 
half of the 19th century. Born in Tarapaca^in 1799, his 
parents were of the 'lower middle class', his father a mer- 
chant-miner working the refuse silver ores of the mines of 
El Carmen. He spent a short period of study in Chile but, 
when the Wars of Independence broke out he quickly joined the 
Royalist army in Peru. He was captured by the rebels of
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Buenos Aires but: escaped to rejoin the Royalist forces in 
Lima. After Peruvian independence was declared by San 
Martfn in 1821, Castilla joined the rebellion and served 
at the battles of Junxn and Ayacucho. He was rewarded by 
being appointed prefect of his native TarapaccT and then 
Tacna. In a dizzying display of false loyalty Castilla 
played the game of Peruvian caudillism, first opposing 
Gamarra and fighting for Orbegoso, then breaking with Orbegoso, 
reconciling with Gamarra and fighting against Orbegoso and 
Santa Cruz. For his 'loyalty' to Gamarra, Castilla was 
rewarded with the ministry of the treasury under Gamarra. 
Castilla developed his political base in Arequipa where he 
married and cemented important connections with the elite.
Of Castilla, Mariategui has said, "Castilla was the military 
caudillo at his best."^-^
Yet, skilled and connected as he was, Castilla would not 
have been able to succeed in strengthening the State had he 
not been fortunate enough to have come to power just when 
guano revenues were to provide him with the revenues with 
which to do it. Guano (from the Indian word for the Guanay 
bird) is bird excrement which, deposited for centuries on 
coastal islands off of Peru proved to be an excellent ferti­
lizer which, when its properties were discovered, became much 
in demand in European agriculture. Roberto Cortes Conde
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explains that,^®
The cold currents off Peru make its climate 
belie its tropical location. They also account 
for the dryness of the coastal zone which con­
stituted an agricultural disadvantage in the 
central zone, accounted for the accumulation 
of enormous deposits of animal excrement in the 
islands off the coast of Peru. The coldness of 
the water (the Humboldt Current) attracted fish, 
hence, birds. The atmospheric dryness permitted 
the preservation and calcination of their deposits, 
which had a high concentration of nitrogen.
On this collection of rocks, the Chincha Islands, guano de­
posits reached one hundred feet in depth and only needed to 
be hacked off with picks and shovels, loaded onto waiting 
cargo ships and senr to Europe. There was no need for pro­
cessing and thus capital inputs were negligible - a few
19tools and a labor force.
The State, under the direction of Castilla as treasury 
minister, laid claim to these islands in 1840 and ran the 
guano trade as a monopoly of the Peruvian State.20 In the 
following years guano revenues were to become the basis for 
an expanded State bureaucracy and army, the re-capitalization 
of the declining coastal agriculture and railroads which began 
creating a unified national political structure. Guano, more 
than any other factor, led to the rise of a strong Peruvian 
State which could finally impose relative political stability. 
In 1865 Pedro Davalos y Liss<5n wrote, 21
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With abundance, anarchy flees...Until then 
Q>efore guano] the government survived on 
customs and Indian tribute, and was at the 
mercy of funds sent by the Provinces...
With guano, now the government did not have 
to fear uprisings, vitality flowed to where 
the money was; and Lima became, for the first 
time, the social head of the nation.
For the State, guano changed everything. As revenues 
grew the State acquired resources against which regional 
caudillo revolts were to prove ineffective. These reve­
nues did not require the State to be beholden to any domes­
tic force and allowed it to become 'relatively autonomous' 
from the clashing upper class sectors in society.22
But, guano did not become important in Peruvian Stare 
finances until Castilla became president in 1845. The first 
guano contract was given, in 1840, to Francisco de Quiroz, a 
legislator and president of the Peruvian Chamber of Commerce, 
who proposed to pay the government 10,000 pesos per year, for 
six years, and advance it 40,000 pesos immediately for the 
exclusive right to export guano.23 However, when the govern­
ment learned that guano, which Quiroz said would net 12 pounds 
per ton in London, fetched 18, it cancelled his contract and
^ jasked for new bids. Few bids came in and the contract 
again went to Quiroz who, with his London backers, agreed to 
pay the State 64% of his net receipts and loan it 287,000 
pesos against its anticipated share. Three months later, the
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government cancelled this arrangement and again contracted 
with the Quiroz group for a five year monopoly in which the 
treasury would receive advances of nearly half a million 
pesos, the first 30 dollars per ton obtained from the sale 
of guano plus 75% of any remaining profits.^ The benefits 
of guano however did not materialize until the late 1840's.
The British found the only other source of guano in the 
world available for the taking on Ichabone Island in the 
South Atlantic off of Africa. Guano exports from Peru could 
hardly match those of Ichabone. In 1846, Peru exported only 
25,100 tons compared with Ichabone's 254,527 tons. But by 
1847 the deposits at Ichabone were exhausted.26
Castilla came to the presidency in 1845 after a horren­
dous period of civil war between 1841 and 1845.2? Castilla, 
popular with a cross section of the political spectrum,
steered a course geared towards avoiding conflict with either
2 3the liberals or conservatives. As guano income to the State
rose, he was able to increase the size of the bureaucracy,
strengthen the armed forces and create a solid class basis
29for the State based on guano revenue disbursements.
Throughout Castilla's two presidencies, the intervening period 
of the Echenigue government, and into the 1870's guano 
revenues rose through a series of lucrative contracts between 
the State and domestic and foreign consignees.^® By 1852,
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guano revenues made up over one third of the national budget
and by 1861 they rose to almost 80%. -*1 Peruvian budgets rose
dramatically, totaling 8,699,000 pesos in 1852, 21,246,000
32pesos in 1861 and 42,236,000 pesos in 1869. With these 
funds, Castilla was able, between 1851 and 1861, to double 
government spending on the bureaucracy and more than triple 
the military budget.33 The bureaucracy was stabilized, 
regularly paid and expanded so that by 1861 it counted over
33,000 employees - about 1.6% of the total population.**^
The key to the success of the State created by Castilla 
was not its ability to impose order. That it did rather 
poorly during the 'guano age'. Its success lay in the crea­
tion of what Shane Hunt calls a 'rentier economy'.33 Peru 
became, as it had been during the colonial era with silver, 
a society that revolved around one commodity which was con­
trolled by the State. With this control the State could use 
the carrot and stick method of rule - those who supported it 
received guano contracts, sinecures, grants and favors, those 
who did not received the army. This method, of course, did 
not that appreciably reduce political instability as 
Castilla's own revolts against the governments of Jos^Hufino 
Echenigue in 1854 and Mariano Ignacio Prado clearly show3® 
but, the nature of the revolts against the government changed. 
No longer were they revolts against the capital, they were now
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initiated to share in the largesse of the State.37
With the huge revenues derived from guano, some 454 
million pesos over the 40 year period, the State created a
class, principally on the coast, which was integrally tied
to the State through guano. Not only did the Peruvian elite 
benefit indirectly through jobs in the bureaucracy and army 
but, in 1849, Castilla had been convinced that Peruvians 
should participate directly in the guano trade. Peruvians 
received lucrative consignment contracts from the government 
and, although it was not until the 1860's that they could 
take full control of the trade, large fortunes were made.3® 
These fortunes became the basis for the development of a
native banking and credit system which did much to re­
capitalize the large sugar and cotton plantations on the
39coast.
Castilla used guano revenues to begin retiring Peru's 
outstanding foreign and, more importantly, domestic debt.
The foreign debt was a result of the borrowings of a penurous 
government during the Wars of Independence and the costs of 
Chilean and Colombian assistance against the Spaniards. The 
British debts of 1822 and 1825 were converted into bonds 
guaranteed by half the government's share of revenues from 
guano consignments shipped to B r i t a i n .However, more im­
portant for Peruvian development was the consolidation of
339
the domestic debt. After the State had begun to repay its 
foreign debt protests were heard from Peruvians who claimed 
that the government's policy should be balanced and should 
recognize the obligations of past governments to Peruvians 
as w e l l . Castilla agreed to recognize the legitimate debt 
incurred by the armies and governments of Peru throughout the 
entire post-independence period. The laws of 1847# 1848 and 
1850 allowed Peruvians to present their claims - often 
scribbled notes of military caudillos - to a special tribunal 
which would make a determination on the legitimacy of the 
claim.43 These debts would be converted into bonds paying a 
yearly interest rate of 6%. Claims amounting to 4.3 million 
pesos were recognized in the first few years and Castilla 
believed that the final accounting would reach between 6 and 
7 million pesos.44 In 1851, however, Echenique became presi­
dent and claims skyrocketed to over 19,154,000 pesos by 1852. 
"Realizing the questionable nature of much of this newly 
created debt, the government feared the possibility that a 
future administration would repudiate it. To avoid this, in 
1853 it entered into a secret contract with European financial 
houses whereby some 9 million pesos of the total was converted 
from internal to external debt."4  ̂ When this 'secret' loan 
became known, Castilla led a revolution against Echenique and, 
although a tribunal of investigation found that over 12 million
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pesos of these claims were spurious, the debt was not repu­
diated. 46 Echenique's attitude towards his prodigality was 
prophetic, "'What does it matter,' he asked, 'that a few 
have enriched themselves whose wealth has also remained in 
the country and contributed to the development of these 
benefits'."47
Guano revenues were additionally made available to the 
coastal elite through the abolition of slavery in 1854. In 
order to win the support of liberal abolitionist Jos^ Galvez 
and to enlist the slaves in his revolt against Echenique, 
Castilla declared the abolition of slavery.48 However, this
A Qwas not an attack on the slave-holding coastal elite. Slave 
owners were compensated for the loss of their slaves with 
bonds worth 300 pesos per slave, sometimes even for already 
escaped slaves. According to Laura Randall, "By 1855, 15,871 
certificates of liberation were issued, and payments of 
4,761,500 pesos made: 1,432,000 in cash and 3,329,500 in 
bonds. By 1860 25,505 slaves were freed at a cost of 7,651,000 
pesos."50 Although Frederick Pike writes that, "The sudden
abolition...produced serious difficulties within the private
/
sector of the economy."51, william Bollinger argues that 
there was, "...a smooth transition out of slavery through the 
massive importation of indentured servants financed by 
generous government compensation for each freed slave.
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In either case, the State policy of compensated manumission 
freed a great deal of capital, that had been tied up in 
chattels, for further investment on ccastal plantations.
At the same time he abolished slavery, Castilla abolished 
the contribucion de indigenas. Though this had been a major 
source of revenue for the State, guano revenues gave Castilla 
the freedom to abolish i t . i t s  abolition had far reaching 
political and economic effects. Politically, it weakened the 
sierra elite as this internal tax was the basis of provincial 
finances. Without it, as Pike argues, "These governments now 
found themselves dependent upon the largesse of the central 
bureaucracy in Lima. Host frequently money was doled out 
from Lima not to aid the development of the provinces, but 
to entrench in power supporters of the political machine that 
was at the moment in control of the c a p i t a l . " 5 4  ^he 
'contribucion1 had also been an important coercive device in 
the hands of the sierra hacendados. It was used by them to 
force the Indians to work on their lands (as Indians needed 
cash to pay the tax) and its abolition led to an economic de­
pression in the h i g h l a n d s . 55 However, the re-imposiition of 
the tax by Mariano Ignacio Prado in 1866, in order to make up 
for lost guano revenues when the Spanish navy seized the 
Chincha Islands in 186456, led to an Indian revolt in the 
highlands which was put down by the government and hacendados.
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This outbreak led to the re-imposition of hacienda pre­
dominance in the highlands through the breakup of Indian 
comunidades and land confiscations.57
Much of the revenue from guano was dissipated in waste­
ful expenditures but Shane Hunt has found that the greater 
part of it found its way into the Peruvian economy.58 The 
consolidation of the domestic debt, slave compensation, and 
guano contracts became the basis for the rise of an export 
elite in the late 19th century. Coastal agriculture became 
its first base, as Peter Klaren relates,
Important for the resurgence of coastal 
agriculture during this period...was the 
guano boom of the 1840* and 1850's, which 
for the first time since independence 
produced large amounts of capital for 
reinvestment in the agrarian sector.
Profits from this 'new industry' rapidly 
soared, enriching in the process the old 
creole families and parvenue landholders 
of the independence period - many of whom 
now turned to the problem of reorganizing 
and revitalizing coastal agriculture.
Plush with guano money, coastal agriculture began a slow but 
steady rise. Cotton, though helped along by the price rise 
and shortage caused by the U.S. civil war, found new pros­
perity while sugar prices zoomed. Yet, neither could have 
reacted to these new markets had guano not provided the capi­
talization for production, as Hunt relates,
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Landowners had acquired the means to purchase 
coolie contracts, partly through payments 
received for manumissions of slaves, partly 
through finance available from newly created 
banks and concentrations of private wealth 
created by guano prosperity. This finance 
did more than merely purchase a labor force:
It permitted coastal haciendas a spending 
spree on borrowed funds. New machinery, new 
buildings and new consumption standards came 
along with new workers and new plantings.
As State largesse was converted into large personal 
fortunes, banks, and coastal prosperity and as the expenses 
of an expanded bureaucracy and military grew, total revenues 
began to fall below budget needs. The war with Spain led to 
an accumulated deficit of 17,000,000 pesos by 1 8 6 9 / 7 0 . In 
order to deal with the deficit, the State, under Jos^ Balta 
and his treasury minister Nicholas de Pierola, cancelled all 
of the contracts of Peruvian consignees in 1868 and contracted 
the lucrative commerce to the French firm of Dreyfus and 
Company in 1869.
The Dreyfus Contract was heavily criticized, particu­
larly by the jilted Peruvian guano consignees, but it did 
solve, at least temporarily, the crisis of State finances and 
provided the government with the funds for an ambitious rail­
road building scheme.63 Dreyfus was given a monopoly on the 
sale of 2 million tons of guano in Europe for which the 
Peruvian State received a 2.4 million sole advance against 
sales and a promised 700,000 soles per month for twenty
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months. In addition, Dreyfus assumed the 16 million sole 
obligation of the government to the Peruvian consignees and 
agreed to service Peru’s foreign debt to the tune of 5 mil­
lion soles per year while the State was to pay 5% interest 
on all advances made to it by Dreyfus.6  ̂ Dreyfus also became 
responsible for floating large loans for the government's 
railroad building program.66
With the Dreyfus Contract, State finances were put in 
order and Peru's international credit rose, allowing it to 
have Dreyfus float loans of 12 million pounds in 1870 and 
15 million pounds in 1872, for the purpose of railroad con­
struction. *>6 Balta and Pi€rola contracted with Henry Meiggs 
to build a dizzying array of railways whose economic benefits 
were, even then, suspect.67 The railways cost Peru 91.9 
million pesos, a bit less than one quarter of all the guano 
revenue received by the State between 1847 and 1878. By
1872, foreign debts consumed almost all of the 700,000 sole
6 8per month advance made by Dreyfus. The engineering feats
of Meiggs were, though, truly amazing, he,6^
...connected the southern port of Mollendo with 
Arequipa and then extended the line to Puno, on 
Lake Titicaca. About 325 miles in length and 
reaching heights of over 14,600 feet, the 
Southern Railway was the longest and highest 
railroad in South America at the time... As a com­
plement to the Southern, Meiggs transported two 
steamboats over the Andes in Pieces and re­
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assembled them on Lake Titicaca. He also began 
work on a railroad from Cuzco to Puno. An even 
more spectacular engineering achievement was the 
Central Railway, an extension of the Lima-Callao 
line to La Oroya, in the central highlands.
Climbing more than 15,000 feet in only 78 miles... 
the central had 65 tunnels, totaling 30,000 feet 
in length, 61 bridges including an iron span of 
580 feet.
Meiggs also built a 93-mile railroad from 
the harbor at Pacasmayo inland toward the 
sierra city of Cajamarca, another one of 50 miles 
from the coastal town of Chimbote up the Santa 
River valley and a 60 mile line connecting 
Moguega with the port of Ilo.
Although the shorter coastal lines did contribute to the
economy, the lines to the sierra were, at least in the short
run, a total disaster. The British minister, Spencer St.
John reported that the railroad from Callao to the sierra,
'passes through sterile country without population, resources
or trade1, while silver shipments required only one car per
month. The Arequipa - Mollendo line ran one passenger train
per day and the line between Arequipa and Puno only two per
week.'*0 The lines could not even compete with llamas and
mules which were still more economic, if slower, means of
transport.71
Railroad construction, however, was not only geared 
towards economic development and this must explain the 
patently un-economic lines. As Pike suggests, "Balta in 
particular came to believe that by criss-crossing Peru with 
railroads, the full economic potentialities of so richly
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endowed a country could be readily realized, while at the same 
time anarchy and revolutionary activities would be stamped 
out.1,72 Charles McQueen also argues that Balta was looking for 
a way to unify the country and end internal strife while at 
the same time secure an alternative source of State revenues73, 
while Randall finds that, "...the government was building a 
'railroad to nowhere,' for political, rather than economic rea­
sons."74 The 'political' railways understandably did nothing to 
create economic development in Peru. The rails, bridges and 
rolling stock were all imported as was the bulk of the labor 
force.75 In later years, they would contribute substantially 
to the Peruvian export economy, but in the 1870*s they led in­
exorably to the near bankruptcy of the State. By the close of 
the 1870's, Peru had the largest rail system in South America, 
it also had the largest foreign debt.
State expenditures on the railways and the near bank­
ruptcy of the State became a scandal in Peru. It was also 
to lead to the beginnings of the consolidation of the coastal 
plutocracy in the form of the Civilista Party. The Civilista 
Party was founded in 1871 under the leadership of Manuel
Pardo and was the first coherent expression of the new coastal
76elite created by the guano policies of the S t a t e . T h e  Party 
avoided the old liberal-conservative disputes and organized
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both tendencies into a broad based coalition.^ After a 
brief attempt by elements of the military to remove him,
Pardo took over the presidency in 1872. Pardo and the 
Civilistas believed, in line with the interests of the 
coastal plutocracy, that the pie-in-the-sky programs of 
the Balta regime would only lead to ruin. What was needed 
they argued was for the government to put the State's 
finances in order and promote 'modernization* which,
"...within the plutocratic lexicon meant an expansion of 
export 1,78
Under Pardo, however, State finances were in serious 
shape. Guano income hardly covered the foreign debt service 
and the budget faced an 8.5 million sole deficit.79 Pardo 
also continued the Balta railroad program because some of the 
lines were useful to the coastal elite and to protect the
o rtenormous investment the State had already made. w He there­
fore set out on a program to strengthen State finances by re­
ducing the size of the bureaucracy and military, imposing new 
taxes, negotiating a new guano contract with Dreyfus and 
nationalizing Peru's nitrate wealth.
Although the military budget was reduced, the bureaucracy 
thinned and customs and internal taxes increased, the center­
piece of the Civilista plan was to make nitrate a State 
monopoly like guano and therefore solve the problem of State
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finance. Nitrate revenue they felt would provide the State 
with the means to pay its foreign debt and expand the infra­
structure for the export economy which the coastal plutocracy 
desired.
Nitrate, found in the Atacama desert, had been known as 
a fertilizer in Peru since the days of the Incas and was 
mined throughout the colonial period under a monopoly from 
the crown to the Jesuits. Small quantities were sent to 
Britain in the 1820's, 1095 quintals (hundredweights) exported 
in the 1830's, 3,679,951 during the 1840's, 8,895,993 in the 
1850's and during the 1860's, 10,587,390.^1 Peruvians were 
involved in its manufacture but, only as small producers. The 
bulk of the nitrate business was in the hands of foreigners - 
Chileans and British. Nitrate production in Peru, until the 
late 1870's, was an example of a. classic enclave economy in 
which labor, capital and inputs were brought in from the out­
side while profits were sent overseas.82 Nitrate production, 
however, was not like guano production. It required costly 
machines to process and remove the various impurities of the 
ore and the establishment of a vast infrastructure of rail­
ways, towns and p o r t s . L a r g e  firms like the Tarapac^Ni­
trate Company thus became the chief producers of nitrate.
Nitrate paid only a 4 centavo per quintal export tax 
to the Peruvian state so the first act by Pardo was to propose
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an increase in the tax to 25 centavos per quintal. The con­
gress, however, proposed and approved a plan to turn nitrate 
into a State monopoly a-la guano.84 The justification for 
this was clear - Peruvians, in and out of congress, believed 
that the growth of nitrate exports was responsible for the 
fall in guano sales in Europe. Between 1869 and 1873 guano 
sales fell from 575,000 tons to less than 350,000 tons. If 
the State could control the export of both fertilizers, the 
price and sales of guano could be increased and Peru's 
foreign debt, which was tied to guano, paid.**** The 'estanco* 
proposal, as it was called, would not have taken the nitrate 
fields away from their owners. Rather, it would have insti­
tuted a Peruvian State monopoly of its purchase. The State 
would have bought nitrate at 2.4 soles per quintal and shared 
with the owners any profit when nitrate sold for over 3.1 
soles per quintal.88 In addition, production quotas were to 
be assigned to each nitrate field working and those unworked
0 7would become the property of the State.
The 'estanco* never got off the ground. First, there 
was clear opposition to the plan from the nitrate companies 
who feared that government quotas would hurt their businesses. 
They increased production dramatically in anticipation of 
quotas and sent the price of nitrate plummeting to 1.87 
soles per quintal. At that price the State would have to
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pay the nitrate producers more than it received on the European 
m a r k e t . S e c o n d ,  the Peruvian State neither had the estimated 
8 million soles nor the legions of trained administrators 
needed to run the monopoly.®9 jn March 1873 the plan was 
shelved in favor of an export tax of 15 centavos per 
quintal.90
A rise in export taxes on nitrates, however, did not 
solve the problem of State Finances. In fact they worsened 
as the now lower priced nitrate continued to replace guano in 
Europe.91 In 1875 a new solution was proposed by the congress 
and accepted by the president whereby the Stare would expro­
priate the nitrate fields with funds received by floating a 
7 million pound loan in Europe. The loan would be serviced 
by revenues from the sale of nitrate.9^
The plan immediately ran into difficulties when the 
State could not raise the funds in Europe and was forced to 
purchase the nitrate fields with government certificates due 
in two years and paying 8% interest. It was agreed that the 
owners of the fields would work them for the State under 
quotas set by the State.9® By 1877 the government had issued
19,550,000 soles in certificates.9* in order to ship and 
market the nitrate in Europe, the State came to agreement 
with the London firm of Antony Gibbs and Sons which had in­
terests in nitrate and had been a State guano consignee in
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the past. In 1876, Gibbs was given the exclusive monopoly of 
the sale of State nitrate and agreed to advance to the 
Peruvian banks managing the business for the State 40,000 
pounds at 6% interest, return to them 2% commission on all 
sales and pay 1.7 soles per quintal to the nitrate producers.95 
The State nitrate monopoly was a complete disaster and 
led to the greatest crisis in Peruvian history since the Wars 
of Independence. The State never completed the expropriation 
of the nitrate fields and the independence of the largest 
producers undermined the value of Gibbs' monopoly; in 1878 
it withdrew from the trade®® while Peru's attempt to secure 
a monopoly in the nitrate trade went far to bring about a 
Chilean declaration of war.®? The War of the Pacific 
(1 87 9 -1 8 83 ) was an utter catastrophe for the Peruvian State 
and economy. Much of what had been built up during the 
'guano age* was either destroyed or lost to national control. 
The Chileans occupied Lima and the rich coastal provinces 
demanding forced 'contributions' to support the occupation.
They carried off the books in the National Library, stripped 
the National Archives, sent the Lima Zoo animals to Santiago 
and dismantled and shipped to Chile much of the Southern 
Railway.^® Peru lost the nitrate province of Tarapacfif out­
right, while Chile was to administer the provinces of Tacna 
and Arica until a plebiscite was held ten years hence to
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decide on their fate.*00 It also lost the guano islands and 
thus, the means to pay off its foreign debts. Its productive 
capacity was in total ruins, as the value of its exports 
dropped to 2,400,000 soles while the currency became vir­
tually worthless.*0*
In debt to foreigners, its economy in a shambles, the 
State gave away what was left. The debts arising from the 
loans of 1869, 1870 and 1872 were retired by giving the State 
railways for 66 years to the Peruvian Corporation of London, 
a company organized by the holders of defaulted Peruvian 
bonds. In addition, the Corporation received free navigation 
of, and the right to the steamboat concession on, Lake
Titicaca, the right to 3 million tons of guano and 80,000
102pounds per year for 33 years. In return, the Corporation 
agreed to extend and repair several railways and arrange for 
the new government loans of up to 5 million pounds.103 This 
agreement, known as the Grace Contract, ushered Peru into an 
age of foreign exploitation and dependency. The country was 
thrown open to foreign capitalists who bought up ruined 
coastal plantations, sierra mines, invested heavily in them 
and built in Peru a modern export sector.*0  ̂ The coastal 
plutocracy regained control of the State in 1895, but by 
then it was no more than a comprador class.
Peru began its history as an independent country as a
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very minor participant in the international economy. By the 
end of the 19th century it had become a typical export 
economy. Instrumental in that transformation was the Peru­
vian State. The State, as we have seen, did not act con­
sciously as an engine of economic development. It acted 
politically, in its own interest and that of the Peruvian 
elite. The guano revenue of the State went to enhancing its 
ability to solve the problem of political order in Peru and, 
in the process, it created a hegemonic ruling class which, 
when it did capture the State, destroyed it and the Peruvian 
economy. The basis of the Peruvian export economy was thus 
laid by the State in the 'guano age'.
The State And The Creation Of The 
Argentine Export Economy
The foundation of the Argentine export economy was 
laid much earlier than that of Peru and the role of the 
State was fundamental here too. For Argentina, it was pre­
cisely the trap pointed to by Garcia Calderon - a reliance 
upon customs revenues which led succeeding Argentine govern­
ments to favor the growth of import-export trade. This 
occurred almost immediately with the Wars of Independence as, 
the independence governments, cut off from traditional Vice­
regal sources of income from the silver mines of Upper Peru,
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opened the port of Buenos Aires to international trade as a 
means of financing the government and the war.^05 Early 
Argentine governments were, therefore, forced to rely upon 
forced loans (particularly from peninsular merchants), the 
printing of paper money, and encouraging the export of cattle 
hides and products which would provide import-export
revenue.10^
The importance of customs revenues cannot be over­
emphasized. They made up 82.5% of total State revenues in 
1822, 78.3% in 1824 and almost 82% in 1829.108• Other taxes 
provided very little revenue to the government. The 'contri-
bucion directa1 introduced in 1821 provided only 1% of total
1 HQrevenues in 1822 and by 1829 did not exceed 3%. The stamp
tax provided between 3 and 4% and port dues another 1%.
The balance was made up with equally insignificant taxes.
It is no wonder that the State supported and encouraged 
import-export commerce.
The expense of the war of liberation which was followed 
closely by civil war forced the authorities in Buenos Aires 
to rely heavily upon customs revenues. The costs of the war 
with Spain and the civil war were high and military require­
ments made up the bulk of the b u d g e t . m  Yet, there had 
been no intention on the part of those in control of the State
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to create a dependence upon foreign commerce. Rather, the 
creole bureaucrat-merchant elite of Buenos Aires sought to 
re-establish the former Viceregal patterns of trade and 
administration for their exclusive benefit. The attempt to 
impose this solution to the crisis of independence on the 
rest of the country caused the provinces to rebel against the 
capital. The Buenos Aires elite was then forced to fall back 
on the only resource at their disposal - the pastoral products 
of the Buenos Aires countryside.
The Unitarians, who took power in Buenos Aires in the 
wake of the defeat of Directory by the provinces at the battle 
of Cepeda in 1820, did nor allow that defeat to deter them 
from their plans for Argentina. Although convinced 'free 
traders', the Unitarians under Martin Rodriguez and Bernardino 
Rivadavia did not see the future of Argentina in cattle pro­
duct exports. Their vision of a future Argentina was much 
more grandiose and ultimately led to their downfall.
Rivadavia planned to use the State to create in Argentina an 
'integrated national e c o n o m y Tfce Unitarians believed 
that Argentina contained all the necessary resources for the 
construction of a 'well balanced economy* but, it lacked the 
capital, labor and technical skills to bring them to fruition. 
These, they believed could be attracted through foreign trade, 
foreign investment and foreign immigration.
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A most important aspect of the Rivadavia plan was the 
settling of the land, with the aim of creating a prosperous 
small farmer, not rancher, economy. Unable to sell public 
lands which were used as collateral against a British loan, 
Rivadavia developed a system of emphyteusis in which land 
was rented for a period of twenty years at the rate of 8% of 
the value of the land used for pasturage, and 4% for land 
used for agriculture. The State reserved the right to revise 
rents after a period of ten years.
There is some controversy over the intentions of 
Rivadavia's emphyteusis plan. On the one hand, it has been 
interpreted as a means of halting the accumulation of large 
tracts of land by estancieros and providing an impetus to 
agriculture, and on the other, simply as a means of halting 
the accumulation of land that would be used solely for the 
purposes of s p e c u l a t i o n . M i r o n  Burgin argues that if it 
was meant to limit the accumulation of land by the large 
estancieros, it was singularly unsuccessful in that it did 
not limit the amount that one could rent.*^® That under 
emphyteusis 112 corporations and individuals received
65,500,000 acres by 1827*^ seems to bear out Burgin's claim. 
But, it seems clear that this was not Rivadavia's intention, 
as, in 1827, he complained that.
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The lack of limitation £with) which, until now, 
public land has been ceded in enfiteusis, in 
all the extent which has been solicited, has given 
rise to an abuse whose consequences already are 
begining to be felt. Immense areas are denounced 
£.claimecQ without intention or possibility of 
settling them, but with the security of selling 
in the distant future at a good price the right 
which has been acquired at little public cost.
Thus it is that the entire extension of public 
lands included within the new frontier line, 
even though the majority of them are unpopu­
lated, are already almost entirely distributed.
The accumulation of such large areas in so few 
hands is necessarily going to retard their 
settlement and cultivation. Nor is it just, 
on the other hand, that a few appropriate to 
themselves exclusively a benefit which the law 
made available in order to favor the industry 
of all. (emphasis added)
As an adjunct to this plan, Rivadavia sought to encourage
European immigration which he believed would change the
character of the countryside. In his opinion, the country
people of Buenos Aires province were 'immoral* and unwilling
to w o r k . Thus, as Scobie argues, "Rather than adapt to
the existing conditions, he hoped to submerge the gaucho with
industrious European peasants, to cover the grasslands with
crops, and to create a democracy of smallholders."120 por
this purpose a Colonization Commission was established and
121colonization companies were encouraged.
The Unitarians also sought foreign investment to build 
the Argentina of their vision. It was at this time that 
Argentina first contracted large foreign debts. In 1822, in
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order to raise funds to finance harbor improvements, frontier 
settlements and a municipal waterworks the State authorized 
the floating of a loan for 5 million gold pesos in London.
The contract for this loan was concluded with Baring Brothers 
of London in 1824. After all costs had been deducted, the 
State received only 3 million gold p e s o s . i oan though, 
was never used for its intended purposes. The war with 
Brazil intervened and the funds were dissipated in military 
expenditures.
In an attempt to find alternative sources of government 
funds, Rivadavia sought foreign investment to re-activate 
mining which had provided Viceregal governments with almost 
half of their revenues. Since the mines of Potosi^had been 
lost, Rivadavia's hopes were placed on the development of 
the Fatima mine in La Rioja province. To this end he en­
couraged the forming of a company in London, the Compania de 
Minas de Las Provincias Unidas del Rio de La Plata. The com­
pany did some preliminary surveying, but the project was 
halted by the government of La Rioja which was opposed to the
Proto-national State at Buenos Aires giving concessions to
1 2 3foreigners in mines not within its jurisdiction.
The expansion of trade, investment and industry further 
required an expansion of credit. The Unitarians established 
a National Bank, under the strict control of the State, which
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they hoped would form the basis for the economic unification 
of the country through the creation of a national market.
The Bank was not geared towards the needs of the cattle in­
dustry. As Burgin argues, "The fact that in defining the 
functions of the bank no recognition was accorded to the 
needs and interests of agriculture and cattle breeding was 
not due to oversignt."^24 Its primary purpose was to lend 
funds to the government and finance commerce. Loans due in 
90 days, as were the credits of the National Bank, could not 
provide a source of cheap credit to the cattle industry whose 
cycle of production was more lengthly.^JS
Theoretical free traders, the Unitarians however, 
recognized the dependence of the State on customs revenues 
and the interests of the small manufacturing and agricul­
tural sectors of the province of Buenos Aires. Their tariff 
policy was a balance between the revenue needs of the State 
and the protection of domestic production. The tariff of 
1822 provided for a basic rate of 15% ad valorem on all 
foreign imports. While lowering the rate to 5% for some 
commodities, particularly those needed for the State's eco­
nomic development plan such as mercury, agricultural tools, 
mining machinery, construction materials, saltpeter and 
bricks, it raised others in an effort to protect national 
industries. An impost of 20% was laid upon foreign sugar,
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coffee,cocoa, yerba mate, tea, rice and foodstuffs, 25% on 
furniture, clocks, carriages, shoes, vinegar, cider, mirrors, 
saddles, clothing, wines, beer and tobacco, and 30% on 
brandy, liquors and cana. Increased protection was afforded 
to the hat industry as foreign imports were required to pay 
a tax of 3 pesos per hat. Wheat and flour imports were sub­
ject to a sliding scale tax by which wheat paid 4 pesos per 
fanega (1.5 bushels) when the domestic price was 6 pesos 
per fanega and decreased to 1 peso per fanega when the domes­
tic price reached 9 pesos per fanega - flour imports were 
similarly taxed to balance the interests of the producer and 
c o n s u m e r . -̂26 Throughout the 1820's tariffs on overseas im­
ports generally rose, affording greater protection to domestic 
industries.
Rivadavia's plan was never fully put into effect.
Strong opposition to it was raised in several powerful sec­
tors of Argentina. The provinces rejected it not only be­
cause the tariff was not protective enough, but because 
Rivadavia sought an economic policy directed by a strong 
central State. Each province, in the aftermath of Cepeda, 
had developed its own State with its own interest and these 
were not the same as that of the national State Rivadavia was 
attempting to construct. Provincial governments, in finan­
cial straits due to the breakdown of internal trade and
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production as a result of the independence struggles, would 
have accepted Rivadavia*s plan only if the central State 
shares the revenues of the port of Buenos Aires with them
and thus assured the financial health of their governments.
1 2 7This was unacceptable to the Buenos Aires State.
The estancieros of Buenos Aires province opposed the 
Rivadavia plan because they felt that the Unitarians were 
willing to give up their province's dominant position in 
the polity and economy of Argentina by separating the port 
of Buenos Aires from the province. This they believed would 
lead to an increase in taxes to support a provincial govern­
ment as well as reduced influence on national policy.
They also resented the policy of 'national' economic develop­
ment, feeling, with some justification, that the State would 
ignore the needs of the cattle industry. For the estancieros, 
major difficulties in the development of the economy in 
Buenos Aires province were the expansion of the frontier 
and Indian attacks. Although the Unitary State recognized 
the problems, it did nothing to solve them.^2®
The Rivadavia plan did not even find favor amongst the 
farmers, artisans or lower bureaucrats of Buenos Aires. The 
farmers felt that the tariff of 1822 did not provide adequate 
protection while the artisans continued to complain about 
competition from foreign imports. The protective character­
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istics of the 1822 tariff had been eroded by inflation caused 
by large emissions of the National Bank and so these protests 
had validity but, on the opposite side, high duties on food­
stuffs brought complaints from the city's consumers,130
The failure of the Rivadavia plan was non that it was 
unrealistic and did not take into account the realities of 
Argentina's potential in the 1820's as Burgin claims131, it 
was rather that no important sector of the economy or polity 
was willing to make the kind of sacrifices it called for, 
nor was the State powerful enough to enforce them. The 
problem of economic development in Argentina was integrally 
linked to the problem of political unification. As we have 
seen in Chapters V, VI, and VII, the political and economic 
crisis of Argentina in the independence period initiated a 
decided shift of political power to rural elites. Political 
and military power were decentralized and fell into the hands 
of those who used them for their own narrow interests. The 
incipient State was weakened, and by the time the Unitarians 
were able to lay the constitutional foundation (Constitution 
of 1826) for a State that could impose its development plan 
on the country, the real basis of power had shifted to its 
opponents. As H.S. Ferns a r g u e s , 1 ^
The policy of Rivadavia was in its design logical 
and realistic.... But in the 1820's it was not 
successful. It required for its implementation
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political stability, peace and the determined 
support of at least one predominant element in 
the community ... the appeal of Rivadavia’s plans 
could excite the enthusiasm and win the support 
of only those with sufficiently long view of the 
community interest, but there was nothing about 
them either as ideas or activities vrfiich 
immediately and strongly engaged the interest 
and support of the men on horseback in the pro­
vince of Buenos Aires, Entre Rios or Corrientes.
There is, perhaps, no better example of how the interests 
of the State steer economic development than the regime of 
Juan Manuel de Rosas. Rosas, a porteno Federalist, became 
governor of Buenos Aires province in 1829 in the wake of the 
Unitarian defeat. He was one of the largest and wealthiest 
estanciero-saladeros of the province and there is no doubt 
that he favored his class. Yet, in some cases, his regime, 
by its tariff policy and nationalist stance against foreign 
intervention in the Rib de La Plata, was in direct opposi­
tion to the interests of the estanciero-saladeros. This 
contradiction can be explained by the fact that Rosas, as 
head of the Buenos Aires State was not only responsible to 
the class that put him into power but also to the State it­
self.
The estanciero-saladero Federalist of Buenos Aires 
quickly came into conflict with the provincial Federalsits 
after the defeat of the Unitarians. The provincial Federal- 
ists and a sector of the porteno Federalists were committed
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to national unification, though under a federal, not cen­
tralized, national State. This group sought to bring Buenos 
Aires under the control of the provinces and that was exactly 
what the majority of porteno Federalists opposed.333 The 
estanciero-saladeros understood the economic advantages which 
Buenos Aires had against the other provinces and sought to 
maintain them through a policy of political separation from 
the other provinces.33** This contradiction, that in order 
to dominate the provinces the Buenos Aires State had to be 
politically separated from the provinces, was to plague 
Argentina for twenty years. Rosas was able to create in 
Argentina what Rivadavia failed to - a strong centralized 
State - by virtue of porteno economic domination of the 
country and the political isolation of its State. Because 
the provinces were dominated economically and militarily, 
the emphasis shifted from the kind of centralized adminis­
tration which Rivadavia had suggested to armed force and 
economic exclusion- The power of Rosas' State against the 
provinces depended upon the economic position of Buenos Aires 
and that position depended upon the cattle industry. Yet, 
when the interests of the cattle industry and the State came 
into conflict, it was the interest of the State that pre­
vailed.
Rosas may have taken over the Buenos Aires State in the
365
interest of the cattle industry but the exigencies of that 
State very quickly impressed themselves upon his regime. The 
land policy of Rosas is most often pointed to in support of 
the argument that he favored the interests of the cattle in­
dustry over those of the rest of the province.^35 However, 
what choice did Rosas have given the dependence of the State 
upon the revenues generated by pastoral exports? His land 
policy had three purposes, (1) to extend cattle production 
in the province and thus, provide increased revenues to the 
State, (2) to provide income for the State through the sale 
of land, and (3) to provide political support for the State 
and reduce the cost of the large armies needed to keep the 
provinces at bay by paying these off in land. Although the 
major thrust of his land distribution policy was the extension 
of cattle raising in order to raise customs revenues, it also 
had other fiscal, and more importantly, political functions. 
Fiscally, the Rosas land policy was geared to provide the 
State with extraordinary income. The income from emphyteusis 
could hardly assist the budget. In 1833, rents amounted to 
only 198,000 pesos and although they were doubled when the 
leases came up in that year, they dropped to 196,000 pesos in 
1839. Obviously many tenants were not paying their rents or, 
many did not pay them in full, and rather than continue this 
policy, Rosas began to sell public lands outright. In 1836,
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the State was authorized to sell 1,500 square leagues of 
public lands.137
The land sales, however, were not very successful 
either. By 1839, land sales had only yielded about one 
million pesos and in 1840, only about 100,000 pesos. Much 
of the land went unsold in a buyers market.1^8 Rosas was 
then forced to give land away, hoping that it would find its 
way into production and thus into the balance of imports and 
exports upon which State finances depended.13  ̂ Land was 
additionally used to pay the army and administration. Rosas 
himself received land in this manner as the leader of the 
Desert Campaign which pushed the Indian frontier south and 
put millions of acres of land into the hands of the State.
For his services Rosas was awarded, in 1834, the Island of 
Choele-Choel on the Rio Negro - which he promptly exchanged 
for 60 square leagues of pasture land. Officers and common 
soldiers were also awarded land as payment.1^®
Payment of the army in land became a State policy with 
Rosas as governor and, when a rebellion against the State 
arose in 1839, rewards of land, cattle and sheep were made to 
the army that put down the rebellion. Six square leagues were 
awarded to generals, 5 for colonels, one half for non-com­
missioned officers and one quarter for privates. lj*l Altogether 
8,500 'boletos de premios entierras* were awarded by the State
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and these became a kind of money with which the wealthy 
speculated. Although thousands were issued to soldiers and 
minor bureaucrats, they almost always ended up in the hands 
of the large estancieros.142 More than anything else, land 
was a political tool for Rosas. With it he could gain ad­
herents to the State and, by taking it away (confiscations), 
he could harm its e n e m i e s . 143 As John Lynch observes,
"...land was the richest source of patronage available, a 
weapon for Rosas, a welfare system for his supporters."144 
Without focusing on Rosas as the head of the Buenos 
Aires State, his tax and tariff policies seem terribly con­
tradictory. Here we have the representative of the estan- 
ciero-saladero class raising internal taxes and imposing 
protective tariffs, both of which were opposed by that class. 
Rosas' first aim, of course, was to maximize the revenues 
taken in through the customs house but he also sought to 
reduce the reliance of the State on those through increases 
in internal taxes. The 1 contribution directa', a poor source 
of income throughout the independence period, was doubled by 
Rosas in 1838. In 1839 he hoped that it would produce 3 
million pesos, 27% of the State budget. However, the tax 
brought in only 891,000 pesos in 1839, about one million in 
1840, and then dropped to 868,000 in 1841. Rosas in that year 
demanded that the legislature revise the system of assessment
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but it would not act and the tax remained a minor part of
State revenues throughout his r e g i m e . 5 £ h e  'contribucion
directs' failed mainly because assessments were made to the
tax collectors by the property owners themselves and thus
there were, by declaration, quite a few 'poor' residents in
Buenos Aires province. Though Rosas railed against such a
poor system of valuation, arguing that the law,146
...made no provision for an equitable and 
objective evaluation of taxable wealth.
This omission was not only injurious to 
the treasury but it was also unjust to the 
taxpayer, for 'nothing was more cruel and 
inhuman than to compel an individual to 
give an account of his private wealth*.
Had this law ... been more in accord with 
the conception of justice, had it been 
based upon the principles of liberalism and 
equality, the tax would have been more 
productive of revenue, and might also 
encourage economy and frugality, the true 
source of public and private wealth.,
the 'contribution' failed to live up to his expectations.147 
The tariff issue clearly illustrates the contradiction 
of Rosas' position as the representative of the estancieros 
and his position as the head of the Buenos Aires State which 
was the provincial State yet also a proto-national State.
Since Rosas denied the other Riverine provinces direct trade 
with Europe and the Interior provinces' trade passed through 
the port of Buenos Aires, he had to incorporate their in­
terests into the policies of the State if he was to conciliate
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them to the predominance of Buenos Aires. If this was not in 
the interest of the estancieros of Buenos Aires, it was cer­
tainly in that of Rosas' State.
If the issue of centralism vs. federalism was the chief 
conflict between Federalists and Unitarians, the issue of 
tariff protection was the chief conflict between porteno 
federalism and provincial federalism.^® The provincial 
Federalists argued strenuously for the protection of their 
agricultural and manufacturing industries which were damaged 
by the relatively light duties charged on foreign imports 
by Buenos Aires. The porteno Federalists argued that protec­
tive tariffs would ruin the economy of Buenos Aires, raise 
the prices of goods to consumers and protect industries 
there, and in the provinces, that were uneconomic and should, 
by all economic logic, be allowed to fail.-^® That Rosas 
supported the views of the porteno Federalists makes his 
volte-face all the more interesting.
The Tariff Act of 1835 (for 1836) constituted a decided 
shift by Rosas to protectionism. The basic import duty was 
set at 17% ad valorem on all commodities not specifically 
provided for in the law. Goods which did not compete with 
those of Buenos Aires and the provinces or were required for 
their industries paid relatively low duties. Hides, horse­
hair, crude wool, crude tallow,horns, bones, jerked beef,
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ostrich feathers and precious metals were allowed in free. A 
tax of 5% was imposed on plaster, coal, bricks, tin plates, 
steel, bronze, mercury, raw wool, paintings, printed matter, 
watches, jewelry and agricultural implements; 10% on silk, 
tar, rice, sack cloth and arms; and 24% on sugar, coffee, 
cocoa, tea, yerba mate, cotton, wool and food stuffs.150 The 
tariff then began to become protective with a 35% duty on 
shoes, clothing, furniture, wine, brandy, liquors, tobacco, 
oil, leather goods, cheese, guitars (1), ink, and mirrors;
50% on beer, saddles, spaghetti and other flour products, 
while hats were to pay a stiff 13 pesos per hat.33l For the 
first time since 1821, a large number of goods were prohibited 
altogether, these included brass and tin plate wares, orna­
mental iron, iron and steel goods, all kinds of kitchen 
utensils, textiles, wood products, maize, peas, beans and 
other vegetables, butter and mustard. Wheat was prohibited 
unless its price in Buenos Aires exceeded 50 pesos per 
fanega, and then it could be imported only by special permit.152 
Overland trade between Buenos Aires and the provinces was free
except for certain products of Paraguay (still considered a 
province), Corrientes and Missiones.^53 About his new policy
Rosas argued that, "...foreign competition was the principal 
obstacle to industrial and agricultural recovery and that the 
tariff 'should result in progressive growth of foreign and
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domestic commerce as well as higher revenues'."154
There certainly were interests in Buenos Aires province, 
particularly in the city and agricultural sector in its 
suburbs, to which this policy could be laid. But, they were 
weak in comparison to the estancieros and consumers of the 
city who would have to pay higher prices in the absence of 
cheap imported foreign articles. Rosas, rather, instituted 
this policy because he believed that it was in the best 
political interest of the Buenos Aires State. "In the eyes 
of the provinces Rosas became the most Argentine of all 
portetfo governors, the only governor in fact who placed the 
economic interests of the nation above those of foreign mer­
chants. The Buenos Aires government revealed itself as a 
national government and Rosas became the recognized leader
of the nation."1^
It is not unlikely that Rosas favored the creation of 
an Argentine confederation under the leadership of Buenos 
Aires and that the Tariff was a first step in reconciling the 
provinces to the Buenos Aires State. Such a step was impos­
sible earlier because from 1829-1831 the commerce of the city 
of Buenos Aires was in a 'wretched state* due to the lack of 
trade with the provinces and civil war and, the drought of 
1829-1932 had turned the pampas 'into an arid desert* where 
cattle died like flies. The National Bank had failed and
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thus the State had no means of raising revenues except 
through customs.*56 The Buenos Aires State was in no condi­
tion fiscally or politically to make concessions to the other 
provinces. By 1835, these problems had receded and it is 
possible that Rosas was making a bid for unification. Juan 
Facundo Quiroga, the La Rioja caudillo, is reported to have 
said that Rosas was in accord with him on the need to form 
an Argentine Confederation and that as soon as the provinces 
were at peace again he would, with Quiroga, take steps to 
convoke a congress of the provinces for that purpose.15?
Rosas himself, writing to Quiroga said that, "Mo one can 
be more fully convinced than you and I of the necessity of 
organizing a general government and that this procedure is 
the only means of insuring existence and respectability to 
our republic..."158
The protective tariff was, however, very quickly revoked 
when Buenos Aires became embroiled in conflicts with France 
and Britain which led to blockades of the port. As a result 
of the Federal Fact of 1831, a defensive-offensive alliance 
between Buenos Aires and the Riverine provinces, the Buenos 
Aires State received the role of representing those provinces 
in international relations.159 when, in the late 1830's 
Rosas refused certain demands of the French for commercial 
privileges and immunities for its nationals against military
conscription, a French naval squadron blockaded the port of 
Buenos Aires. In 1838, the French found support for their 
blockade in Uruguay (whose independence Rosas did not recog­
nize) and the Riverine provinces which opposed the policy of 
Buenos Aires of denying them direct access to overseas trade. 
Although the dispute with the French was settled by 1840, 
the issue of Uruguayan independence, and Buenos Aires opposi­
tion to it, continued and in 1845 brought about a blockade of 
the port by both the French and the British.160
The blockades themselves are beyond the scope of this 
work161, however, it is clear that any hope of Argentine 
unity on the basis of Rosas' tariff was all but lost by this 
assertion of nationalism by the Buenos Aires State. The 
blockades forced the abandonment of the protective tariff 
policy as import-export revenues dropped and Buenos Aires 
sought to make running the blockade attractive through lower 
duties.1®^ The French blockade and intervention lit the fires 
of disunity as Buenos Aires was attacked by a 'Coalition of 
the North' in 1839 led by the hated Unitarians and, in the 
same year, by an army raised by disgruntled estancieros of 
southern Buenos Aires province who blamed Rosas for the bloc­
kade and cutoff of exports.16  ̂ Rosas was able to defeat both 
the internal and external challenges to his regime but he 
became convinced that the only way to deal with his opponents
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in Buenos Aires and the provinces was through f o r c e . T h e  
dictatorship imposed by Rosas ruled out formal national 
unity. If any unity existed in Argentina during the 1840's 
it was that imposed by Rosas' praetorian State. The failure 
of Rosas was thus, the impossibility of reconciling the role 
of the State as the expression of Buenos Aires province with 
its role as the expression of the Argentine nation. For 
Burgin,166
...as long as Rosas' government remained essentially 
a provincial government it served a useful purpose 
and was economically justified. But when by force 
of circumstance, the porteno government assumed the 
functions of a national government it not only for­
sook the interests of Buenos Aires but it also 
fanned the flames of bitter resentment in the 
Interior and the Litoral.
The importance of the Rosas period for the development 
of the Argentine export economy in the late 19th century 
cannot be underestimated although, Argentina by 1860 was 
only marginally integrated into the international economy 
compared to what it would become by the turn of the century.167 
Patterns of economic and political development laid by the 
politico-economic conflict over the formation of the State 
were to relegate the Argentine economy to the status of an 
export economy. The intransigence of the political structure 
in Buenos Aires finally bore fruit in the 1860's and 1870's 
with the failure of the Provinces in the 1850's, under Justo
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Jos^de Urquiza, to create a State in which Buenos Aires was 
subservient to the p r o v i n c e s . A r g e n t i n e  unification arose 
on the basis of Buenos Aires and its pattern of development - 
stockraising. Railroads opened up the pampas to world trade 
but the previous pattern of landholding reduced the impact of 
immigration and the growth of agriculture. Argentina became 
a major producer of grains but the benefits of this develop­
ment did not emerge as the Argentine farmer became a tenant 
or laborer on the lands of large estancias rather than an 
independent smallholder.170 The cities and towns, which in 
the U.S. arose as a result of the opening of the frontier to 
food crop agriculture and provided the markets necessary 
for the rise of modern industrialization, were absent in 
Argentina.171 Industry received very little impetus from 
the poor Argentine tenant farmer as he never became a perma­
nent fixture in the countryside. Estancieros would rent a 
section of their land to the tenant for a period of from 3 to 
6 years and, at the end of the contract, require the tenant 
to grow alfalfa for his cattle. The evicted tenant there­
fore had no incentive to improve the land or build permanent
structures. Every 3 to 6 years he was forced to pick up
173stakes and find a new home. Immigrants therefore collected
in Buenos Aires, servicing the export sector. Capitalist de­
velopment in Argentina thus was stunted by the economic pat-
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terns created as a result of political conflict and the State 
in the first half of the 19th century. Argentina entered the 
20th century as an export economy.
It is paradoxical that in both Peru and Argentina the 
political conflicts between sectors of the dominant classes 
which made the consolidation of the State so difficult were 
also what made the consolidation of strong States so impera­
tive. It was because the States themselves were the objects 
of such conflicts that they could not perform their role 
of mediating these conflicts and producing stable class basis 
for rule. The Spanish colonial administration had been able 
to perform the function of mediating class conflict by vir­
tue of its 'relative autonomy' from the Spanish American 
classes but, in the early republican era, the basis of rule 
in Spanish America had been dramatically transformed.
Whereas the authority and legitimacy, as well as the 'rela­
tive autonomy' of the colonial administration had been based 
upon its representation of the Spanish monarchy, the new 
republican State administrations were based upon the notion 
of 'popular sovereignty' (although narrowly defined to in­
clude only members of the dominant classes) which automatic­
ally made the public authority - the State - the target and 
prize of intra-class conflict. State and dominant class con­
solidation were thus hampered by the lack of 'relative
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autonomy* and maneuverability of the new State.
The authority of early Peruvian and Argentine States 
was rarely effective outside of the capitals and/or major 
ports. Although, as we have seen, efforts were made to con­
solidate State authority on the basis of programs of national 
development and integration, these were made impossible by 
political conflicts between sectors of the dominant classes 
and the political and economic weakness of the new States. 
Both the Peruvian and Argentine States therefore came to rely 
more and more upon the factor which they could easily tap 
into - foreign trade. A stopgap measure designed to shore up 
State finances in the face of the enormous costs of the inde­
pendence struggles, customs revenues became the major source 
of State finance in Peru (up until guano revenues replaced 
customs revenues in the 1850's] and Argentina, as well as in 
most other Spanish American countries. Such reliance led 
States to encourage the growth of agro/mineral export enter­
prises as a means of enlarging State revenues and thus the 
ability of States to impose political order. The results of 
this strategy led, as we have seen, to a strengthening of the 
export elite in Argentina and the creation of one in Peru 
as well as the hardening of a pattern of agro/mineral export 
growth in both. In the late 19th century these patterns 
formed the basis for the dramatic expansion of agro/mineral
378
export development fueled by active State support.
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CONCLUSION: SPANISH AMERICA AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY
In both Peru and Argentina, State policies aimed at 
strengthening the State and creating political and social 
order laid the foundation for the development of the export, 
economies of the late 19th century. Though the aims of the 
Peruvian and Argentine States were political, the effects of 
their policies tended to steer their countries into economic 
roles in the international economy that were solidified with 
their success.
Political instability, of course, did not disappear.
In Peru, the late 19th century was the scene of some of the 
fiercest political conflict in its history. This conflict was 
brought about by Peru's defeat in the War of the Pacific as 
each faction blamed the other for the ruination of the 
country.^ Yet, the rapidity with which a powerful State was 
reconstructed indicates that the terms of the conflict were 
decidedly different than in the early 19th century. After a 
short period of military rule under Andres Caceres, the only
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recognized hero of the War of the Pacific, the two contending 
factions of the coastal plutocracy - Democrats (Pierolistas) 
and Civilistas - joined together to oust him in a bloody 
civil war in 1895.2 Under the presidency of Democrat Nicolas 
de P^erola (1895-1899), the hegemonic class created by the 
policies of the State in the 'guano age' took charge and re­
built the economy on the basis of their own interests - export 
production.^
With Pierola, Peru marched rapidly into the international 
economy as an export producer. The State was employed by his 
administration and succeeding ones to steadily advance the 
growth of exports. Peru converted to the gold standard in 
order to attract foreign investment and stabilize the cur­
rency so that Peruvian financiers would shift their interests
4from currency speculation to productive investment. Since 
currency stabilization required an expansion of exports to 
finance a gold backed money, the State encouraged the growth 
of mining and coastal agriculture. Between 1895 and 1897 the 
total value of Peruvian exports rose by 40%.^
With the currency stabilized and the financial position 
of the State solidified, the decade after Pierola's term saw 
even more spectacular growth of the export economy. The 
quantity of exports expanded by 41% between 1900 and 1904 and, 
by 1907 by 164%.b New export industries were rapidly inte-
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grated into the economy. Rubber exports grew from 16 
toneladas (tons) in 1900 to 3,193 toneladas in 1912?, while 
oil production in the rich La Brea Paritfas fields tripled 
between 1904 and 1908 under the leadership of the foreign 
owned Pacific Petroleum Company which had purchased the
grights to the fields from the State in 1889. The mining 
industry, freed from taxation by the State for 25 years in 
1890, and allowed to import machinery free of duty, ex­
panded rapidly with copper exports doubling between 1901 
gand 1902. In 1902, the U.S. Cerro de Pasco Corporation 
was formed and, in the next twenty-five years became one of 
the largest agro/mineral producers in the world.'*'0
The leading role of the State in this 'economic 
miracle' is indisputable. Currency stabilization, laws pro­
viding for the development of corporations which facilitated 
large agro/mineral exploitation, the instituting of the 
National Agricultural Society, National Mining Society and 
National Industrial Society, improvements in port facilities, 
roads and communication - all geared towards export promotion - 
were the legacy of the plutocratic Peruvian State.^ So 
successful was this State that it could accommodate the coastal 
plutocracy, foreign capital and even the sierra elite.
If Peru's strides in integrating its economy into the 
international market were prodigious, Argentina's were
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astounding. With Bartolom^ Mitre's success against Urquiza's 
Confederation at the battle of Pavon in 1861, Buenos Aires 
and the economic pattern produced by its State prevailed over 
the whole of Argentina. However, the definitive unification 
of Argentina under the hegemony of the Buenos Aires State and 
its class supports - merchants and landowners - did not come 
about until the State set out on a policy to destroy the 
autonomy of the provinces by removing all barriers to their 
incorporation into the nation, as defined by Buenos Aires.
The methods used were the Constitution of 1853 and railroad 
construction.
The Constitution of 1853 was designed by the provinces 
of the Confederation to once and for all reduce the influence 
of Buenos Aires in Argentina. In the hands of the provinces, 
the Constitution would have been able to limit the autonomy, 
so closely guarded by the Buenos Aires elite, which gave it 
such overwhelming mastery.1  ̂ But, in the hands of the Buenos 
Aires State, it meant the subordination of the provinces and, 
ultimately, Buenos Aires province itself.14 Under Mitre and 
Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, the Argentine State was centralized 
and the provinces brought to submission (although Buenos Aires 
province was not reduced until 1880 when the city was separated 
from the province). Between 1862 and 1880 some 22 instances of 
Federal State intervention in the provinces were recorded.
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During the late 1860's they used the cover of the Paraguayan 
War to reduce the power of provincial strongman Urquiza and 
his supporters-*-®, while the isolation of the Interior and 
rural Buenos Aires province, which had always provided bases 
for opposition to the State, was destroyed by a wave of rail­
way building by the State.
Railroad construction had political as well as economic 
designs. In 1852, Juan Bautista Alberdi wrote, "Without the 
railroad political unity cannot be had in a country where dis­
tance makes central political power impossible... Political 
unity can only begin through territorial unity, and only the 
railroad can make places separated by five hundred leagues a 
unified country."!? The dual role of railway construction 
was clearly recognized by those in charge of the Argentine 
State. Mitre, in his speech at the groundbreaking ceremonies 
for the Central Argentine Railroad in 1863 said, "Everyone 
must rejoice on the opening of this road, for it will tend to 
give riches where there is poverty and to institute order 
where there is anarchy."!®
Perhaps no State policy was more responsible for Argen­
tina's dramatic export growth in the late 19th century than 
the financing of the railroads. The railways were not built 
by British capitalists seeking to expand Argentina's export 
production. They were built by the State through its
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guarantees to reluctant British investors. If the railroads 
did not pay for themselves, the Argentine government would 
assure them a profit. British investors were thus assured a 
7% return on capital invested whether the railroads were 
profitable or not.19
The progress of the railroads and Argentine export 
growth went hand in hand. The railroads made possible what 
James Scobie calls the 'revolution on the pampas'^9 by 
bringing immigration into the pampas to convert vast areas 
over to grain cultivation and carrying the crops to the ports 
for export. In 1872-1873 only 325,000 acres were devoted to 
wheat while by 1887-1888 it had increased to 2,000,000 acres. 
Wheat exports jumped from 9 toneladas in 1871 co 327,894 in 
1890 while corn exports rose from 15,032 tons in 1880 to 
707,282 in 1890.21 By 1904, agriculture had displaced stock 
raising as Argentina's major exporter.22 The sugar industry 
in Tucumctn also received enormous stimulation with the coming 
of the railroad, production doubling between 1880 and 1886.^3
Better transport and the development of refrigeration 
led to a shift in emphasis in the cattle industry as the ex­
port of salted meat was replaced by the export of frozen and 
chilled meat. Salted meat which made up 48% of all meat ex­
ports in 1887 dropped to only 4% by 1904 while frozen meat 
rose to 51%.24 Between 1870 and 1900 the total value of
396
Argentine exports rose from 30 million gold pesos to over 
150 million gold pesos,25
It is obvious that without the external demand Argen­
tina would not have experienced such dramatic growth in so 
short a time. But, even so, it would not have been able to 
respond to that demand had not the State taken an active role 
in the promotion of export activities.26 In 1894, invest­
ments in infrastructure for the export economy accounted for 
63.1% of the entire public debt, while such investments made 
up 36.6% of the national budget. By making government guar­
antees available to foreign investment for the construction 
of railroads, port facilities and other export related infra­
structure, the State was able to attract foreign capital 
amounting to 3.5 million pesos by 1913.2? In fact, as Roberto 
Cortes Conde argues, "One could say that government action in 
directing this process of growth by specifically promoting, 
encouraging, and guaranteeing basic investment in infrastruc­
ture played a much more important role than is generally 
assumed..."28 In order to finally do away with provincial 
autonomy, in order to 'civilize* the Argentine, in order to 
promote the predominance of the political center, Argentine 
statesmen steered the economy into rapid export growth in the
second half of the 19th century.
Exclusive agro/mineral export development in Peru and
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Argentina, as well as in most other Spanish American countries 
of this era, ultimately resulted in what writers such as Andre 
Gunder Frank, Theotonio Dos Santos, and Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso and Enzo Faletto have described as underdevelopment 
and dependency. Nevertheless, although these writers may 
claim that Spanish American underdevelopment and dependency 
was a result of capitalist exploitation expressed as a system 
of international trade within which the Spanish American 
economies were relegated to the role of raw materials pro­
ducers by that system, the historical evidence does not bear 
out their thesis. As I have argued throughout this work, the 
fact that Spanish American countries developed agro/mineral 
export economies was not primarily the result of the influences 
of the international economy.
I have challenged the dependency thesis as it specific­
ally relates to the origin of the Spanish American export 
economies in.the 19th century because of its emphasis on the 
primacy of the international economy whether expressed pre­
dominantly as external domination as with Frank or as external 
domination expressed through internal class forces as with 
Cardoso and Faletto. By shifting the focus of analysis away 
from the international system of trade to the historical 
development of the social relations of production, inter-class 
conflict, intra-class conflict, and the State within Spanish
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American countries I have shown that the agro/mineral export 
economies were chiefly the result of the complex interaction 
of these forces. The international economy, rather than 
being the determinant factor, influenced the development of 
the Spanish American economies in the 19th century by 
offering the possibility of export development as an alterna­
tive to inward focused economic development. Of course, 
there is no reason to believe as the dependentistas do, that 
inward focused economic development would have created pro­
gressive capitalist economies - that such a possibility
2  9existed would have to be proven, not assumed. Neverthe­
less, I have argued that a choice was made to develop out­
wardly - to develop export economies - through a process in 
which essentially domestic crisis, class conflicts and State 
development played the dominant role.
By defining capitalism, with Marx, as a system of 
production, not trade, I have found that, contrary to the 
assertion of the dependentistas, Spanish America has not 
been capitalist since the 16th century. The forms of produc­
tion developed during the colonial period, which I have found 
remained essentially intact through the 19th century, were 
indisputably non-capitalist. Thus, the appropriation of 
surplus value at the level of production (profit) was not 
the result of capitalist exploitation. This is hardly
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surprising since the colonial power, Spain, did not intself 
develop capitalist relations of production (wage labor and 
capital) to any great extent during the colonial era. It is 
clear then that the exploitation of Spanish America by Spain 
was not based on capitalist exploitation but rather the 
colonial relationship which was imposed politically. The 
trading system through which Spanish merchants made their 
profits was never based upon capitalist market relationships 
in which trade - the circulation of commodities - was only a 
moment in the realization of surplus value generated at the 
level of production. Rather, it was based on a trade mono­
poly imposed politically in which the colonies were forced to 
turn over a part of their non-capitalistically generated 
surplus free to Spanish merchants. In any case, I have made 
clear that this Spanish trade monopoly was only an adjunct to 
the primary focus of Spanish Colonialism which was the ex­
traction of precious metals from the colonies by the Spanish 
State. In Spain, this colonial booty did not form the basis 
of any 'primitive accumulation' leading to the development of 
capitalism but, rather, was used to buttress the monarchy 
against the aristocracy and to finance its imperial designs 
in Europe.
By focusing on the development of the colonial 
political economy itself rather than its external trade
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links with Spain, I have found that the role of the Spanish 
State's colonial bureaucracy in regulating the colonial 
economy was the key element in both the development of that 
economy and in the political administrative crisis that 
engulfed Spanish American countries in the wake of the 19th 
century Wars of Independence. I have argued that it was the 
effort to resolve this political-administrative crisis, 
rather than the pull of the international economy, that moved 
most Spanish American countries to construct agro/mineral 
export economies in the 19th century. Not only did the 
colonial bureaucracy regulate class relations between the 
dominant classes and the subordinate laboring classes but 
also, and more importantly, class relations within the domi­
nant classes. It was able to do this through its control of 
key economic factors - land, labor, mercury distribution 
(for the processing of silver) and trade. Competition for 
these resources, and thus the conflict over their appropria­
tion and distribution, was directed at the bureaucracy, short 
circuiting direct intra-class conflict within the dominant 
classes. The net result of this political, rather than 
economic regulation of society was to keep the colonial 
economy directed towards the interests of the Spanish State 
and, more importantly for Spanish American development, to 
keep inherently conflictual class relations in check.
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This politico-economic complex of rule and management 
of class conflict, I have argued, was weakened by the Bourbon 
reforms of the latter half of the 18th century which, because 
they undermined the legitimacy of the colonial bureaucracy, 
led to the movements for independence when the Spanish State 
in Spain collapsed during the Napoleonic Wars. Thus, as I 
have argued, the movements for independence were not, as the 
dependentistas claim, an expression of Spanish America's 
quest for a more direct integration into the international 
economy, but rather a result of the political-administrative 
crisis caused by the Bourbon reforms. With independence the 
international economy became somewhat more important to the 
Spanish American economies owing to the elimination of the 
Spanish monopoly trading system, however little dramatic 
change occurred in either the form or extent of their trade 
until the second half of the 19th century.
More important than the international economy in deter­
mining the direction of the Spanish American economies in 
the 19th century was the specific manner in which the new 
Spanish American States attempted to resolve the political 
turmoil which erupted with the complete disappearance of the 
Spanish colonial administrative apparatus. The secret of 
that administration's success in regulating inter-class and 
intra-class conflicts during the colonial period had been
•*02
its 'relative autonomy1 from the classes in conflict. But, 
as I have shown, the weakness of the new Spanish American 
States made the regulating of these conflicts and the 
fashioning of unified ruling classes by these States impos­
sible. In fact, the focus of intra-class conflict within the 
dominant classes became the State itself because the new 
political-administrative structures could enhance or upset the 
control of the dominant classes over the laboring classes. In 
effect, different sectors of the dominant classes in the 
Spanish American countries required incompatable political- 
administrative requisites for the reproduction of their ex­
ploitative relationship with the laboring classes. Thus, 
they engaged in predominantly political, not economic, 
battles with one another over the administrative and legal 
form of the new States.
What the new Spanish American States lacked was the 
kind of 'relative autonomy' which had served the Spanish 
colonial bureaucratic administration so well. Without the 
resources to impose their political sway in the new countries 
they could neither regulate inter-class and intra-class con­
flicts nor prevent attacks on their own structures. The lack 
of authority and legitimacy of these States further prevented 
their appropriating the necessary resources to strengthen 
themselves on the basis of wholely or predominantly domestic
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sources. Thus, as I have argued, these resources were acquired 
by the Spanish American States primarily through external 
economic links - revenues from the custom houses (and thus the 
encouraging of production for export), foreign loans to 
finance State expenditures, trade/production monopolies (such 
as guano in Peru), and foreign investment, principally in 
railroad construction which, while serving to encourage export 
expansion, also gave the States the means with which to 
eliminate local political autonomy and opposition. Spanish 
American States were thus the mediation through which the 
Spanish American economies were articulated with the inter­
national economy. I have argued, therefore, that the general 
pattern of economic articulation with the international 
economy - agro/mineral export - was not economically moti­
vated by those States nor economically imposed by inter­
national capitalism. It was rather primarily the result of 
the strategy of Spanish American States attempting to solve 
political crises.
By the late 19th century Spanish American countries 
leapt to meet the expanding international economy with open 
arms. 'Modernization* - the link with the outside, Euro­
peanization - became the panacea for all the conflicts of the 
19th century. It was - for a time. States were strengthened, 
political conflicts were confined within their institutional
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structures and hegemonic ruling classes tied to export growth 
emerged. But, the veneer of capitalism could not create the 
effects of the real thing. The export economies' dynamic 
center lay elsewhere - in the industrial capitalist nations - 
and it would not be long before Spanish Americans realized 
that they had exchanged the possibilities of development for 
growth and dependence.
Although the argument in this study has centered on 
the origin of dependency in 19th century Spanish America, it 
clearly has implications for the debate on the contemporary 
relationship between the developed and less developed coun­
tries. As in its thesis on the causes of 19th century de­
pendency in Spanish America, the dependency perspective 
leans heavily on the effects of international economic forces 
to explain the causes of contemporary dependency. The success 
of this view has spawned even grander theories, like the World 
Systems theory of Immanuel Wallerstein, which holds that the 
development of individual economies can only be analyzed and 
understood within the context of the Capitalist World System
which, he argues, had its origin in Europe and began to expand
30in the 16th century. Development and underdevelopment are 
thus two aspects of the development of this system. Although 
within this theoretical perspective classes are acknowledged - 
though only in their international character as a 'world
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proletariat1 and 'world bourgeoisie' - the World Capitalist 
System is a system of countries, some of which constitute 
the 'core' (the developed countries), others the 'semi­
periphery' (the semi-developed countries), and still others 
the 'periphery' (the under or less developed countries).
While a country's position in the system is determined by 
its internal economic Structure, that structure is determined 
by the system.
The displacement of attention from the political and 
economic processess within countries to the relations between 
countries, whether individually or within the context of a 
World Capitalist System, in explaining underdevelopment has 
led to Marxists and non-Marxists alike to similar approaches 
to the problem of underdevelopment. Samir Amin, for example, 
sees world revolution arising from the contradictions between 
rich and poor nations - in effect, proletarian countries vs. 
bourgeois c o u n t r i e s . I n  a somewhat similar vein both left 
and right wing governments of the less developed countries 
have focused their energies at the United Nations on the cre­
ation of a 'new international economic order' in which the 
developed countries will be forced to redistribute their 
wealth to the less developed on the assumption that the unequal 
economic relationship between the two has been the cause of the 
latter's underdevelopment. Thus, in the less developed coun­
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tries, the exploiters of the working classes represent them­
selves as the exploited of the Capitalist World System in 
the hope of derailing the class struggles in their countries 
through appeals to nationalism. This trend has also found 
favor in the developed countries as depression, unemployment 
and reduced living standards are blamed on the international 
economy. Workers there, no doubt, feel better knowing that 
the causes of their economic woes lay beyond their effective 
influence and their attention thus placed on the international 
level make them less troublesome opponents for the national 
bourgeoisies.
Dependency and World Systems theory have, consequently, 
obfuscated what this study has sought to illuminate - that 
countries become underdeveloped and dependent primarily as a 
result of political and economic forces internal to those 
countries and, if they are to break free of this condition, 
it will depend upon changes within those countries which can 
only come about as a result of those same internal forces.
The class struggle, the State and the political process in 
the less developed countries, as I have argued, should be the 
focus of any analysis of the causes of underdevelopment and 
dependency because these social formations are and have been 
the arenas within which the maintenance or transformation of 
economic patterns are decided. While dependency and World
407
Systems theory have been valuable in directing attention to 
the 'effects' of international economic relations, their 
emphasis on these as main explanatory variables lead only 
to misguided analysis, ideological confusion and reactionary 
practice.
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